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Abstract
This thesis presents a novel market-based method, inspired by retail markets for resource
allocation in fully decentralised computational systems where agents are self-interested. The
posted oﬀer mechanism used requires no central or regional coordinator or complex ne-
gotiation strategies. The stability of outcome allocations, those at equilibrium, is analysed
and compared for three buyer behaviour models. The approach is scalable, robust and may
be tuned to achieve a range of desired outcome resource allocations. These include a bal-
anced load, allocations reﬂective of providers’ diﬀering capabilities and those appropriate to
heterogeneous buyer preferences over multiple attributes.
The behaviour of the approach is studied both game theoretically and in simulation, where
novel evolutionary market agents act on behalf of resource providing nodes to adaptively price
their resources over time in response to market conditions. Sellers competitively co-evolve
their oﬀers online without any need for global market information. This is shown to lead the
system to the game theoretically predicted outcome resource allocation when buyers’ decision
functions degrade gracefully. Additionally, allocations remain stable in the presence of small
changes in price and other more disruptive agents. The posted oﬀer model therefore appears
to be a useful mechanism for resource allocation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous
decentralised computational systems where nodes are self-interested. Furthermore, evolu-
tionary computation is shown to be a potential approach to realising self-interested adaptive
pricing behaviour under the assumption of private information present in the posted oﬀer
model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
One scenario of the future of computation populates the Internet with vast numbers of software agents
providing, trading, and using a rich variety of information goods and services in an open, free-market
economy.
Jeﬀrey Kephart, James Hanson and Jakka Sairamesh
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The environment within which information and computation systems operate is changing.
High bandwidth always-on communication channels are everywhere and telecommunications
infrastructure is continuing to be deregulated. This leads to opportunities for the creation
of vastly scalable computational platforms, built from generic and substitutable components.
As a result, organisations and individuals are increasingly ﬁnding themselves operating in
scenarios where they do not have full control or even full knowledge of key resources such
as network infrastructure, data provision and computational capacity. These are resources
which nonetheless remain vital to their continued successful operation and development.
In this context, paradigms are being created for the development and deployment of
massively distributed computational and business systems, which enable resources to span
many locations, organisations and platforms, connected through the Internet. Grid [5], cloud
[6] and service oriented [7] computing are examples of such paradigms. Due to their ﬂexibility
and scalability, approaches which construct systems from generic distributed components are
becoming highly prominent in both distributed computing and e-commerce [8].
In order for any organisation to work successfully within such a computational ecosys-
tem, there is a need to ﬁnd novel ways to manage, control and understand these highly
complex distributed systems. Research has now begun to look towards socially and econom-
ically inspired agent-based systems to manage the allocation of distributed components in a
necessarily dynamic environment [6, 7]. This thesis aims to contribute to this approach.
1.1 Scenario
Future distributed, decentralised computational paradigms envisage vast numbers of software
agents, representing resource providers and users as they arrive, organise and dissipate, and
computational capabilities are formed and reformed as needed, without reference to a central
authority or coordinator. It is predicted [9] that in supporting this, the Internet will evolve
into a space in which these agents will engage in a market economy, trading for a wide range
of generic computational resources. Indeed, as the Internet matures, it is predicted that the
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majority of traﬃc it carries will be generated by autonomous agents, acting on behalf of their
owners [10]. Such distributed systems are considered in this thesis in the broadest sense, as
systems where there exists an amount of work or resource to be distributed about a network
of nodes. However, no single agent is expected to have either full control or knowledge of the
system as a whole. As these systems continue to be developed, there is a need to ﬁnd novel
ways to understand and autonomically manage and control them [11]. As part of this, there
remains the problem of how such resources can or should be allocated amongst the nodes
[12].
From an engineering perspective, any resource allocation problem will have a set of objec-
tives: a desired allocation or outcome. A common example of this is a balanced load, where
the task of providing a resource is shared evenly between a group of nodes. More complex
objectives may involve stable, uneven allocations, where account is taken of other factors.
Such factors might include users’ preferences over quality of service issues, underlying costs
to the resource provider, or diﬀerences in the capability of nodes to provide an equivalent
resource. The ability to allocate resources in a desired conﬁguration, in a scalable and robust
manner, is essential.
In many systems, nodes are either assumed or designed to be self-interested, each wishing
for example to maximise its allocation or perform its assigned task as fast as possible without
regard for other tasks. In these cases, either the total demand for a resource may exceed its
total supply or else the unrestricted use of resources regardless of task prioritisation can neg-
atively aﬀect overall performance. The allocation of resources to individuals in the presence
of such scarcity is the classic problem studied by economics. In the human world, building
on the simple idea of bilateral exchange, it is often approached using the structure and rules
of a market, and its tool, price.
Markets can also be used in settings where it is impractical or unwanted to associate
monetary payment with the resource allocation process. Indeed, market-based control is a
broad approach to resource allocation in a wide range of real world applications [13]. In these
scenarios, artiﬁcially created markets and pricing can enable stable, eﬃcient, self-organising
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resource allocation to be achieved. Where resources can be treated as interchangeable com-
modities able to be provided by anyone, market economies can be used to allocate such
resources when individuals’ decisions are self-interested [14].
However, the market mechanisms employed in these systems to date, though operating
in a distributed manner, often rely upon some form of central or regional coordination or
control, such as an auctioneer, specialist, or set of super-nodes [15]. It is likely that this lack of
full decentralisation leads to unfulﬁlled potential in terms of both scalability and robustness
to failure. Alternatives, such as those approaches which rely on agents’ ability to negotiate
bilaterally are promising options, however often rely on the complex cognitive ability of agents
or highly developed strategies. This will add an additional computational overhead at each
node, which may be avoidable. This thesis considers a further less studied alternative, that
of the retail-inspired posted oﬀer market mechanism. The posted oﬀer mechanism was ﬁrst
described by economists studying large retail stores, in which prices are ﬁxed by the sellers
and publicly announced. Buyers subsequently choose how much to buy, and from whom,
based on these posted prices. The mechanism is used widely in human markets, especially
where large numbers of buyers value resources similarly. It also has the advantages of being
simple to understand and implement, as well as requiring little computational overhead on
the part of participants.
1.2 Overarching Research Questions
This thesis is concerned with two overarching research questions:
• How do posted oﬀer markets allocate resources in decentralised computational systems
consisting of self-interested individuals? More speciﬁcally, what can we say about what
outcomes to expect from employing them and what gaps, if any exist between ideal
cases and reality?
• How can we design software agents which perform well in such systems, in order to
achieve their objectives and in doing so give rise to the predicted global outcomes?
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These questions are studied in an abstract model of a decentralised computational system
consisting of resource providing and resource using nodes. Analysis is performed with a view
to obtaining desired global outcomes, brought about by the interactions between the self-
interested nodes. Dependent on the behaviour and properties of the nodes, interesting and
useful outcomes can be predicted. These include the load being evenly balanced across the
network, resources allocated according to nodes’ capabilities and resources being provided
with attributes appropriate to the preferences and demands of the users. Throughout, the
impact of diﬀerent and heterogeneous node behaviours and capabilities are considered, and
experimental results additionally provide evidence of robustness and scalability.
Using a range of example scenarios, obtainable outcome resource allocations are described
game theoretically, with reference to classic economic models such as Bertrand competition.
Furthermore evolutionary market agents are developed, which enable the demonstration of
these outcome allocations using evolutionary simulations of agents’ interactions. Unlike the
game theoretic analyses, these simulations replicate more accurately the assumptions of in-
complete and private information present in real world embodiments of the model. Where
diﬀerences exist between the outcomes in the theoretical and simulation results, analysis is
provided to explain why this is the case, and what if anything may be done to mitigate against
it.
This exciting topic is by its very nature interdisciplinary. Whilst the application area is
ﬁrmly rooted in computing, the processes and techniques involved draw heavily from eco-
nomics and evolutionary biology. An introduction to relevant concepts is also therefore
provided.
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
The major contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• The description of a novel method of allocating resources in fully decentralised com-
putational systems using self-interested agents. The approach does not rely on any
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central or regional coordinating node, nor complex strategic reasoning on the part of
participating agents.
• A method for and examples of game theoretic analysis of the mechanism, describing
how equilibria and hence resulting outcome resource allocations may be predicted,
given a particular population of agents.
• A description of how to use the approach in order to obtain an evenly balanced load
across a decentralised network of resource providing nodes, in the absence of central
coordination or cooperation.
• An analytical method for determining parameters for the system in order to bring about
additional desired global outcome resource allocations.
• A novel agent strategy, which makes use of evolutionary computation to adaptively
price resources over time and is capable of achieving the predicted outcome allocations
using only private information.
• An extension to the approach, grounded in decision theory, which permits resources to
be described over multiple quality attributes. Analysis demonstrating that the extended
approach leads to resources being provided with quality of service attributes determined
appropriately and proportionally to a heterogeneous population of users.
• A comparison of the performance of the mechanism when user agents are endowed
with a range of diﬀerent decision making behaviours.
As was described in publications arising from this thesis [1, 2, 3], the method presented here
joins only two other families of market-based approaches for achieving resource allocation
under the assumption of self-interest in fully decentralised systems with no central or regional
coordination. The alternatives, either using bilateral negotiation or provider nodes hosting
their own auctions, require a larger degree of complex strategic reasoning, particularly on
the part of resource users’ agents in order to perform well. The approach presented in this
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thesis does not require users to use such complex agents; considerably simpler strategies are
shown to be suﬃcient in many cases.
Additionally, the line of questioning taken in this thesis departs from those employed in
developing traditional market-based control methods, in that it focuses on the achievement
of particular stable outcome resource allocations as the desired objective. Three particular
types of objective are studied:
• A balanced load, where each node provides an equivalent quantity of the resource to
its users;
• Additional stable uneven allocations, where the quantity provided by each node may
be tuned according to parameters; and
• Resources with heterogeneous quality attributes provided such that the quality attributes
are determined automatically in order to suit the demands of a heterogeneous popula-
tion of users.
Throughout the thesis, a methodological approach inspired by Kephart et al. [9] is taken.
For each type of objective, ﬁrstly the behaviour of myoptimal agents is investigated, that is
those able to accurately optimise their behaviour based on the current state of the environ-
ment. Subsequently the key assumption required for myoptimal behaviour, of full knowledge
of the current state of the environment is relaxed, and agents instead take an evolutionary ap-
proach, making use of only private information. The resulting behaviour of each is compared
and commonalities and diﬀerences are highlighted. As will be shown, the ﬁrst approach is
typically only feasible in very small systems, where the environment is suﬃciently simple to
allow an agent’s behaviour to be optimised in real time with respect to its expected payoﬀ.
Since the evolutionary approach makes use of only private information, such global optimi-
sation of behaviour is not required. Therefore much larger and more complex scenarios are
able to be considered in this case.
7
1.4 Overview of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the problem of
resource allocation in decentralised computational systems, and discusses why parallels can
be drawn between such systems and social and economic ones. A number of existing classical
and market-based approaches are reviewed, highlighting why the development of a new ap-
proach is valuable for use in systems with self-interested participants and no central control
or coordination. In chapter 3 a resource allocation model, the problem to be studied is for-
mulated, based on the motivating scenario. The fully decentralised market-based approach is
described here and user behaviours to be investigated are also introduced. Initial game the-
oretic analysis of the expected behaviour of the system is presented for each user behaviour,
illustrating how a balanced load may be achieved when provider agents are myoptimal. Chap-
ter 4 relaxes the assumption of complete knowledge required by myoptimal agents and instead
presents the evolutionary market agent algorithm, which requires only private information. The
analysis is then extended to examine the impact of this on the system, and a load balanced
outcome is demonstrated in simulation. Results on scalability and mixed buyer populations
are also presented in this context. Chapter 5 extends the model to consider heterogeneous
provider node capabilities by taking into account diﬀering costs of resource provision and
nodes’ private valuations. Both the analytical method from chapter 3 and the evolutionary
simulations from chapter 4 are employed in order to predict and design for a variety of addi-
tional outcome resource allocations. Chapters 6 and 7 consider a further and highly realistic
extension to the model, which accounts for resources that are described over multiple quality
attributes. A description of how agents’ decision making processes can also be extended to
account for this is presented, based on multi-attribute utility theory. This extension provides
a qualitative diﬀerence in terms of the diﬃculty of the problem studied, as competition is
no longer conducted on price alone. Game theoretic analysis and evolutionary simulations
are again employed in order to predict and demonstrate stable outcome resource allocations,
under a variety of behavioural conditions. Additionally, the simulation results in chapter 7
highlight a dilemma faced by sellers represented by evolutionary market agents, brought about
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by the additional complexity of the multi-attribute extension. The dilemma is characterised
through further experimental results, and the impact of this on overall system performance
is quantiﬁed. Finally, chapter 8 concludes the thesis by reviewing the contributions of the
preceding chapters and discussing future prospects and directions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMICS OF COMPUTATIONAL
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Some of the owner men were kind because they hated what they had to do, and some of them were angry
because they hated to be cruel, and some of them were cold because they had long ago found that one could
not be an owner unless one were cold. And all of them were caught in something larger than themselves.
Some of them hated the mathematics that drove them, and some were afraid, and some worshipped the
mathematics because it provided a refuge from thought and from feeling. If a bank or ﬁnance company
owned the land, the owner man said: The Bank - or the Company - needs - wants - insists - must have - as
though the Bank or the Company were a monster, with thought and feeling, which had ensnared them.
These last would take no responsibility for the banks or the companies because they were men and slaves,
while the banks were machines and masters all at the same time. Some of the owner men were a little
proud to be slaves to such cold and powerful masters.
John Steinbeck
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This chapter provides an introduction to the problem of computational resource allocation
and a review of previous solutions. After identifying common ground between decentralised
computational systems and economic systems, the application of economic principles to the
allocation of resources in such systems is considered and existing approaches discussed. In
particular, two broad families of market-based control approaches are identiﬁed, those which
use auctions and those which rely on bilateral bargaining. A third promising but less well
understood approach is described, based on retail markets, and reasons are highlighted why,
from the perspective of simplicity this is an attractive option. The small amount of existing
work applying this mechanism to resource allocation is discussed, along with some prior
methodology, speciﬁcally the use of evolutionary computation and game theoretic analyses.
Considerable scope is shown for research in applying these techniques to better understand
how the approach may be deployed in solving computational resource allocation problems.
This thesis in general and this chapter in particular assume no prior expert knowledge of
economics, and as such an accessible introduction to relevant concepts is provided. Addi-
tionally, a brief introduction is given to other key concepts relied upon in the thesis, including
game theory, agents and evolutionary computation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 introduces and motivates the family of com-
putational resource allocation problems, with reference to relevant technologies including
grid, cloud and service oriented computing. Previous centralised solutions are described,
along with issues which arise from the use of centralisation and potential decentralised alter-
natives. A discussion is also presented in this section on the diﬀerences between cooperative,
non-cooperative and self-interested node behaviour. Section 2.2 describes why the systems in
which this thesis is interested may, under certain conditions, be thought of as having much in
common with economies; parallels are drawn between resource allocation in computational
systems and the human world. This section also introduces some important concepts from
economics which are relied upon in subsequent chapters, including game theory. Section
2.3 looks in more detail at how economics has previously been applied to computational
resource allocation and reviews the families of approaches which currently exist. A case is
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made for the further study of the applicability and impact of the posted oﬀer market mech-
anism. Section 2.4 discusses a particular problem to emerge from the use of the posted oﬀer
model, that of adaptive pricing by sellers, and again existing approaches to this problem are
discussed. Finally, section 2.5 concludes with a summary of the chapter, drawing conclusions
and highlighting why the work presented in this thesis is needed.
2.1 Computational Resource Allocation
Since the earliest days of computers, people have sought to apply them to the solving of
large and complex problems. Indeed, computers’ ability to solve large problems have brought
beneﬁts to humanity in ﬁelds as wide ranging as chess playing [16] and protein folding [17],
amongst many others. However, key to the continued ability to apply computers to these kinds
of problems is ﬁnding ways to enable them to scale massively, while remaining accessible to
those who might use them. For example, it could be argued that the requirement either to
own a supercomputer such as Deep Blue or have the funds and specialist knowledge to build
a distributed platform such as that used by the Protein@Home project reduces accessibility.
Grid computing is one technology which attempts to address this. By providing a standard
way to access computing power on tap, a grid platform allows users to run very large generic
programs, distributed over many computational nodes [5]. Related technologies such as cloud
computing [6] enable a similar standard means of access to potentially unbounded scalable
computing, while service oriented architectures [7] provide a framework for distributed com-
putational resources to be componentised and packaged up, such that distributed applications
may be constructed from loosely coupled components.
Given such a range of approaches to scaling up computational capabilities, it is not sur-
prising that computational resource allocation in such systems is not a single well deﬁned
problem. Instead, it is perhaps best described as a family of problems, each speciﬁc to the
particular embodiment, but with much in common. At its heart however, the problem of
computational resource allocation can be stated as follows: how should computational re-
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sources be made available to users, such as to achieve the objectives of the resource providing
nodes, the users and the system overall? It is important to note here that the term user does
not apply solely to an end user of a computer system or their processes, but also to any
component which requires the use of a resource from a providing node.
In order to answer this question for a particular system, it is of course necessary to
possess some further understanding of what is required. Does the how in the question refer
to a particular outcome or endpoint, or perhaps instead a governing process, a set of rules or
parameters to which the allocation must conform? Many approaches [12] focus on fairness and
eﬃciency as global objectives. Furthermore, what are the objectives of the resource providing
nodes and users? Are the providing nodes’ objectives aligned, and do they align with the
objective for the behaviour of the system as a whole, if one exists? If there is a conﬂict or
tradeoﬀ in achieving the objectives, how are these to be resolved?
In order to gain some perspective on these issues, it is interesting to consider Foster
and Kesselman’s [5] characterisation of computer systems as they scale. They note that in
simple single end machine systems, resource allocation is typically dealt with at the operating
system level, by a kernel or similar program which has absolute control over the resources
in the machine. This enables it to achieve a tightly integrated system, but also provides
a bottleneck, as resource requests must be fed through the kernel in order to be assigned.
In clusters, many individual machines can communicate through message passing and ﬁle
systems. Here increased scale is obtained at the expense of integration, as homogeneous
nodes are controlled by a single machine responsible for job allocation. Larger still, intranets
are characterised more by heterogeneity of nodes, which may be under administrative control
of separate entities. Nodes may have diﬀerent policies for use of their resources, diﬀerent
external demands and diﬀerent capabilities. Here issues exist with regard to the availability
of global knowledge. Nodes may attempt to map out the computing environment in order to
plan the best use of resources, though the size and dynamic nature of such networks means
that any one node is unlikely to have an accurate view of the system’s current state [5]. The
ﬁnal category considered by Foster and Kesselman is perhaps the most interesting, that of
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internets. These forms of network span many organisations, locations and platforms and are
large and heterogeneous. Here there is no central control and often no global objective with
regard to resource allocation.
Nevertheless, the Internet provides the most potential when considering future approaches
to massively scalable computing systems [12] and indeed the Folding@Home project [17] is an
early example of this. However, Lai [12] argues that in achieving the goal of harnessing the
scale of the Internet in order to provide accessible, generic computing platforms on a vast
scale, resource allocation remains a problem.
2.1.1 Centralised Approaches
Classically, resource allocation objectives are achieved in a centralised manner, often rely-
ing on a single node responsible for, say, load balancing [18]. A balanced load, though by
no means the only interesting outcome, can be used as an example of a desired resource
allocation, an objective against which a particular approach to resource allocation may be
tested. Load balancing is additionally in itself interesting, since it is useful in numerous real
world scenarios, including telecommunications networks, road networks and electricity and
water distribution networks. In many of these domains, even in very large scale systems,
centralisation is the usual approach taken [18].
Resource allocation techniques can be divided into two groups, stateless and state-based
[19]. Perhaps the most widely known and easily understood stateless approach, used to balance
the load on web servers, is round-robin DNS. A more complex example is proportional share
scheduling [12], in which resources are allocated to jobs according to a set of pre-determined
weights. However, stateless approaches such as this are unable to take account of current
server load or availability, leading to no guarantee that the desired outcome is achieved.
Simple state-based extensions permit the usage of information about the resources being
managed, and enable the proximity to the desired allocation to be measured. Examples of
state-based resource allocation approaches include those which make use of geographical
information and previous usage levels in order to determine an appropriate allocation of
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resource. A useful review and comparison of these approaches in the web server domain may
be found in [19].
2.1.2 Problems with Centralised Approaches
Centralised resource allocation methods do however have a number of drawbacks [20]. These
include:
• the requirement that the environment remain static while the central coordinator is
calculating the optimal resource allocation,
• that the coordinator has global knowledge of the system and all nodes within it,
• that all coordination messages must route through the central point, counteracting the
beneﬁt from having resources distributed about the network, reducing scalability [21]
and creating a fundamentally brittle system [22].
The Internet in particular is a dynamic network, where the ﬁrst two requirements are
highly unlikely to be met [5]. Brittleness may be mitigated against to a certain degree, by
introducing backup coordinator nodes, however even in these cases the wider system is reliant
upon the existence and performance of a small number of key nodes. Failure at these key
points in the network may well cripple wider functionality, at best [23].
2.1.3 Decentralised Approaches
These drawbacks lead to the need for a truly decentralised approach to the allocation of
resources that does not rely on a central coordinator [20]. In the ﬁeld of grid computing,
examples include Cao et al.’s [24] hierarchical approach, and TURBO [21]. In the latter,
allocations are achieved through the reliance on altruistic behaviour between cooperating
peers, which collaborate in order to reach a global objective.
Balanced overlay networks [25] are another eﬀective and generic technique for balancing
a load across a decentralised network. In this approach, resource providing nodes present
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an estimation of their availability to other local nodes to which they are connected. Newly
arriving jobs take a random walk through the network and select the providing node with
the highest availability. Upon accepting and completing a job, a provider node updates its
availability estimate.
In decentralised peer-to-peer storage systems Surana et al.’s [26] approach may also be
used. Here the case is considered when moving loads around the network also uses band-
width. Their objective is therefore a balance between achieving an even load and minimising
the amount of load moved. Their fully decentralised approach is, in eﬀect, tantamount to
performing a centralised calculation at each node, periodically requiring cooperative reas-
signment of a load, based on global knowledge of the system.
2.1.4 Cooperation, Non-Cooperation and Self-Interest
Critically however, previous decentralised approaches either rely on nodes’ having complete
global knowledge, or else cooperating to some extent in order to reach a shared objective [27].
As an example of this, in balanced overlay networks [25] resource users are self-interested
within the bounds of the providers observed within their random walk, though the providers
themselves are relied upon both to provide an honest and accurate account of their availability
and to facilitate the random walk by exposing their local connections. In the case where
such cooperation may not be relied upon, it is likely that the system’s performance would
deteriorate signiﬁcantly. Similarly, Surana et al.’s [26] approach assumes both cooperation
between nodes and global knowledge of the system.
A non-cooperative, decentralised approach to resource allocation does exist in the domain
of downloading replicated ﬁles. Dynamic parallel access schemes [28, 29] make use of self-
interested smart clients to increase the speed of ﬁle downloads. It is not clear however, how
this approach might be generalised to other service-based systems.
Buyya et al. [27] argue that we may not always be able to rely on cooperation between
nodes, for several reasons. Amongst these are the possibility that a node behaves erroneously,
perhaps due to a software or hardware error such as a virus, unforeseen circumstances or an
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external fault. Large systems are also likely to be noisy systems, as data is lost or corrupted in
transit and the likelihood of measurements being inaccurate or misreported increases. Finally,
limits on and delays in information transmission mean that nodes’ actions may be misguided
or insuﬃcient. Crucially, Khan and Ahmad [30] show that in any decentralised cooperative
approach, global optima can only be achieved when all the nodes cooperate. It is for these
reasons that this thesis looks towards an approach which does not rely on the cooperation of
nodes.
Some confusion does exist within the literature however in the treatment of the terms
non-cooperative and self-interested. It is important to note that non-cooperation does not
imply self-interest. Indeed, in Khan and Ahmad’s [30] study of various games-based resource
allocation methods, they describe a model in which non-cooperative agents bid for jobs based
on an honest estimation of the estimated time to complete a job. Their agents, though not
cooperating, act without consideration of the beneﬁt they expect to derive from their actions.
Clearly, such a consideration is a prerequisite for self-interested behaviour and hence the
behaviour they describe is not self-interested.
Indeed, it is the assumption that an agent will behave either cooperatively or non-cooperatively,
regardless of its predicament, that is at odds with self-interest. A self-interested agent may
behave either cooperatively or non-cooperatively at certain times. The key factor is that this
decision will be made by the agent, based on whether it is in its own perceived interest to
do so. In making this decision, the agent must therefore consider the beneﬁt it expects to
gain from the options with which it is faced. If it does not, it cannot be said to be truly
self-interested.
Therefore, when considering systems where nodes are owned or administered by separate
parties, such as the very large distributed systems discussed by Foster and Kesselman [5],
rather than consider agents on a cooperative / non-cooperative spectrum, it may instead be
more useful to know whether or not an agent is self-interested. If it is possible to assume
this of nodes, then as will be discussed in the following sections, the models and tools of
economics allow for a great deal of progress to be made.
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2.2 Related Economics
When selecting components with which to compose an application in a service oriented
architecture, or when deciding where to send an image processing task on a computational
grid, appropriate resources may be available from a number of providing nodes. Similarly,
large numbers of users may ﬁnd themselves competing for access to the best resources, or a
resource at a time more suited to their needs. If individual users and providers are acting
in a self-interested manner, then the resulting interactions may be thought of as being an
economy [13].
Indeed, large computer networks such as the Internet, made up of heterogeneous indi-
viduals with independent objectives can quite rightly be viewed as social networks as well as
purely digital ones. It is perhaps of little surprise then that a social science such as economics
might be useful in solving a problem such as decentralised computational resource allocation,
since economics itself is concerned with the allocation of resources between individuals with
diﬀerent objectives in human societies. Therefore, in computational networks that are social,
to what extent can economic theory be called upon in order to predict, and hopefully design
the resource allocation behaviour of complex computational systems, where individual nodes
are self-interested?
It is perhaps useful at this stage to present and deﬁne some relevant terminology, which is
used throughout this thesis. Firstly, according to Begg et al. [31] economics is “how [a] society
resolves the problem of scarcity” (p3). Furthermore, they state that “a resource is scarce if the
demand at a zero price would exceed the available supply” (p5). This is exactly the scenario
with which we are faced in the computational resource allocation problem. How then do
humans attempt to solve it?
There have of course been a number of diﬀerent approaches to this problem in human
history, but one which is particularly dominant is the use of markets. Rothbard [32] describes
a free market as “an array of exchanges that take place in society. Each exchange is undertaken
as a voluntary agreement between two people or between groups of people represented by
agents”. Similarly, Begg et al. [31] deﬁne a market as “a set of arrangements by which buyers
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and sellers are in contact to exchange goods or services” (p32). The important factors here
are that there is an exchange between two or more individuals, and that this exchange is
voluntarily entered into by all participants.
In order to facilitate such exchanges, a particular type of good is often agreed to serve
as currency, in which case the individual giving away currency in order to obtain another
good is termed the buyer, while that which receives the currency and gives away the other
good is termed the seller. It is of course not required that this formal delineation be present,
though it has been argued [33] that an economy will evolve towards common agreement on a
particular good to treat as currency, typically that which the individuals ﬁnd easiest to retain
and exchange widely without additional cost.
A mechanism through which voluntary exchanges between individuals are facilitated is
called an auction, and though the rules for these can also emerge naturally in economies,
the earliest theoretical description of an auction is given by Walras [34]. This Walrasian
auction posits an auctioneer with full access to the participants’ demand for a good at each
possible price. The auctioneer is then able to calculate a single optimal price at which the
exchanges take place, such that the quantity of the good supplied exactly matches the quantity
demanded.
Mathematical micro-economic theory treats an economic system as being akin to a phys-
ical system, possessing a current state and forces acting upon it [34, 35]. Such a system has
one or more equilibrium points, towards which in the absence of restrictive forces, the system
will drift. At these equilibria, the system is at rest. Smith [36] ﬁrst postulated that what he
called an invisible hand would drive an unrestricted market economy towards greater pros-
perity, that free and voluntary actions of self-interested individuals leads to greater overall
well-being.
This argument was reﬁned by Walras and Pareto, who proposed a century later that
through the perfect Walrasian auction, an economy will reach a Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium
point [34]. At this stage, no individual may be made better oﬀ without making at least one
other individual worse oﬀ. In reality however, due to either imposed or unavoidable barriers
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to free exchange, additional costs associated with performing a transaction, an imperfection
in the ability of the auctioneer, or simply the cost associated with the time an auction may
take, such perfect Walrasian auctions are often an unrealistic theoretical ideal [35].
A number of more realistic auction mechanisms exist in the real world, including the
common English auction, found amongst other places on Ebay [37]; the Dutch auction; Vickrey
auction and Continuous Double Auction, often used in ﬁnancial markets. Cliﬀ [38] gives a
useful introduction to and critique of several auction mechanisms, including those listed here,
while Friedman and Rust [39] provide a more detailed look at the Continuous Double Auction.
Purely electronic markets also make use of a range of auction mechanisms. In designing
a mechanism, the aim is typically to achieve an eﬃcient system overall, by making use of
the self-interested nature of individuals. This is demonstrated by Phelps et al. [40], Byde [41]
and David et al. [42] amongst others. For many, the ultimate aim of such research is the
automation of the mechanism’s design, appropriate to individual scenarios [43, 44, 45, 46].
Taking Cliﬀ’s [46] work as an example of this, a parametrised mechanism design space is
speciﬁed, which may be searched in order to ﬁnd high performing mechanisms for speciﬁc
scenarios. Results from an evolutionary search demonstrate that classic, human-designed
mechanisms are often far from optimal.
Importantly, though this thesis most certainly does not take a view on the applicability
or ethics of Rothbard’s [32] views or conclusions for human society at large, the Austrian
School to which he belonged, along with the earlier Lausanne school, have long advanced the
tradition of a mathematical, logical approach to economics, which is useful in this particular
domain. In particular, the methodology of determining the outcome of economic activity
as the product of interacting self-interested agents provides us with a highly useful tool.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the application of economic theory to the design and
analysis of computational systems has little to do with human economies, and mechanisms
which work well in the engineering domain cannot be assumed to transfer value free to human
society.
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2.2.1 Utility and Rationality
One of the key ideas in economic theory is that of utility, the concept of relative satisfaction
[34]. An individual, when faced with a choice between two or more alternatives, may assign
each alternative a utility, allowing the alternatives to be compared with respect to each other.
This way, economic decisions may be made and a self-interested individual may be described
as being utility maximising, a term used often synonymously with economic rationality. This
gives us the assumption that a rational self-interested individual will always make choices
which maximise their own utility.
In human economics, the assumption of perfect rational utility maximising behaviour is
a blunt instrument, and Simon [47] amongst others claims that in reality psychology, cogni-
tive capacity and other factors produced by evolution will come in to play. This led to the
development of the theory of bounded rationality, the idea that individuals act to maximise
their individual utility within some constraints. These might be a lack of capacity to calculate
the best action to take at a given time, a lack of full information concerning all the options
available or any number of other factors. Indeed, Simon questions [47] whether full economic
rationality would be indeed be evolutionarily optimal at all.
On a macro-economic scale this criticism is sometimes retorted by the as if argument
popularised by Friedman [48]. This argument contends that though humans’ decision making
may well be bounded, random or indeed on occasions appearing purposefully economically
irrational, when viewed on mass, humans behave as if they are indeed utility maximising. This
debate continues amongst economists, however for the purposes of the design of economics
inspired computational systems, it is merely helpful to be aware of the arguments surrounding
individual economic decision making, especially as we will see later, with regard to the impact
of diﬀerent behaviours on global outcomes.
However, utility is by its nature subjective. Indeed, the concept of a scalar value for
utility, the util was originally proposed as a unit of psychological measurement to enable the
comparison of utility between individuals [35]. This approach was quickly discarded, since
though it makes sense to consider whether Alice likes apples more than she likes bananas,
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it is meaningless to conceive of whether she likes apples more than Bob likes bananas. In
modern economic theory, utility is more commonly thought of as an expression of relative
preference by an individual between alternatives. These preferences may be denoted by means
of ordinal or cardinal utility, the former of which records merely the order of preference
between alternatives, while the latter attempts to place comparable numerical values on the
alternatives. Care must be taken however when using cardinal utility, since the temptation can
easily arise to assume that operations on cardinal utility values imply more than they are able
to meaningfully convey. In practice, this means that the values represented by cardinal utility
preserve preference orderings up to positive linear transformations [34]. Though cardinal
utility does not provide a means of comparing satisfaction between individuals, it can be
useful in individual agents’ decision making processes.
Indeed, elements of decision theory build upon cardinal utility in order reason about
tradeoﬀs between relative preferences and values. Keeney and Raiﬀa [49] in particular argue
that utility models can be constructed to represent humans’ preferences, and that these can be
useful in aiding decisions in complex practical situations. Of course, many decisions require
the consideration of numerous objectives, costs and the tradeoﬀs between them, and this is
where approaches they advocate such as multi-attribute utility theory are particularly useful.
2.2.2 Relevant Game Theory
As with any discipline, economics has its tools of the trade, and one of the most important
and useful of such tools in micro-economics is game theory. In essence, a game is what occurs
whenever two or more rational individuals interact, and game theory is concerned with how
the outcomes of these interactions relate to the individuals’ preferences and the structure of
the game [50]. Game theory was formally deﬁned when Von Neumann and Morgenstern [51]
published their seminal book in 1944, and subsequently developed throughout the 1950’s by
many others, including most notably Nash [52].
However, examples of what became known as game theory have existed in speciﬁc in-
stances throughout history. Perhaps the most important of these were the early models of
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economic competition due to Cournot and Bertrand [53]. As far back as 1883, Cournot
proposed that ﬁrms1 producing equivalent goods, each knowing what price they can obtain
for their good in the market, compete by making decisions about the quantity of the good to
produce. Crucially, Cournot considered that ﬁrms act independently of each other, act strate-
gically and seek to maximise their proﬁt when making their decisions about what quantity of
the good to produce. This is perhaps one of the ﬁrst examples of analysis of the interactions
of self-interested strategic individuals and resultant eﬀects.
Bertrand [53] responded to Cournot by noting that the law of one price does not always
hold, and therefore one ﬁrm may indeed lower the price it charges for the good and in doing
so capture the entire market. By increasing the quantity it sells, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt would be sure
to increase also. However, Bertrand further observed that a competing ﬁrm would, when
acting rationally, respond to this by reducing the price it charged in turn. In doing so, it
would expect to capture the entire market and increase its payoﬀ. The other ﬁrm responds in
kind, and so a price war begins, as ﬁrms compete to supply the entire market, by undercutting
the other’s price in turn. The outcome of this, predicted by Bertrand, would be that both
sellers reduce their prices as much as they can bear. Assuming that the ﬁrms have equivalent
costs, then they would reach an equilibrium when they were both charging their cost price.
At this stage, neither seller can increase its payoﬀ by unilaterally changing its decision. This
is the Bertrand equilibrium [34], and complements an equilibrium discovered through similar
analysis by Cournot in his model.
The framework provided by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [51] allows competitive games
of this type to be described and reasoned about in a principled way. They claim that a game
can be completely described in terms of the following pieces of information:
• The players of the game;
• For every player, every opportunity they have to move (make a decision);
• What each player can do at each move (their options);
1In economic literature sellers are sometimes referred to as ﬁrms.
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• What each player knows at each move; and
• The payoﬀs received by each player for every combination of moves.
Each player is therefore faced with one or more decisions, and given the payoﬀ structure
of the game and the knowledge available at each decision point, is assumed to act such as to
maximise its payoﬀ. The actions a particular player takes at each decision point are deﬁned
by the player’s strategy. A strategy can then be thought of as a set of rules which deﬁnes the
player’s actions, in any and all circumstances which may arise during the game. A strategy
therefore deﬁnes a player’s entire behaviour.
This is perhaps best illustrated by the canonical example of a game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
[54]. In this idealised game, two individuals are in police custody on suspicion of having
committed a crime and are separately questioned. Each is assumed to value their own freedom
beyond that of their accomplice, and is therefore faced with a dilemma. Each player can either
cooperate with the other by keeping silent, or else defect by providing a statement that the other
player is guilty. Here we have the players of the game and the opportunities they have to move.
In this particular game, both players also know nothing about the other’s action, since their
decisions are made simultaneously in isolation.
The prosecutor, who sets the structure of the game, provides the players with information
concerning their payoﬀs for each action. These are best presented through a payoﬀ matrix,
an example of which is shown in ﬁgure 2.1. Here, the numbers represent the number of years
in prison the player will be sentenced to, in each case. The values are negative, since strictly
this is a payoﬀ matrix, and the payoﬀ associated with increasing time in prison is certainly
increasingly negative. The payoﬀ values are shown for the row player, here player 1. Since
the game is symmetric, the same is true in reverse, and only one value needs to be shown in
each space in the table. In this example, if both players were to defect and provide evidence
to convict their accomplice, then each would receive ﬁve years in prison, since they would be
found guilty, but had also pleaded guilty to the crime. If both players were to cooperate by
staying silent, then each would receive one year in prison on minor charges only. However, if
player 1 were to defect, but player 2 cooperated, then player 1 is allowed to go free for assisting
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Player 2
Player 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate -1 -10
Defect 0 -5
Figure 2.1: Sample payoﬀ matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Player 2
Player 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R S
Defect T P
Figure 2.2: Generalised payoﬀ matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
the authorities in their investigations, but player 2 is punished with ten years in prison, since
he is both found guilty and refused to confess. The reverse is true if player 1 cooperates but
player 2 defects.
More generally, the payoﬀs for a game to be considered to be the Prisoner’s Dilemma
are as given in ﬁgure 2.2, where R is the reward for cooperation, P is the punishment for
defection, T is the temptation to defect, and S is the sucker’s payoﬀ, if the player cooperates
and the other defects. These must be structured such that T > R > P > S.
In reasoning through a player’s actions, it is clear that regardless of the opponent’s choice,
the rational choice is always to defect, since T > R and P > S. Since this is true for
both players, both will defect and neither could have done better by doing otherwise. This
illustrates the concept of a Nash equilibrium, a strategy proﬁle from which neither player may
unilaterally deviate in order to increase his payoﬀ [52]. In this particular case, defection is also
a dominant strategy, since whatever the opponent were to do, it always remains the rational
choice.
This is clear, however what is less so is the behaviour of rational players when the game
is repeated [54, 55]. In the repeated case n rounds of the game are played, where n > 1 and
an additional constraint is added to the payoﬀs, that 2R > T + S. Each player is able to
remember the actions of his opponent between rounds, and a player’s payoﬀ is the sum of
the payoﬀs gained in each round. Here, due to backwards induction, the Nash equilibrium is
26
still for each player to defect in every round [54], though since nP < nR this does not give
rise to the highest achievable payoﬀ for either player.
Since the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma was ﬁrst proposed by Axelrod [54], numerous con-
tributions have been made to understanding the dynamics of the game in evolutionary models,
on networks and with greater numbers of players and choices [55]. Key to players’ obtaining
a higher payoﬀ is the achievement of a level of cooperation between them; their developing
an understanding with their opponent that they will not decide to defect but instead continue
to cooperate. The players forgo the higher short term temptation T , which would likely end
up in both receiving P , in exchange for a higher longer term payoﬀ, ideally nR.
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is relevant in economic games, particularly Bertrand
competition, since it shows how cooperation or collusion between self-interested individuals
can bring about a higher payoﬀ for each. Recall that the Bertrand equilibrium, which is
also a Nash equilibrium [34] occurs when self-interested sellers undercut each other’s price
in order to obtain a higher short term payoﬀ, leading to both sellers having no option but
to sell at their cost price. This is analogous to defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Cooperating sellers could instead choose to maintain higher prices, if they could be assured
of the cooperation of their competitors in doing the same.
In the majority of advanced market economies, such price-ﬁxing collusion is considered
illegal. Nevertheless, in oligopolies, markets where the number of sellers competing to pro-
vide a certain good is small, collusion may emerge implicitly simply by ﬁrms observing and
responding to each other’s actions. Cheung et al. [56] demonstrate this eﬀect, showing how
such implicit collusion may emerge naturally. Nevertheless, in markets with larger numbers
of sellers, this becomes increasingly less likely to occur.
The possibility of collusion between sellers allowing a market to remain away from a
competitive equilibrium is then a contribution that game theory makes to our understanding
of economic models. In larger markets, as discussed by Cheung et al. [56] this can be assumed
to not occur, but nevertheless it should be borne in mind especially in markets with smaller
numbers of sellers. Most importantly however, game theory allows us to reason about the
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interactions of self-interested individuals, and in doing so identify and predict outcomes for
a given economic system.
2.2.3 Agent Based Economic Modelling
An individual which performs an action in a particular situation is called an agent. In eco-
nomics, the term agent is used speciﬁcally to refer to an actor who makes individual decisions
within a model [34]. These decisions are typically expected to seek to maximise the agent’s
utility, within the constraints of their knowledge and ability. In this way, a rational economic
agent can be seen as being equivalent to a player in game theory. As has been discussed,
micro-economics in general and game theory in particular seeks to reason about the interac-
tions of such agents and therefore ﬁnd and predict outcomes in a given economic situation.
However, game theory does not scale well. Indeed, considering the combinations of agents’
actions and interactions in all but the smallest games quickly becomes exponentially hard. In
larger systems, macro-economic models have classically been dominant, since they account
not for individual agents, but instead attempt to model their aggregate behaviour [34].
However, an alternative to this which permits us to keep the interactions between indi-
vidual economic actors in consideration is to use computational agent-based simulation to
build generative models of economies from the ground up [57]. This approach is also applied
with success in other social sciences [58, 59]. Both in facilitating this and in acting in real
scenarios where situated agents act on behalf of humans, a further use of agent terminology,
the software agent has come into being. Wooldridge and Jennings [60] describe a software
agent as a being computer system in possession of (at least) autonomy, social ability, reactivity
and pro-activeness. More precisely, they specify an agent as being:
• Clearly identiﬁable problem solving entities with well-deﬁned boundaries and inter-
faces;
• Situated (embedded) in a particular environment - they receive inputs related to the
state of their environment through sensors and they act on the environment through
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eﬀectors;
• Designed to fulﬁl a speciﬁc purpose - they have particular objectives (goals) to achieve;
• Autonomous - they have control both over their internal state and over their own be-
haviour;
• Capable of exhibiting ﬂexible problem solving behaviour in pursuit of their design
objectives - they need to be both reactive (able to respond in a timely fashion to changes
that occur in their environment) and proactive (able to act in anticipation of future
goals).
Sengupta et al. [61] argue that traditional economic analysis has indeed not been very
successful in dealing with the complexity of markets with heterogeneous individuals. They
claim that agent-based models are much better suited to such complexity, and in addition
allow the modeller to focus on individuals’ behaviour, for example using psychological models
of consumer choice rather than purely statistical ones.
Multi-agent systems have also become a dominant paradigm for the design of distributed
systems [43], where individual components fulﬁl their own independent goals. Such systems
are often characterised by the conﬂicting objectives of agents, which must be resolved in order
to ﬁnd agreement. As we have seen, markets provide a mechanism by which individuals may
settle on a particular agreement, in this case an allocation of resources.
Software agents are therefore useful for two related reasons. Firstly, they may be assembled
into generative models of social and economic systems, through which results akin to those
obtained game theoretically may be obtained. And secondly, they may be embodied in the
software systems being modelled, as autonomous individuals, capable of acting in order to
further their goals. In the speciﬁc economic case, both sellers and buyers may be represented
in the a market by autonomous software agents.
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2.2.4 Evolutionary Approaches to Economic Games
As was discussed in section 2.2.2 above, a player’s behaviour in a game can be completely
speciﬁed by its strategy [50]. This deﬁnes the player’s behaviour in every and all possible
situations in which it may ﬁnd itself. In simple single round games such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, a strategy may be represented by a single bit of information which determines
whether the player cooperates or defects. However, in even moderately sized repeated games
and certainly in large ones, the strategy space, the domain which deﬁnes all possible strategies,
becomes unmanageably large.
Consider for example the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here a player has two choices in
each round. Therefore a player who takes no account of the actions of his opponent and
continues regardless might represent his strategy in terms of n bits, where n is the number
of rounds. A player who takes into account the previous round when making his decision
would instead have to consider what his action would be in 22 = 4 possible states. Taking
account the previous r rounds, the number of states is 4r [62]. If a player’s strategy consists of
a full set of rules, one for each of these possible states, then there are a possible 24r strategies
[62]. The size of the strategy space makes strategy acquisition for the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma an interesting problem. Furthermore, since the iterated version of the game has no
strategy which dominates all others [63], competing players are not faced with a static search
problem. This problem has lead to a large amount of literature, much of which was motivated
by computer based Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma competitions [63].
One approach which has proved eﬀective in tackling the problem of learning a high per-
forming strategy is evolutionary computation [55]. Evolutionary algorithms provide us with
the tools to be able to search for solutions to complex problems such as this, and including
those faced by economic agents. In the years since evolutionary computation was ﬁrst pio-
neered [64, 65, 66], a number of techniques have now matured, and have been applied to a
wide range of computational problems, including search, learning, optimisation, design and
game theoretic analysis [67, 68, 69]. As we might therefore expect, there is more than one
approach which could be employed here.
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In strategy acquisition, co-evolutionary learning has proved particularly eﬀective [15, 56,
59, 70] and theoretical work now exists which begins to quantify the expected generalised
performance of learnt strategies against unknown opponents [71, 72]. Co-evolution is an
extension of evolutionary computation in which the ﬁtness function is in part dependent
upon the actions of others [68]. Co-evolution has been used to learn strategies in repeated
games such as the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [63] and also to ﬁnd Nash Equilibria in games
with continuous strategy spaces [73].
Co-evolutionary learning algorithms can be divided into two key families, the Michigan
and Pittsburgh (or simply Pitt) approaches [74]. In the Michigan approach, the individuals
in the population consist of separate rules, which together form the complete strategy. Con-
versely, in the Pitt approach each individual in the population is itself a complete strategy.
Since rules are only tested as part of a whole strategy, the Pitt approach provides a convenient
mechanism for assessing strategies when compared with each other, whereas the Michigan
approach results in a diﬃcult problem of payoﬀ attribution. For this reason, Pitt-based algo-
rithms have been the more widely used, and are the most easily understood.
Pittsburgh co-evolutionary learning has much in common with evolutionary game theory, a
further tool used to analyse games. Though developed originally for use in biology [75], this
approach is now also used in economic scenarios [44, 40, 76, 77]. By allowing a population of
strategies to evolve, rewarding the most successful strategies by replicating them (potentially
with some mutation), while culling the least ﬁt strategies, evolutionary dominance and the
stability of certain strategy proﬁles may be explored. Vytelingum et al. [77] provide a useful
introduction to the applicability of evolutionary game theory to the analysis of agent-based
markets. They detail how populations of buyers and sellers can evolve towards the dominance
of certain strategies interacting through a continuous double auction. Kephart et al’s [9]
analysis of pricing behaviour uses a similar approach to analysing the dynamics of a simple
market.
However, the issue of exponential growth of the strategy search space is fundamental.
Even in large static markets, agents are faced with the problem of ﬁnding a good strategy
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from an immensely large search space. Furthermore, the generalisation issue [71, 72] illustrates
that ﬁnding strategies which work well against previously unseen competitors is harder still.
If agents are dealing additionally with the possibility that the market may be dynamic, as
others arrive and leave or update their preferences, then extending a rule-based approach
such as is used in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [62] or in the smaller pricing model by
Cheung et al. [56] becomes unfeasible.
A promising alternative to static evolutionary strategy search, with a greater focus on
adaptability, is the treatment of action selection as a dynamic optimisation problem. Though
developed as a technique for use on stationary problems, evolutionary computation has in
recent years been used in dynamic environments [78]. In this case, the goal of the algorithm is
no longer to ﬁnd the optimum point in the search space, but to track its movement over time.
Branke [78] provides a comprehensive introduction to techniques which have been suggested
for the modiﬁcation of traditional evolutionary algorithms to problems with dynamic ﬁtness
landscapes. The majority of approaches rely on the technique of retaining a certain amount of
information about the landscape, through maintaining diversity in the population. A number
of techniques have been proposed to ensure this, such as the periodic introduction of random
immigrants to the population [79] and triggered hypermutation [80]. However, the random
immigrants approach is a somewhat blunt instrument, which may disrupt the eﬀectiveness
of the search and prevent the algorithm from ﬁnding the global optimum [81]. Triggered
hypermutation may be highly eﬀective, but relies on certain domain-speciﬁc knowledge, such
as what should be considered a trigger. A third option, when some pattern exists in the
nature of the environment’s dynamics, is the retention of knowledge of the landscape in the
individuals themselves: a form of memory [81, 82]. Regardless of the speciﬁc approach taken,
by not attempting to learn a strategy which considers every possible scenario in which the
agent ﬁnds itself, but instead acting to maximise payoﬀ in the nearer term, the complexity of
the search space and hence the diﬃculty of the strategy acquisition problem may be greatly
reduced.
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2.3 Economics-Inspired Resource Allocation
As has been discussed, large computational networks such as the Internet, consisting of in-
teracting nodes with independent objectives can be viewed as an economy. As a result,
economics has been both applied and used as inspiration for techniques to perform resource
allocation in such computational settings [13].
The actions and decisions of resource providing and resource using nodes can be auto-
mated by the use of software agents interacting in a market. The aim of a buyer agent might
be to secure the fastest and most reliable resource at the lowest cost for its user. Conversely, a
seller agent might aim to maximise the revenue for the resource provider, or perhaps generate
high levels of business. Whatever the business strategy of the resource provider, the selling
agent will be competing with similar agents from other providers for the same resource users.
Each agent will therefore have to employ its own strategy for success in the market.
This idea is not new. In a discussion of lessons learnt from experience with load man-
agement in giant-scale web services, Brewer [18] proposes the idea of incorporating, into a
request for a resource, a notion of its value or cost. It is argued that this, along with the
use of smart agents, would allow for responsive adaptation in the presence of changes to the
network, as well as graceful degradation. Similarly, Gupta et al. [83] argue that in the pro-
vision of virtually zero cost per-use computational services, a mechanism involving pricing
and user self-selection is preferable to the alternative of provider or regulator enforced limits:
rationing.
The application of economic ideas to resource allocation problems in computational sys-
tems is approached in the ﬁeld of market-based control, an introduction to which is provided
by Clearwater et al. [13]. Using the terminology of Casavant and Kuhl’s [84] taxonomy of
scheduling in distributed computing systems, this is a family of distributed mechanisms for
dynamic global resource allocation.
Typically, resource owning or providing nodes are represented by selling agents, and re-
source users or tasks are represented by buying agents. Buyers then attempt to purchase
suﬃcient resource to satisfy their task or user’s requirements from the set of available sellers.
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Sellers charge an amount of either real or artiﬁcial money for the resource, determined by
their strategy and dependent on factors such as the quantity or quality of the resource being
provided. Since self-interested buyers can be expected to pay more for resources which they
desire more, and self-interested sellers will charge what they can get away with in order to
maximise their payoﬀ, resources will tend to go to those who value them the most.
Fundamentally, these approaches attempt to harness the rational behaviour of self-interested
agents, which interact in some market environment in order to achieve resource allocation
without reference to a central authority. Relying upon the theories of micro-economics dis-
cussed in section 2.2, through such repeated exchanges between utility maximising individu-
als, eﬃcient resource allocations may be achieved.
2.3.1 Centralised Market Mechanisms
As in human economies, agents in a market-based computational system may interact through
any of a number of diﬀerent mechanisms [38]. Common examples include English, Dutch
and Vickrey auctions, in which an auctioneer facilitates the bidding and determines the al-
location of resources. A range of market-based resource allocation and control applications
are described by Clearwater et al. [13].
Where scarcity exists on both the seller and buyer sides, double auctions such as the Con-
tinuous Double Auction and Clearing House provide an alternative approach [39]. Research
in the ﬁeld of automated mechanism design also suggests that other less obvious auction
mechanisms may lead to more eﬃcient outcomes in certain circumstances [46, 85, 86].
However, both Cliﬀ and Bruten [15] and Eymann et al. [20] note that due to the mechanisms
employed, a large proportion of market-based control systems are not truly decentralised,
since they rely on a centralised price ﬁxing process rather than the participants between them
determining prices. This is true of Wolski et al.’s [14] G-Commerce model, which relies upon
a central market maker. Cliﬀ and Bruten [15] argue that the presence of such a centralised
process or component removes the primary advantage of using a market-based system: its
robust, decentralised, self-organising properties.
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2.3.2 Distributed Market Mechanisms
A number of distributed auction mechanisms have also been proposed [87, 88, 89], which do
not rely on one central coordinating node. These approaches reduce the fragility associated
with reliance upon a single point, provide more scalability and allow for dynamic composition
of auctions. Typically, either the central auctioneer is replaced by a number of local ones,
which may communicate through some secure means, or else the auctioneer role is fulﬁlled
by a spare, disinterested node. Double auctions for example, though relying on a specialist
to match bids and asks [40], may be decentralised by the presence of multiple specialists
between which the participants may choose [90]. These techniques do reduce bottlenecks at
certain points within the network and the removal of a single node cannot lead to system-
wide failure. However, similarly to the replicated round-robin DNS approaches discussed in
section 2.1.1 above, the system is still largely reliant on a small subset of its nodes.
However, it may be possible in systems such as this to scale up the number of auctioneers
or specialists, in order to achieve a suitable degree of redundancy and decentralisation. This
issue is an active area of research and worth investigating further, though intuition suggests
that in an ideal world a system which relies upon a set of super-nodes can never provide the
level of robustness of a system without such a need, even if the super-nodes were present
in abundance. Approaches such as this also raise questions of motivation for those acting
as super-nodes, as participation fees for example are set by auctioneers in most cases [90].
Therefore, if an approach exists without the need for such complexity, it should be preferred.
A further alternative is that individual provider nodes themselves host independent auc-
tions for their resources. This approach is applied to computational resource allocation in
Spawn [91]. Here, users’ agents bid in sealed-bid auctions hosted by providers’ agents, for
their resources. In order to be eﬀective, this requires a high level of strategic ability on the part
of buyers, as they must decide in which auctions to participate. Of course, consumers may
win multiple auctions, and questions then arise of how to handle these situations. Literature
exists which explores the dilemma faced by buying agents bidding in multiple auctions, such
as that by Gerding et al. [92, 93] though again this thesis attempts a less complex approach.
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2.3.3 Bargaining
Cliﬀ and Bruten [15] conclude from their critique that, rather than depend upon a central
node such as an auctioneer, market mechanisms should instead rely on the ability of intelligent
agents to bargain between themselves in order to arrive at acceptable prices. This approach is
taken in the AVALANCHE [94], and CATNET [95, 96, 20, 22] systems. These take inspiration
from Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) [57], an agent-based modelling technique
which attempts to replicate the dynamics of human markets with complex cognitive agents.
These approaches are those which attempt to replicate human markets the most faith-
fully, since they rely on highly developed strategies, as agents negotiate bilaterally in order
to determine the provision of a resource. It is likely in this approach that the development
and operation of such strategies will themselves require signiﬁcant computational overhead.
While these approaches are indeed eﬀective and widely applicable, if a simpler alternative
exists, it should be preferred where possible. An additional point of interest is that in the
mechanism used in CATNET [20], resource providing nodes are relied upon to forward re-
quests to neighbouring hosts, without any consideration of the eﬀect of this on their own
interests. This appears to be at odds with the self-interested nature of the agents. However,
the study of bargaining agents is a topic of ongoing research [97, 98, 99] and has a relevance
beyond that which is considered in this thesis.
2.3.4 Retail Markets and the Posted Oﬀer Mechanism
Though they do not discuss them in detail, Cliﬀ and Bruten [15] also brieﬂy mention retail
markets as an alternative to auctions and bilateral negotiation. The mechanism used in
modern retail markets is usually referred to as the posted price or posted oﬀer model [100, 101],
though in online content delivery it is sometimes referred to as the quoted price model [102]. It
is a fully decentralised approach to the determination of price without the need for complex
bilateral negotiation, and provides a potentially simpler alternative.
Wang [103] provides an interesting comparison of auction-based and posted oﬀer selling,
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and shows that auctions are more commonly used in human markets where there is a greater
dispersal of valuations of the good amongst the buyers. Where buyer valuations are more
similar however, he favours the posted oﬀer market mechanism. This can be reconciled with
the idea that according to the most common mechanism design objectives, there exists no
single dominant mechanism [86]. For an example of this in a speciﬁc case, the impossibility
result due to Myerson and Satterthwaite [104] shows that no double auction can simultaneously
be eﬃcient and budget balanced while also ensuring that at least one participant would
not be better oﬀ using a diﬀerent mechanism. It is therefore appropriate that research into
computational resource allocation continues to consider the impact of a range of mechanisms.
Plott and Smith [100] describe the posted oﬀer mechanism as being a process in which
sellers of multiple units of a good each post one price or oﬀer, and buyers subsequently
respond by stating the quantity which they wish to purchase from each seller. Exchanges
then occur between buyers and sellers at these price and quantity values. Technically, the
reverse process in which buyers quote prices and sellers state quantities is also a posted oﬀer
mechanism, though is less commonly encountered. Importantly, price quotations cannot be
changed during the exchange period.
Some examples of using similar mechanisms in computational resource allocation do
exist in the literature, though they are not faithful implementations and make additional
assumptions. Chavez et al. [105] use an approach of this type in Challenger, where oﬀers
are broadcast to the nodes in a network, though instead of using price, bids contain an
honest reporting of a job’s priority. However, this honesty means that there is no competition
between nodes and as with Khan and Ahmad’s [30] approach discussed in section 2.3 this
not self-interested behaviour. Xiao et al. [106] describe their system GridIS, in which buyers
broadcast job requests and sellers reply by posting oﬀers to perform them at a price. However,
the behaviour of the sellers used requires certain global information in determining their price,
both in the form of the latest accepted market price, which in a posted oﬀer mechanism is
considered to be private information, and also the level of aggregate supply of all the providers
in the network. Again, the assumption of private information forbids this too.
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Perhaps the most faithful implementation of the posted oﬀer mechanism in decentralised
computational resource allocation is that by Kuwabara et al. [107], though they do not describe
it as such. They propose an approach which in which sellers quote prices for their resources,
and buyers subsequently decide the quantity (which may be zero) to purchase from each seller.
Their analysis determines the quantities provided at the equilibria at which the markets arrive,
and present this as a stable outcome allocation of resources. This is indeed fully decentralised,
since no central component, such as an auctioneer or specialist is used; prices are determined
privately by the sellers and then posted via a broadcast mechanism.
2.4 Adaptive Pricing
As in human retail markets, key to the eﬃciency of the posted oﬀer market approach used by
Kuwabara et al. [107] is the assumption of iterated transactions. For example, where a large
number of buyers arrive over a period of time, each seller is able to adapt its price such that
the payoﬀ from its transactions is maximised. Sellers therefore compete on price, over time.
From a seller’s perspective, we are therefore faced with the question ﬁrstly of ﬁnding the best
price, and secondly how this price should be adapted in response to market conditions. Of
course, other sellers will also respond, as prices co-adapt. This is therefore a type of adaptive
pricing game.
2.4.1 Approaches to Adaptive Pricing
Critically however, though the sellers in Kuwabara et al.’s [107] system are non-cooperative,
they are not self-interested, since they do not consider their payoﬀ when determining their
price. Instead, a seller node’s previous usage is encoded directly as the seller’s next price,
with no regard to the payoﬀ it is likely to obtain by doing so.
Jagannathan and Almeroth [102] observe that in content delivery markets both online and
oﬄine, posted oﬀer markets are frequently used. They also argue that pricing strategies from
oﬄine markets may not transfer well to online ones, and this agrees with Kephart et al.’s [9]
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argument that with the advent of automated software agent traders, market dynamics can be
expected to be quite diﬀerent from those involving humans. By considering a scenario where
mirrored ﬁle servers operate from a number of locations around the world, Jagannathan and
Almeroth [102] show that charging and adapting prices can be used to control the resource
usage. For example, European servers may be busier and hence slower when North American
servers are not, due to the time diﬀerence. By setting an appropriate pricing scheme, they
show that this can be mitigated against.
The majority of the computational resource allocation models discussed in this chapter,
with the exception of that by Surana et al. [26] assume that the cost of replication of data is
negligible. Therefore, other than by taking into account ﬁxed costs, in this idealised world
payoﬀ maximisation is equivalent to revenue maximisation. Reminiscent of Bertrand’s [53]
criticism of Cournot, Jagannathan and Almeroth [102] also note that on the Internet, sellers
may quote diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent buyers, since each oﬀered price is hidden. Indeed, this
point also enforces that argument that in decentralised markets of this type, the last accepted
price in the market will be private information.
Jagannathan and Almeroth [102] describe three families of pricing strategies:
Static Pricing In static pricing, the seller charges one price for all customers indepen-
dent of time. This has the advantages of being simple and appearing fair, however ﬁnding
the optimal price to charge is non-trivial. Additionally, this is highly likely to be suboptimal,
since especially with heterogeneous buyers, there is a likelihood that at least one of them
would have been prepared to pay more and hence increase the seller’s payoﬀ.
Discriminatory Pricing In this scheme a diﬀerent price is quoted to each customer,
based on the seller’s best estimate of what they are willing and able to pay. In the short term
this can maximise revenue, though in the long term, since this appears unfair, Jagannathan
and Almeroth argue [108] that customers may be put oﬀ. They also claim that this is illegal
in real markets in some jurisdictions, and as a result they are not keen on this approach.
39
Dynamic Pricing Here a price is quoted which changes over time, but does not vary
by customer. Prices may change based on current system load, customer arrival rate, or
other external factors. Dynamic pricing is particularly useful when information about the
diﬀerences between individual customers is not available, or too expensive to store or process.
This method also has the advantage of appearing more fair to customers, as they can all obtain
the same price by adopting the same behaviour. This method can also be used to experiment
with pricing. For example, by adopting a number of test prices at various times, the seller
can explore the market in order to ﬁnd a price which maximises revenue, given the current
set of buyers.
Dynamic pricing behaviour can therefore be seen as strategic in the game theoretic sense.
As was discussed in section 2.2.2, one eﬀective way to computationally model multiple players’
strategic behaviour, and hence self-interested dynamic pricing behaviour is with co-evolution.
In the study of markets, co-evolution has indeed been used to optimise parametrised bidding
and bargaining strategies [44, 94, 109, 110]. In co-evolutionary learning, this optimisation itself
is dynamic, as it is performed against a moving optimum, as the competitors and potentially
also buyers also update their strategies.
Price [111] demonstrates that, rather than optimising the parameters of a particular bid-
ding strategy, certain classic competitive behaviour can be achieved by co-evolving prices
directly. By drawing an analogy between payoﬀ and evolutionary ﬁtness, dynamic pricing
by co-evolution is used to to drive competition in the market. In a sense, from a seller’s
perspective, evolution itself is the strategy. Amongst other examples, Bertrand competition
is demonstrated by competitively co-evolving two sellers’ prices.
Price’s [111] approach appears initially highly attractive to system designers. The evolu-
tionary algorithm employed by an agent does not require a model of the environment, since
evolutionary ﬁtness is instead obtained from the live market. It is a lightweight approach,
which does not even require knowledge of the number or characteristics of competitors or
customers. However, to date very little work has been done to investigate the suitability of
this approach for computational resource allocation tasks.
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2.4.2 Impacts of Adaptive Pricing
Some work analysing the eﬀects of dynamic pricing in computational markets does exist in
the domain of e-commerce. Greenwald and Kephart [112] explore a similar idea in the study of
what they term ShopBots, which act for consumers in a model of an electronic media market,
checking many sellers (online shops) and comparing prices. This enables customers to ﬁnd
the best deal. As a consequence of this, they also predict the advent of PriceBots, which
act for sellers, automatically and dynamically setting prices to maximise their utility, as was
described in the previous section. In this context, their work goes on to study the dynamics
and predicted outcomes in such a system.
Their model considers two types of buyers. Firstly they consider buyers who will buy from
any seller whose price is lower than the buyer’s valuation of the good being oﬀered, typically
chosen at random. Secondly, they consider buyers who proactively seek out the seller making
the best oﬀer. They term these type A and type B buyers respectively, though in this thesis the
more descriptive terms time savers and bargain hunters are preferred.
Their game theoretic analysis shows, as predicted by Bertrand’s model, a population
consisting of entirely type B hyperrational bargain hunters leads to an equilibrium where
sellers charge their marginal cost price [112]. Conversely, they ﬁnd that a population of only
type A time savers allows sellers to behave monopolistically, charging a price equivalent to the
buyers’ valuation.
In Kephart et al.’s [9] earlier related work, two models of sellers’ adaptive pricing be-
haviour are studied and Greenwald and Kephart [112] add a third. Firstly a rather unrealistic
game theoretic behaviour is considered, in which sellers are able to take account of full knowl-
edge of the buyers’ and competing sellers’ decision making processes. Secondly, a myopically
optimal, or myoptimal strategy is used, where sellers have access to full knowledge about the
current state of the other agents and their decision functions, but do not anticipate that other
competing sellers will respond to their price changes or attempt to foresee the impact of their
actions. Myoptimal sellers perform an analysis of the immediate consequence of each possible
price they could charge, before making a decision. They are therefore able to behave fully ra-
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tionally, or optimally, within the myopic constraint that they cannot consider the future. The
third model is termed derivative following, which employs a simple hill climber pricing algo-
rithm with proﬁt as the objective function, and is therefore a somewhat simpler alternative to
Price’s [111] evolutionary pricing algorithm. Unlike the game theoretic and myoptimal methods,
both of these generate and test approaches do not require knowledge of buyers’ preferences
or decision making processes, nor those of other sellers. This general approach is therefore
likely to be much more representative of real scenarios where information is indeed private.
In the particular model studied, the market equilibrium reached depended also on the
model of seller chosen [9, 112]. Game theoretic sellers, able to make use of full knowledge
were unsurprisingly found to reach the Nash equilibrium. Myoptimal sellers were observed
to engage in a price war, and in the case where the payoﬀ landscape was multi-modal, the
price war was found to repeat in an unending cycle [9]. Derivative following sellers produced
an outcome similar to that observed by Cheung et al. [56], where implicit collusion allowed
each to charge the monopolistic price.
Of particular interest is the observation by Kephart et al. [9] that myoptimal sellers in
a multi-modal payoﬀ landscape lead to a never ending series of price wars. These occur
for a similar reason to that for defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, that they may increase
their short term payoﬀ by undercutting each other on price. However, once the sellers’ oﬀered
prices near their costs, rather than settle into equilibrium, it becomes rational for one of them
to instead opt for a diﬀerent section of the market, a diﬀerent peak in the payoﬀ landscape.
They argue that the instability generated by this outcome is potentially a major obstacle for
the success of electronic markets which rely on this kind of mechanism, since they foresee
that multi-modal payoﬀ landscapes will pervade real world embodiments.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
In summary, emerging paradigms for the development and deployment of massively dis-
tributed computational systems allow resources to span many locations, organisations and
42
platforms, connected through the Internet. In such systems, both resource providing and
resource using nodes may arrive, organise and dissipate, as computational capabilities are
formed and reformed as needed, without reference to a central authority or coordinator.
As these systems mature, it is predicted that the majority of their interactions will be
carried out by autonomous software agents on behalf of their owners. In such distributed
systems, where there exists a distribution of work to be done or resource to be provided
about a network of nodes, neither control nor even full knowledge of key resources may be
assumed, as they may be owned or administered by diﬀerent organisations or individuals and
as such have independent objectives. There is a need to ﬁnd novel ways to understand and
autonomically manage and control these large, decentralised and dynamic systems. As part
of this, there remains the problem of how to allocate distributed resources amongst the nodes.
Economics provides a method for modelling such problems and reconciling conﬂicting
nodes’ objectives. In particular, game theory is a useful tool with which to reason about the
interactions between self-interested agents. A number of diﬀerent approaches to implement-
ing this have been proposed, including single and double sided auctions. However, these
typically either require a centralised price ﬁxing process such as an auctioneer or specialist,
or else regional super-nodes able to perform this function in a distributed manner. Both
approaches require information to be channelled through one or more coordination points,
raising questions of robustness and potentially creating bottlenecks. An alternative to this is
bilateral bargaining, and this shows a great deal of promise as a fully decentralised approach,
though it seems likely that this requires highly complex agent capabilities throughout the sys-
tem, which will come with their own computational overhead. Furthermore, when agents are
unable to fulﬁl this role, they will most likely be disadvantaged.
The simpler retail-inspired posted oﬀer market mechanism provides a further promising
alternative. Here agents are not required to possess complex strategic capabilities and indeed
classic economic outcomes have been observed when sellers use evolutionary algorithms to
decide their prices. The success of evolutionary computation in general and co-evolution in
particular at strategy acquisition and learning in repeated games make it an ideal candidate
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for this, and evolutionary algorithms have been used in the design of market mechanisms and
agent strategies alike.
However, a key characteristic of the systems being modelled is their sheer size. Though
a strategy space may be deﬁned and searched for small to medium sized economic games,
as the system scales, the strategy space typically grows exponentially, making oﬄine search
for a good generalised strategy harder. There is therefore a need to investigate further the
impact of more lightweight online evolutionary approaches to oﬀer generation, and to assess
the suitability of this approach, or lack thereof, for achieving resource allocation objectives.
Previous results are mixed, indicating that the approach may be able to generate out-
comes predicted by classical economic theory, but also that eﬀects such as price wars and
collusion may alternatively induce unstable or undesirable outcomes instead. This thesis
aims to contribute towards this understanding, comparing game theoretic results with those
from evolutionary simulations in a variety of scenarios and with diﬀerent resource allocation
objectives. It is hoped that the insight gained from the results presented will be useful in
both predicting outcomes from resource allocation systems embodying the models studied,
and also provide a greater understanding of how market agents may be deployed in order to
obtain these outcomes.
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CHAPTER 3
A MODEL FOR DECENTRALISED
COMPUTATIONAL RESOURCE
ALLOCATION USING SELF-INTEREST
Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.
George E. P. Box
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In this chapter, the retail-inspired posted oﬀer market mechanism is described and a
model for computational resource allocation based on this mechanism is developed and anal-
ysed. Section 3.1 deﬁnes the posted oﬀer mechanism itself, as used throughout this thesis,
and formulates the resource allocation problem to be studied. In section 3.2 the model is
analysed game theoretically for a small number of agents, and it is shown, with reference to
Bertrand competition, how the approach may be used to achieve a balanced load in a compu-
tational setting. Section 3.3 concludes the chapter with a discussion, highlighting why some
of the assumptions about the agents in the analysis may be unrealistic and raising important
questions which emerge from this.
Throughout the analysis, a number of models of behaviour of resource using buyer agents
are considered. Their eﬀects on the qualitative outcomes of the model are compared and
investigated. As such, this chapter provides both an introduction to the problem and a
theoretical underpinning for the results presented later in the thesis.
3.1 Problem Formulation
3.1.1 Scenario and Objectives
As discussed in section 2.2.2, Bertrand’s [34] model of economic competition is one of the
simplest to account for the interactions between individual sellers who compete on price
to provide homogeneous goods. The retail-inspired posted oﬀer mechanism is qualitatively
similar to Bertrand’s model, in that it also accounts for sellers that compete on price to provide
a homogeneous good to a population of buyers. In the types of computational resource
allocation problems investigated here, the good is considered homogeneous, since the buyers
do not care from whom they purchase a functionally equivalent resource1.
However, unlike many other market-based resource allocation mechanisms, such as those
discussed in section 2.3, this thesis focuses on how to achieve a particular outcome resource
1At this stage the reader may be concerned by the lack of account of non-functional attributes. These are
considered in chapters 6 and 7.
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allocation in a given scenario. The approach taken begins from the starting point of a desired
allocation of resources which the system designer or owner wishes to achieve. An artiﬁcial
market is then created in order to bring this allocation into eﬀect, under the assumptions of
decentralisation and self-interest.
Consider ﬁrst a scenario consisting of a set of resource providing nodes, S, each member
of which provides an equivalent, quantitatively divisible resource , which may vary only in
price. The members of S are assumed to be self-interested. Subsequently imagine a large
population of resource users or buyers, B, each member of which aims to consume some of
the resource , at regular intervals.
If si is a node in S and bj is a node in B, qij is used to denote the quantity of the resource
 provided by si to bj . The total quantity of  provided by si at a given instant, its load, lsi ,
is therefore:
lsi =
jBjX
j=1
qij : (3.1)
The ﬁrst resource allocation objective considered is a balanced load, such that at any
instant, each resource providing node in S is providing an equal amount of  across the
population of resource users. A particular resource allocation such as this, a conﬁguration
for the provision of  by the nodes in S at a given instant, may be expressed by the vector
~LS = hls1 ; ls2 ; :::; lsni, where n = jSj. For convenience and ease of comparison between
scenarios, this vector is often normalised by the total resource being provided. An evenly
balanced load may therefore be written as h 1
n
; 1
n
; :::; 1
n
i.
Though this is a trivial problem when central control or cooperation may be assumed,
here the objective is to achieve this using only self-interest, in a fully decentralised manner
with no central or regional control, and with only private information available.
It is worth noting at this stage that alternative approaches exist to the measurement of
load. For example, we may wish to adopt a longer-term view, as in the long-term proportional
share approach described by Lai [12]. In this alternative approach, load is averaged over
a realistically set sliding time window. Casavant and Kuhl [84] also discuss the need to
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determine an appropriate measure of the load for the particular system. At this stage however,
the instantaneous load as described above is used.
3.1.2 Mechanism and Assumptions
A posted oﬀer mechanism is used to decide what quantity of the resource  is provided to
which user node and from which provider node. At a given instant, a resource providing
node, si 2 S, advertises  at the price psi per unit via a broadcast mechanism. Each resource
user, a buyer in this case, then has the option of purchasing some of the resource , should
it be in their interest to do so at the price oﬀered. The system iterates, with sellers able to
independently adapt their prices to the market conditions over time. This approach was ﬁrst
described in [1].
At this stage, the eﬀect of the embodiment of the approach in any particular application
or network environment is not considered, since this would make it unnecessarily diﬃcult to
analyse and understand the underlying behaviour of the model. With this in mind, a number
of simplifying assumptions are taken:
1. That the system proceeds synchronously in discrete time-steps,
2. that each buyer desires exactly one unit of  per time-step,
3. that the actual provision of  may be regarded as instantaneous, such that it does not
interfere with the mechanism,
4. that each seller has suﬃcient quantity of  available to satisfy all the buyers in B should
it be so requested, and
5. that network connectivity is uniform.
The ﬁrst two assumptions are present at this abstract stage in order to aid the analysis of
the system, and though their presence has not been fully investigated, there appears to be no
obvious intuition as to why they should alter the underlying behaviour being demonstrated.
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Assumptions 3 and 4 may not be appropriate for certain embodiments of the approach,
however are representative in theory of the provision of information-based services such as
HTTP requests, and are present in other related work such as Kuwabara et al.’s [107] model
discussed in chapter 2. Finally, assumption 5 replicates the network conditions found in
Wolski et al.’s [14] G-Commerce system.
Each time-step, each buyer, if it chooses to buy, may purchase any amount of  from any
number of resource providers in S, subject to the constraint that the total amount purchased
per time-step is equal to exactly one unit (as per assumption 2). If no oﬀer from any seller in
S is acceptable, the buyer may instead purchase nothing. These constraints mean therefore
that
PjSj
i=1 qij 2 f0; 1g for all bj 2 B.
3.1.3 Buyer Behaviour
Both buyers and sellers accrue a payoﬀ, or utility gain, from their interactions in the market-
place. For buyers, this is deemed to be the value they associate with the price paid subtracted
from the value they associate with the purchased resource. If buyer bj ’s unit valuation of 
is denoted by vbj , then its payoﬀ from a unit transaction with si will be vbj   psi . Since any
buyer accepting a price above vbj would lead to a negative payoﬀ, this is its reserve or limit
price. From a buyer’s perspective, if a seller’s price would not lead to a negative payoﬀ for the
buyer, then the price is described as being acceptable. Sbj is used to denote the subset of S
which contains exactly those sellers in S whose price is acceptable to buyer bj . When buyers
are homogeneous in so far as they have the same reserve prices, such that vbj = v ;8bj 2 B,
a set of sellers acceptable to the buyer population B exists, and is denoted as SB . Of course
SB  S, or more precisely SB = fsi : si 2 S; psi  vg.
As with sellers, buyers are assumed to be self-interested and boundedly rational, at least
insofar that they prefer higher payoﬀs to lower ones. As with real economic actors, this is
manifested through the following of some strategy. Here, the strategy incorporates a decision
function, which given a situation describes the quantity (which may be zero) to buy from
each seller. This is a similar approach to that taken in by Greenwald and Kephart [112],
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in which buyers may be either hyperrational bargain hunters, seeking out the best possible
price, or else time savers who will purchase from any acceptable seller, chosen at random1. The
possibility of complex buyer decision functions means that there may not be a straightforward
mapping between sellers’ prices and buyer valuations, and the subsequent outcome allocation.
Determining the outcome is therefore non-trivial.
Though buyers may adopt any of a number of behavioural strategies, throughout this
thesis three representative buyer types are considered. These are Greenwald and Kephart’s
[112] hyperrational bargain hunters and time savers from and a further type, a risk-averse spread
buyer behaviour [1]. These are now described.
Bargain Hunters
Bargain hunters always attempt to maximise their instantaneous payoﬀ. In each iteration, they
check the prices of all the sellers, selecting the one seller which provides the most attractive
oﬀer (i.e. the lowest price). If this price is acceptable, then the buyer purchases its entire unit
of  from that seller. In the event that more than one seller provides an equally attractive and
acceptable oﬀer, the buyer purchases an even proportion of  from each such seller. This is
the basic model of consumers used by Bertrand [34].
Time Savers
Time savers do not check the price of every seller in the system when deciding from whom to
buy. Instead, they select a seller at random, and if its price is acceptable, then they purchase
the entire unit of  from that seller. If it is not, then they continue selecting previously
unchecked random sellers until they ﬁnd an acceptable price. If no seller has an acceptable
price, then they purchase nothing.
1Greenwald and Kephart [112] refer to time savers as any seller or type A buyers.
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Spread Buyers
Spread buyers are rudimentarily risk-averse, preferring to spread their purchases across a
number of sellers. At each time-step, the buyer looks at all the available oﬀers, and purchases
a proportion of  from each seller with a price below vbj , relative to the expected utility gain
from purchasing from that seller. Speciﬁcally, the quantity purchased by buyer bj from seller
si is determined according to the following calculation:
qij =
(vbj   psi)
(nvbj  
Pn
k=1 p

sk
)
: (3.2)
Spread buyers only consider those sellers with an acceptable price.
Alternative Buyer Behaviours
It is worth reinforcing that although three buyer behaviours are considered here, many other
potential behaviours will exist. For spread buyers, for example, an alternative might be to
motivate risk-aversion through the model itself, by incorporating a real probability of sellers
defaulting or behaving dishonestly. However in order to avoid complicating the model at this
stage, the assumption of risk averse behaviour is used to gain extra clarity instead.
A behaviour with a high level of practical relevance might be that of sticky buyers. Sticky
buyers prefer to continue using resource providers which they have previously used. They
might switch to another seller if the long-term gain were greater than some threshold, and
this could be motivated by an explicit cost to switching or discount for loyalty, amongst other
things.
However, at this stage these are left as items for future research. Indeed, given the vast
possibilities in agent behaviour, the analyses outlined in this thesis are intended to lay out a
methodology for the determination of outcome allocations for a given set of agents. While
some results are speciﬁc to example scenarios, it is the method outlined in these examples
which forms a major contribution of the thesis.
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3.1.4 Seller Behaviour
Sellers also receive a payoﬀ, deﬁned by their payoﬀ function. Seller si’s payoﬀ is denoted as
Psi . In its simplest form, this is its revenue from the sale of :
Psi =
jBjX
j=1
psiqij ; (3.3)
or indeed
Psi = p

si
 lsi : (3.4)
Clearly, a seller wishing to maximise its revenue would aim to increase both its price and
the quantity of its resource sold to the buyers, its market share. However as we have seen
from the buyers’ behaviour, the market share will depend upon the relationship between its
price and those of its competitors, speciﬁcally a higher price is likely to lead to a lower market
share. The following section investigates this tradeoﬀ.
3.2 Predicted Outcomes
One motivation for employing an artiﬁcial market is that competition between self-interested
sellers drives the system towards equilibrium. It is at this equilibrium that the system is stable
in the long term, and thus the allocation of resources in this stable state is referred to in
this thesis as the outcome resource allocation. Of course, in realistic scenarios, continuing
changes to the system may lead to the existence of attractors rather than equilibria in the
classic sense, though this case is not considered at this stage.
The model described here is, in essence, a generalised version of the Bertrand game [34].
As discussed in chapter 2, the classic Bertrand game consists of two sellers, both of whom
oﬀer to sell a certain homogeneous good to a population of buyers. Each seller must decide
what price to charge for the good, and then supply the quantity subsequently demanded
by the buyers. The buyers in the classic Bertrand game behave hyperrationally, as with the
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bargain hunters studied here, always buying from the seller with the lowest price, or half from
each seller if the prices are identical.
In this game either seller can take the entire market by oﬀering a price only fractionally
lower than its competitor. However, since this applies to both sellers, the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium for the game is for both sellers to charge as little as possible, their zero-
proﬁt price. If each seller’s costs are equal, then the equilibrium price for each seller will also
be equal. This leads to the sellers sharing the market equally at equilibrium, and it is this
basic idea which provides us with a balanced load in the simplest case.
However, in the more general case, where buyers may follow any of a number of strategies,
calculating the expected outcome resource allocation may be a more complex task. Here a
methodology is followed of determining the sellers’ best response at each iteration, by solving
payoﬀ equations constructed from the given buyer behaviour. This enables us to identify the
Nash equilibrium outcome, where each and every seller’s best response is equal to its previous
position.
In the following discussions, it is assumed that the buyers do have an identical reserve
price, v = 300, and therefore that we have a single acceptable set of sellers, SB . Any seller
in S but not in SB will of course attract no buyers at all, and will hence receive no payoﬀ and
have a load of zero. For the sake of clarity, in the remainder of this section, only those sellers
in SB are considered.
3.2.1 Bargain Hunters
Let us ﬁrst consider a scenario with two identical resource providing nodes, such that S =
fs1; s2g, each with costs of zero. Recalling the sellers’ payoﬀ function, given in equation 3.4,
we have that
Ps1 = p

s1
 ls1 : (3.5)
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and
Ps2 = p

s2
 ls2 : (3.6)
As in Bertrand competition, B is a large population of hyperrational buyers, bargain
hunters, as described in section 3.1.3. Recalling the decision function for these buyers, and
the assumption that each buyer wishes to purchase exactly one unit of , we may therefore
say that
Ps1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
jBj  ps1 if ps1 < ps2 ;
0:5 jBj  ps1 if ps1 = ps2 ;
0 otherwise:
(3.7)
and the equivalent for s2 respectively.
From a game theoretic perspective, given an observed value for their competitor’s price,
both s1 and s2 will wish to respond with the best response. In this case, this will be to
undercut the competitor’s price, if possible, in order to receive the payoﬀ given by the ﬁrst
case in equation 3.7. The competing seller will of course act similarly, leading to a price war
where each undercuts the other until their zero-payoﬀ price is reached. Assuming that a seller
would rather not participate than receive a negative payoﬀ, once ps1 = ps2 = 0, the rational
course of action is to maintain a price of 0, accepting the second case.
Recalling that the current load on a resource providing node is given by equation 3.1
above, we therefore have that at equilibrium,
ls1 = 0:5 jBj ; (3.8)
and
ls2 = 0:5 jBj : (3.9)
This is indeed an evenly balanced load, i.e.
~LS = h1
2
;
1
2
i: (3.10)
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The theory of Bertrand competition (which is described more fully in [34]) demonstrates
that when competing on price alone, two sellers are enough for the perfectly competitive
outcome described here. Since the same logic applies to larger number of sellers, this evenly
balanced outcome also holds for larger systems under the same assumptions. This idea was
was ﬁrst presented in [1] and elaborated upon in [3].
3.2.2 Time Savers
Intuitively, a population of time savers will posses less of the all or nothing nature of bargain
hunters, as each will prefer potentially any seller whose price is acceptable. Considering the
simple two node example described above, what outcome should we expect with a population
of time savers? Recalling that only those sellers in SB are considered at present, the payoﬀ
for s1 and s2 should be expected to be
Ps1 =
ps1
jSBj (3.11)
Ps2 =
ps2
jSBj (3.12)
Here, unlike with bargain hunters, there is no advantage for a seller in undercutting the
price of a competing seller, since this will only serve to reduce its payoﬀ. Instead, the dominant
position is to charge the highest possible price while still remaining in SB ; the equilibrium is
at ps1 = ps2 = v.
Similarly to bargain hunters however, since ps1 = ps2 , then ~LS  h12 ; 12i. Note that due to
the probabilistic nature of the buyers’ decision function, the allocation will tend towards this
as the probabilities average out.
3.2.3 Spread Buyers
For a population of spread buyers, as described in section 3.1.3, the sellers’ payoﬀ functions for
the simple two node case are
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Ps1 =
jBjX
j=1
v   ps1
2v   (ps1 + ps2)
 ps1 ; (3.13)
and
Ps2 =
jBjX
j=1
v   ps2
2v   (ps2 + ps1)
 ps2 : (3.14)
Sellers s1 and s2 will each then attempt to maximise their respective payoﬀ function as
before. The outcome resource allocation occurs when the system is at equilibrium. Figure
3.1a illustrates an example payoﬀ function for s1, when v = 300 and ps2 = 250.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Seller s1’s payoﬀ function with one competitor and a population of spread buyers,
and (b) s2’s subsequent payoﬀ function from s1’s best response.
Clearly, the best response price for s1 is less than ps2 ; in fact in this instance it is 217:71.
However, given this value as ps1 subsequently, s2 is then faced with the payoﬀ function il-
lustrated in ﬁgure 3.1b. Of course, s2 will respond to this value for ps1 . Its best response is
in this case 204:92. By using the sellers’ payoﬀ functions to iteratively calculate each seller’s
best response, this particular system is found to be at equilibrium when ps1 = ps2 = 200.
Clearly at this point the market share, and hence load, of each seller is also equal: ~LS =
h1
2
; 1
2
i.
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3.3 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter a model for computational resource allocation has been introduced, which
uses the posted oﬀer market mechanism to determine a mapping between resource providing
and resource using nodes for the provision of the resource. A measurement of load on a
resource providing node was also introduced. Notation was given to describe the seller and
buyer populations and three buyer behaviour models were deﬁned. Within this context, both
buyer and seller payoﬀ functions were described and the notions of buyer valuations and
acceptable sellers were introduced.
The fundamental problem of achieving stable desired outcome resource allocations, under
the assumption of self-interest and an absence of central or regional control was described.
Although when these restrictions are not in place the problem is a trivial one, their presence
makes the problem more challenging.
An initial analysis of the model with two competing sellers was conducted, considering
populations of each buyer type. It was found that each of the three buyer types led the system
to a diﬀerent equilibrium, but that at each an evenly balanced load between the resource
providing nodes was obtained.
The contributions of this chapter are therefore as follows:
• A model for computational resource allocation, using posted oﬀer markets to determine
to and from which nodes the resource is provided;
• A measurement of load on a resource providing node;
• Notation to describe seller and buyer populations, as well as the deﬁnition of three
buyer behaviour models;
• Buyer and seller payoﬀ functions, and notions of buyer valuation and the acceptability
of sellers in the context of the model;
• An analysis of the equilibria of the system in the presence of three diﬀerent buyer
behaviour models, and a description of how this can lead to an evenly balanced load
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as the outcome resource allocation.
The sellers’ behaviour in this chapter can be considered to be myopically optimal, or
myoptimal as described by Kephart et al. [9]. Myoptimal behaviour of this kind will result in
the price dynamics described for each buyer behaviour being borne out as the system moves
through time. Alternatively, agents endowed with foresight and capable of game theoretic
reasoning would be expected to calculate the equilibrium positions identiﬁed and knowing
that their payoﬀ could not be bettered by any other action, adopt that price.
Of course, the assumptions required for either of these models of seller decision making
are great. For myoptimal behaviour, at the very least accurate knowledge of the competitors’
prices and buyers’ strategies and private valuations would be required. For a fully game
theoretic agent, knowledge of the other sellers’ payoﬀ functions and their strategies is also
needed. For these reasons, as Kephart et al. [9] note, though this model of seller behaviour
would be desirable from their perspective and also useful for the purposes of system-wide
analysis, it is highly unlikely that it will be faithfully implemented, especially in larger systems.
How then might sellers act instead in an attempt to emulate fully rational behaviour, and how
might this lead a system to depart from the predicted outcomes described here?
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CHAPTER 4
ACHIEVING A BALANCED LOAD WITH
EVOLUTIONARY MARKET AGENTS
It is neither the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent,
but the one most responsive to change.
Charles Darwin
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Chapter 3 introduced a model for decentralised computational resource allocation using
self-interested agents engaged in a posted oﬀer market mechanism. However, in the chapter’s
ﬁnal section it was discussed that due to potentially unrealistic assumptions about the ability of
sellers to obtain and process market information, the results of the analysis may misrepresent
likely real world outcomes.
In this chapter sellers are modelled using an evolutionary approach, which requires them
to possess neither global market information nor excessive computational processing power
in order to adopt payoﬀ maximising behaviour. Self-interested evolutionary market agents [1]
are introduced, which act on behalf of resource providers to adaptively price their resources
over time. The resource allocation model introduced in chapter 3 is then investigated in sim-
ulation when resource providing nodes use evolutionary market agents to price their resources.
Simulation results for each of the three buyer behaviour types introduced in section 3.1.3 are
presented and compared with their predicted results in section 3.2.
The contribution in this chapter is therefore to show that the use of online competitive
co-evolution of self-interested resource providers can drive a decentralised market for those
resources towards equilibrium, and to demonstrate that a balanced load emerges as a result.
Furthermore, the system is robust to small changes in price. When buyers act as spread buyers
this equilibrium is that predicted in the previous chapter’s analysis and this is due to the
smooth nature of these buyers’ decision function. For bargain hunters and time savers, whose
decision functions contain a step, evolutionary market agents’ myopic nature leads the sellers’
prices, and hence loads to oscillate rather than reach the Bertrand equilibrium, as would
be expected of game theoretic agents. Mixed buyer populations are also investigated, with
favourable results, and ﬁnally the scalability of the system is discussed and further simulation
results are presented. These results were previously presented in [3].
Section 4.1 ﬁrst highlights the reasons why the evolutionary simulation approach is nec-
essary, in the light of the results from the previous chapter. Section 4.2 discusses potential
approaches to developing an evolutionary algorithm and argues why that taken is appropriate
in this scenario. Section 4.3 describes the evolutionary market agent algorithm used and sec-
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tion 4.4 updates some of the predictions from chapter 3 in light of this new approach. Section
4.5 describes the experimental set up and simulation results, including a comparison of the
three buyer types and investigations into mixed populations of buyers and scalability. Sec-
tion 4.6 discusses some design decisions taken in developing the evolutionary algorithm used,
presenting comparative results with other potential variants, and ﬁnally section 4.7 concludes
with a discussion.
4.1 Motivation
Chapter 3 introduced a model for decentralised computational resource allocation, using
self-interested agents in a posted oﬀer market mechanism. In this mechanism, selling agents
advertise their resource at a price, and buying agents subsequently decide how much resource
to purchase and from whom. As discussed in section 2.4, the key problem to be addressed by
a seller in a posted oﬀer market is that of how to adapt its price over time, such as to maximise
its payoﬀ. The game theoretic analysis in chapter 3 showed how when sellers behave either
myoptimally or game theoretically, a stable equilibrium can be reached which results in an
equal quantity of resource being provided by each seller.
However, a key problem facing sellers is that in only slightly larger systems than those
explored in chapter 3, both myoptimal and game theoretic approaches becomes unfeasible,
since they require both exact and global knowledge of the system’s current state as well as
a large amount of computational power [9]. Additionally, in the models investigated in this
thesis, agents do not have access to the utility functions of other agents, as these are considered
private information. As a result, they are not able to consider the payoﬀ landscape with which
they are faced, at least unless they employ some environment modelling technique, making
use of information gained from interactions in the market. However, this is also a complex
task, and troubled by the additional problem that with the eﬀects of a highly dynamic system,
the information learnt will be quickly out of date.
Kephart et al. [9] suggest that one possible alternative approach is to begin with some
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initial conﬁguration of agents and use evolution to simulate their co-adaptation. However,
the evolutionary method they propose still requires full knowledge of the payoﬀ landscape,
or else enough trial runs in the market to determine it, and therefore does not fully solve the
scalability problem. This chapter takes a step further, making use of a lightweight evolutionary
approach inspired by Price [111], in which agents co-evolve their market positions online,
making use of only private information. This approach is taken both as a method to further
analyse the behaviour of the model, especially with larger numbers of agents, and also as a
prototype design for selling agents in a future embodiment of the model. A seller making use
of this algorithm is termed an evolutionary market agent.
4.2 An Evolutionary Approach
With only private information available, sellers cannot directly calculate a best response price
to the current state of the market, only sample the landscape using individual oﬀers to see
how they perform. One way for the seller to ﬁnd the optimal market position, given the
black box nature of the problem is therefore to take an exploratory approach. Evolutionary
computation [68] provides an eﬀective method of achieving this. Indeed, as section 2.2.4
discussed, evolution, or more accurately co-evolution when more than one agent is involved,
has long been used to model competing players in repeated games. By using an evolutionary
approach, sellers can expect to ﬁnd good responses to the market. This approach allows us
to achieve an approximation to the game theoretic outcome, under the assumption of private
information.
Chapter 2 described a number of diﬀerent approaches to using co-evolution in economic
games, including the Michigan and Pittsburgh families of algorithms. Either approach could
be used in developing an evolutionary algorithm to model adaptive pricing behaviour of
sellers, and much literature exists comparing the suitability of each approach for other types
of learning tasks [74].
A further consideration in the development of an evolutionary algorithm for use by an
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adaptive seller is that of strategy representation and the resulting search space. For example,
key to the Pittsburgh family of learning algorithms is that each individual in the evolutionary
algorithm’s population contains a whole candidate rule set which deﬁnes the agent’s behaviour.
Individual rule sets should consider every scenario in which they agent may ﬁnd itself, and
prescribe an action accordingly. This is the approach taken by Cheung et al. [56] in their
evolutionary modelling of petrol pricing in Australia.
Of course, the granularity of the rules’ triggers can vary from the precise to the general,
but as the size of the market increases, the number of rules is likely to also increase quickly.
As Cheung et al. [56] point out, and as discussed in section 2.2.4, the complexity of the
strategy search space may prove to be a major obstacle, due to the increased dimensionality
and computational overhead required to ﬁnd a good market position.
With this in mind, instead of encoding an explicit strategy capable of prescribing actions
for all given market states, the approach taken here considers the problem of ﬁnding a good
market position as a dynamic optimisation problem. Having each agent encode only their
current oﬀer, and by evolving these directly, the level of complexity is reduced considerably.
The task before the evolutionary algorithm is then not to learn a catch all strategy, capable
of determining the best action for any given future market state. Instead, it aims to ﬁnd
the optimal market position given the current state of the market and accept and deal with
the notion that the market state may change during the optimisation process. In a sense,
evolution itself is the strategy.
This approach has both positive and negative implications. Since the dimensionality of the
problem is signiﬁcantly reduced, the algorithm stands a good chance of ﬁnding a proﬁtable
market position within a very short space of time. The lower complexity also permits easier
analysis of the ﬁtness landscape associated with the search space, and hence provides further
insight when selecting appropriate algorithms. Indeed, rather than being complex and high
dimensional, the ﬁtness landscape becomes the same as the agent’s payoﬀ landscape for the
current market state.
However, relying on ﬁtness information from the market itself, rather than from an oﬄine
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model, means that each ﬁtness evaluation is potentially very costly. Poor solutions must
still be tested in the market, as are good solutions, in order to determine their ﬁtness. In
measuring the success of this approach, the key metric will not therefore be the ﬁtness of the
best individual, but the cumulative performance of the entire population over time.
4.3 The Evolutionary Market Agent Algorithm
An evolutionary market agent operates on behalf of a particular resource providing node in
order to adaptively price its resource over time. Using evolutionary computation techniques,
the agent evolves the market position of its host over time, in response to current market
conditions. A population of prices is evolved online, with payoﬀ information from the mar-
ket being used as ﬁtness values, and the objective being payoﬀ maximisation. Competition
between sellers is therefore driven by the co-evolution of their respective evolutionary market
agents.
In this model a market position consists simply of price. Therefore each member of the
population, an individual in evolutionary computation terminology, represents a real valued
price. For each interaction in the market, an individual’s price is adopted, and the resulting
payoﬀ provides its ﬁtness.
The evolutionary algorithm used by an individual seller proceeds as in algorithm 1, and
was ﬁrst presented in [1].
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Algorithm 1: The evolutionary market agent algorithm
1. Decide upon the design parameters to be used: initial price range [pmin, pmax],
population size and mutation factor, . In the simulations described, pmin = 0, and
pmax = 500. A population size of 20 was used, with a mutation factor,  = 0:1.
2. Generate an initial population, Pop, and set k = 1. Each individual in Pop is a real
value, drawn from the uniform random distribution [pmin, pmax].
3. Initial ﬁtness testing
(a) Set the seller’s oﬀer to the value of the ﬁrst individual in Pop, and enter the
market for one market time-step. Record the seller’s payoﬀ, Psi as that
individual’s ﬁtness.
(b) Repeat for the next individual in Pop, until all initial individuals have been
evaluated in the market.
4. Probabilistic tournament selection
(a) Select four individuals, x1; x2; x3 and x4 from Pop, at random, such that
x1 6= x2 6= x3 6= x4.
(b) Let champion c1 be either x1 or x2, the ﬁtness of whichever is greater with
probability 0:9, the ﬁtness of whichever is less otherwise.
(c) Let champion c2 be either x3 or x4, the ﬁtness of whichever is greater with
probability 0:9, the ﬁtness of whichever is less otherwise.
5. Let the oﬀspring, o, be a new individual with its price equal to the mid-point of c1 and
c2.
6. Mutate o, by perturbing its value by a random number drawn from a normal
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation .
7. Insert o into Pop and remove either x1 or x2, whichever lost the ﬁrst tournament, 4(b).
8. Set the seller’s oﬀer to the value encoded in o, and enter the market for one market
time-step. Record the seller’s payoﬀ, Psi as o’s ﬁtness.
9. Repeat from step 4.
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4.4 Predicted Outcomes with Evolutionary Market Agents
Most fundamentally to note about the evolutionary market agent algorithm is that, as expected,
it has no knowledge of the buyers’ decision functions, and hence does not calculate a best
response to the current state of the market. The seller’s behaviour is instead exploratory and
myopic. This has important implications for the outcome of competition between evolutionary
market agents in the presence of bargain hunters and time savers, since these buyer types have
a step in their decision functions.
By contrast, spread buyers provide the beneﬁt of a smooth decision function, and hence
seller payoﬀ function which degrades gracefully as a seller moves away from the optimal
price. Evolutionary market agents lend themselves better to this behaviour. As an illustration,
consider in the model described in chapter 3, the scenario when a seller s1 is competing with
s2, where v = 300 and ps2 = 250. Figure 4.1 illustrates the payoﬀ s1 can expect to receive as
a function of its own next price, ps1 , for the three buyer types we discussed in section 3.1.3.
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Figure 4.1: Seller s1’s payoﬀ function with one competitor, for each of the buyer types. First
presented in [3].
The step function is clearly visible here, for sellers dealing with either bargain hunters or
time savers. In the absence of full knowledge of the buyers’ decision functions (i.e. the curves
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shown here), and relying upon a myopic exploratory heuristic, a seller would be expected to
oscillate between receiving a near-optimal payoﬀ, and one of zero.
Such an oscillation between high and low payoﬀs is not conducive of stable outcomes.
Indeed, for bargain hunters, the position of the step for a given seller will depend upon its
competitors’ prices. Since the same is also true of the other competitors, the exact equilibrium
position of the step, given by the sellers’ prices, will be fairly arbitrary.
For spread buyers however, a small move away from the optimal price leads to a small
change in payoﬀ for the seller. The resulting impact upon the other sellers’ payoﬀ functions
is also minimal. This incremental characteristic of a market of spread buyers leads to a less
brittle, more predictable system.
4.5 Simulation Results
Since the co-evolutionary approach aims to emulate rational myoptimal behaviour under the
assumption of only private information, the hope is that the system reaches an approxima-
tion to the predicted outcome in chapter 3. However, given the evolutionary market agents’
stochastic, exploratory nature, statistical results gained experimentally are useful. The sce-
narios described in section 3.2, and some larger, more complex examples are now explored
in simulation.
4.5.1 A Baseline Scenario
Figure 4.2 illustrates the evolution of this behaviour over time in a scenario with two resource
providing nodes, such that S = fs1; s2g. Both s1 and s2 are represented by independent
evolutionary market agents, as described in section 4.3, each with a population size of 20 and
a mutation factor of 0:1. B consists of ten homogeneous spread buyers, such that v = 300.
Figure 4.2 clearly shows the ability of the approach to achieve a roughly even load be-
tween the two resource providers in a short time. This is due to the evolutionary agents’
competitively co-evolving their prices to within close proximity of each other quickly, result-
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of price (above) and load (below) of two resource providing nodes over
time, with a population of 10 spread buyers. A stable evenly balanced load emerges. Mean
and standard deviation over 30 independent runs. First presented in [3].
ing in roughly even shares of the market. Following these exploratory ﬂuctuations, the loads
stabilise as the prices converge to the predicted equilibrium, here 200. At this point, the loads
are highly equal. Due to diverse populations within each agent’s population however, their
prices, and hence also the allocation of resources continue to vary to a small degree.
4.5.2 Comparing Buyer Types
Let us now turn our attention to the behaviour of the system in the presence of bargain
hunters and time savers. Intuitively, from section 4.4 above, oscillatory behaviour would be
expected when these buyers’ decision functions, with their step characteristics, are present.
When observing the load on resource providing nodes in simulation this unreliable behaviour,
along with a high standard deviation, is indeed manifested.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate this with two sellers and a population of 10 bargain hunters,
and time savers respectively. The behaviour illustrated above in ﬁgure 4.2, for spread buyers,
is clearly more desirable.
The presence of the step in the decision function for both bargain hunters and time savers
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the load on two resource providing nodes over time, with a population
of 10 bargain hunters. The step in the buyers’ decision function leads to oscillations and
unpredictability. Mean and standard deviation over 30 independent runs. First presented in
[3].
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of the load on two resource providing nodes over time, with a population
of 10 time savers. The step in the buyers’ decision function has less of an oscillatory eﬀect.
Mean and standard deviation over 30 independent runs. First presented in [3].
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clearly leads to oscillations in the load allocated between the resource providing nodes; the
allocations do not remain stable over time. The graceful degradation of the spread buyers’
decision function, however, leads to a highly stable and evenly balanced load.
4.5.3 Mixed Buyer Populations
As has been shown, one beneﬁt of spread buyers’ behaviour is the graceful degradation of
a seller’s market share as its price moves away from the optimum (or the optimum moves
away as competitors update their prices). This smooth curve allows the sellers’ evolutionary
algorithms to easily ﬁnd the new optimum price. By contrast, as we saw in section 4.5.2, buyer
behaviours with a step in their decision function lead to more erratic, less stable equilibria.
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Figure 4.5: The proximity of the outcome resource allocation to an evenly balanced load
degrades gracefully with respect to the proportion of bargain hunters in a population otherwise
consisting of spread buyers. Each data point is from 30 independent runs of a simulation with
two sellers and 100 buyers, which vary along the x axis. First presented in [3].
However, how disruptive is the presence of such buyer behaviour in a population other-
wise consisting of spread buyers? The experimental result in ﬁgure 4.5 indicates a graceful
degradation of performance in the presence of an increasing proportion of bargain hunters in
the population.
70
4.5.4 Scalability
In addition to the unrealistic assumptions outlined in section 4.1, one of the key reasons for
adopting this online evolutionary approach rather than attempting to implement myoptimal
sellers or a full strategy learning algorithm is scalability. Since information about buyers and
competitors does not need to be obtained, and the payoﬀ landscape does not need to be
computed by the seller, the complexity of pricing algorithm itself is not dependent on market
size. Additionally, due to the distributed, decentralised nature of the mechanism employed,
the approach scales well.
This scalability leads to the behaviour demonstrated in the above simple scenario also
being observed in much larger resource markets. Figure 4.6 illustrates the evolution of price
and load for 1; 000 sellers and 10; 000 buyers in a typical run of the simulation. Figure 4.7
shows the mean and standard deviation of the load variance for 30 independent runs. It is
clear that in this respect the approach is highly scalable, as results are of a similar form to the
smaller simulation. Figure 4.8 shows the time taken for the system to reach within 1% of the
predicted outcome allocation, from the initial allocation, as the number of sellers increases.
 0
 2e-07
 4e-07
 6e-07
 8e-07
 1e-06
 1.2e-06
 1.4e-06
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600  700  800  900  1000
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
L
o
a d
 V
a r
i a
n
c e
P
r i
c e
Iteration
Price
Load Variance
Figure 4.6: Evolution of price and load variance between 1; 000 resource providing nodes over
time, with a population of 10; 000 spread buyers, demonstrating a high degree of scalability.
Results from a typical run. First presented in [3].
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Figure 4.8: Time taken to reach close proximity to the predicted outcome allocation (within
1%). Each data point represents the mean and standard deviation over 30 independent runs.
First presented in [3].
A further important question concerning the scalability of the approach, and one that is
shared with many other market-based mechanisms such as CATNET [22], is that of how knowl-
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edge of oﬀers might be disseminated around the system. In some embodiments of the model,
such as networks making use of wireless technology, broadcasting may indeed be achievable.
In peer-to-peer networks, the broadcast facility may be emulated through algorithms such as
ﬂooding [113], distributed hash tables [114] or epidemic algorithms [115]. However, Ardaiz et al.
[22] argue quite correctly that decentralised and self-interested resource allocation approaches
should prefer decentralised, incentive-compatible discovery mechanisms.
4.6 Design of the Evolutionary Algorithm
The evolutionary algorithm used here is not the result of extended experimental tuning or
design, and as such it is highly likely that it may be improved upon. This thesis does not
claim that the evolutionary market agents presented here is superior to other already existing
adaptive pricing algorithms, however this is not the primary concern at this stage. Rather, this
chapter emphasises the suﬃciency of the online co-evolutionary approach to drive competi-
tion between sellers and achieve the eﬀects described. A useful extension to this work would
be to perform a comparison with other suitable strategies, such as the Gjerstad-Dickhaut [116]
and Roth-Erev [117] algorithms.
However, during the course of the experimentation, some results concerning the evolu-
tionary algorithm itself were obtained which are now reported. Particularly, the decision to
use either stochastic or deterministic selection and replacement operators aﬀects the algo-
rithm’s performance. Two variants of each operator were tested. For selection, the variants
were the stochastic selection method described in section 4.3 and a more deterministic version
where the winner of each tournament was always chosen to be a parent. For replacement,
the variants were the deterministic operator described in section 4.3, where the loser of the
ﬁrst tournament was always replaced, and an alternative where with a probability of 0:1 the
individual replaced was instead selected at random from all those in the two tournaments.
Combining these, the four variants of the algorithm tested were as follows:
• Both deterministic selection and replacement operators,
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• Deterministic selection but probabilistic replacement,
• Probabilistic selection and probabilistic replacement, and
• Probabilistic selection but deterministic replacement.
In the experiments, all variants of the algorithm were able to ﬁnd the equilibrium price,
but diﬀered on their behaviour once at the optimum. Figure 4.9 shows the standard deviation
of each algorithm’s price about the mean for a seller over 30 independent runs.
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Figure 4.9: Standard deviation about the mean price for four algorithm variants. Probabilistic
selection combined with the deterministic replacement operator enables the algorithm to
remain closer to the equilibrium price. First presented in [3].
As can be seen, the use of both deterministic operators led to a high and highly volatile
standard deviation, indicating frequent signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in price. The two variants with
probabilistic replacement operators performed very similarly to each other, with lower and
signiﬁcantly more stable standard deviations. The lowest standard deviation was achieved
by the variant with the probabilistic selection but deterministic replacement operators. This
is the algorithm described in section 4.3 and it is for this reason that it was chosen for the
majority of the simulation experiments in the thesis.
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Intuitively, probabilistic operators could be expected to improve performance. This is
since, in the early part of the simulation, a price higher than the equilibrium might yield
a high payoﬀ for a seller, but once the other competitors had responded to this, it would
no longer be possible for any seller to reach such a high payoﬀ. This price would remain
in the population, and frequently win tournaments, despite its adoption at a later iteration
being unlikely to reproduce the high payoﬀ. The market would have moved on and its ﬁtness
would be out of date. Probabilistic selection ensures that other individuals, with lower ﬁtness
values but perhaps more suited to the current market conditions, can get selected instead. It
is interesting then that probabilistic replacement did not bring about a similar performance
gain. However, though it might be useful to occasionally select individuals with only an
average ﬁtness in future iterations, it is likely that individuals with very low ﬁtness would
perform poorly in any scenario, and there would therefore be little to gain by retaining them.
A more formal analysis of the populations over time will prove illuminating.
4.7 Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter recognises that while they are useful to analyse the equilibria in the model, the
myoptimal and game theoretic approaches taken by sellers in chapter 3 rely on a number
of unrealistic assumptions. Firstly, that in order for a seller to identify its immediate best
response oﬀer to a given market scenario, it must ﬁrst have access to every competitor’s
current oﬀer as well as knowledge of the buyers’ decision functions. Secondly, it assumes that
each seller has suﬃcient computational power to calculate the resulting optimum. For a fully
game theoretic seller, the additional knowledge of its competitors’ pricing algorithms is also
required.
Given these unrealistic assumptions, this chapter attempts to provide an alternative ap-
proach, where sellers each use an evolutionary algorithm to explore the payoﬀ landscape
and optimise their market position. It was shown that this co-evolution of oﬀers can lead
the system to approximate the outcome resource allocations predicted in chapter 3. Indeed,
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co-evolution itself is the competitive force which drives the market towards equilibrium.
The relationship between experimental performance in simulation, and game theoretic
predictions for the three buyer behaviour models deﬁned in section 3.1.3 was explored. Buyer
behaviours with a step in their decision function were found to lead to unstable, erratic
outcome allocations when sellers’ prices were set by evolutionary market agents. Those buyers
with smooth decision functions however, such as spread buyers, lead to a highly even and stable
balanced load, which is also being robust to small changes in price. It was further shown that
this performance degrades gracefully as the proportion of buyers with step functions in the
population increases.
Therefore, the contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• An argument that myoptimal and game theoretic selling agents are unlikely to be
faithfully implemented in decentralised computational systems where nodes are self-
interested, since they require information about other agents which is typically consid-
ered private and unavailable;
• The description of an alternative approach, using evolutionary market agents, which sell-
ers may use to attempt to optimise their prices within the constraints of the information
available.
• Experimental evidence from simulation runs that when sellers use evolutionary market
agents, the system is able to approximate the game theoretically predicted equilibrium,
and hence evenly balance the load across the resource providing nodes, when buyers
adopt the spread buyer behaviour.
• Experimental evidence that due to a step in the decision functions of bargain hunter
and time saver buyers, the system does not converge to the predicted equilibrium and
instead remains unpredictable and unstable in these cases;
• Further experimental evidence showing that when buyer populations are mixed, the
system’s performance degrades gracefully as the proportion of buyers with steps in
their decision functions increases, in a population otherwise consisting of spread buyers.
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• Further experimental evidence which demonstrates that the system scales well with
respect to the number of agents participating in the system and a balanced load can be
achieved with very large numbers of agents.
• Analysis of experimental results for four diﬀerent variants of the evolutionary market
agent algorithm, with the conclusion that probabilistic selection and deterministic re-
placement operators provide good performance.
As discussed in section 3.2, the underlying theoretical idea which describes how the sys-
tem achieves a balanced load is that of Bertrand competition. However, it should be noted
Bertrand competition relies on the presence of a number of additional potentially unrealistic
assumptions [34]. Three of these are of particular interest. Firstly, Bertrand competition as-
sumes no collusion between sellers. Secondly, it is also assumed that sellers only compete on
price, and are otherwise unable to diﬀerentiate their products in the market. Thirdly, sellers
are assumed to have the same marginal cost.
Here, collusion is ruled out by the model itself, but it would be remiss to ignore the
possibility of its occurrence in real world embodiments. Cheung et al [56] showed in a sim-
ilar evolutionary simulation that if sellers are able to reliably predict the responses of their
competitors, then even without knowledge of their pricing algorithms, they may implicitly
collude in order to raise prices and hence their payoﬀs. This behaviour is not observed in the
simulations here, since the sellers do not retain historical information concerning each other.
It is also unlikely, as noted by Cheung et al. that this collusion would occur in very large
scenarios with many competing sellers. However, in smaller oligopolistic markets involving
strategic sellers, the possibility of this aﬀecting the outcomes should be borne in mind.
It is also likely in real world embodiments that truly self-interested sellers would attempt to
violate the second assumption of Bertrand competition listed above, by diﬀerentiating their
product other than on price alone. Particularly in the presence of heterogeneous buyers,
factors such as quality of service or branding could provide targeted product diﬀerentiation,
which can lead to increased proﬁts for the seller and alternative overall outcomes [34]. Looking
ahead, chapters 6 and 7 therefore investigate the eﬀect of considering additional quality
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attributes over which to describe the resource, such that sellers are able to achieve such
diﬀerentiation.
Finally, the balanced load outcome presented here is heavily reliant on the third assump-
tion, that of equivalent marginal costs between sellers. This is intentional, since the approach
is motivated by large homogeneous resource providing environments, where it does not mat-
ter from whom the resource is provided. It is of course reasonable to expect that should the
resource providing nodes not be homogeneous, and instead vary in their ability to provide
the resource which is being traded, then a diﬀerent outcome resource allocation would be
obtained. This important topic is the subject of chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
ACHIEVING ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES
IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
I may not have gone where I intended to go, but I think I have ended up where I needed to be.
Douglas Adams
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This chapter builds upon the previously studied market-based approach to achieving re-
source allocation in decentralised systems, by considering heterogeneous provider nodes. In
this scenario, providers may be said to value their resources diﬀerently. By considering sellers’
heterogeneous costs and valuations, an extended version of the model described in chapter
3 is able to bring about additional stable uneven outcome resource allocations.
Here it is demonstrated how, given such valuations and a model of buyer behaviour, the
outcome allocation may be predicted. Furthermore, a method is outlined for determining
sellers’ parameters in order to use the approach to achieve a desired stable objective. The
behaviour of the extended model is analysed both game theoretically and in simulation using
evolutionary market agents. As with chapters 3 and 4, the impact of diﬀerent buyer behaviour
models is considered. Importantly, particular desired resource allocations are achieved trans-
parently to resource users, as no modiﬁcation to the buyers is required.
Section 5.1 begins the chapter by motivating the need to extend the original model. Sec-
tion 5.2 then describes the extension, paying particular attention to changes needed to the
sellers’ payoﬀ functions in order to encapsulate their heterogeneity. Section 5.3 analyses the
newly extended model game theoretically, considering the impact of buyers behaving as bar-
gain hunters, time savers and spread buyers. The problem of determining parameters for sellers
in order to achieve desired outcome resource allocations is addressed in section 5.4, before
experimental results in section 5.5 demonstrate the achievement of the predicted outcomes
when spread buyers and evolutionary market agents are used in simulation. Section 5.6 charac-
terises the impact of varying the sellers’ valuations with respect to each other, and illustrates
why issues of stability may arise in monopolistic scenarios. Finally, section 5.7 concludes with
a discussion.
5.1 Motivation
So far, this thesis has proposed an evolutionary market-based approach to achieving an evenly
balanced load between resource providing nodes in a fully decentralised system where agents
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do not cooperate. The approach, which makes use of an artiﬁcially created posted oﬀer
market for the resource, relies purely upon self-interest, and no individual node has any desire
in favour of the balanced outcome. In the mechanism, resource providing nodes quote prices
for equivalent resources and resource users select how much and from whom to purchase.
Evolutionary market agents, acting on behalf of resource providing nodes, evolve the price
quoted by their respective seller over time. The payoﬀ from the live market is used as the
ﬁtness function for each seller’s evolutionary algorithm.
However, the approach described in chapters 3 and 4 considers that all resource providing
nodes have an equivalent ability to provide the resource. In many real world scenarios this
will not be the case. For example, one node may be able to perform more work than another
in the same amount of time.
In this kind of scenario, with heterogeneous resource provider abilities, the approach
described so far is not able to take account of these factors. Its use will result in an even
resource allocation between the resource providing nodes, regardless of their heterogeneous
abilities. This is therefore likely to be an ineﬃcient outcome. In this chapter the approach is
extended in order to take advantage of this information in providing an appropriate, stable
and desired outcome allocation.
5.2 Heterogeneous Resource Providing Nodes
As in the homogeneous model introduced in chapter 3, consider a set of resource providing
nodes, S, each member of which provides a functionally equivalent, quantitatively divisible
resource , which may vary only in price. Imagine then a large population of service users
or buyers, B, each member of which aims to consume one unit of the resource , at regular
intervals.
In chapters 3 and 4, the objective was to balance the load evenly, such that all the resource
providers in S provided an equal amount of  across the population of resource users. In
this chapter however, the objective is to predict what outcome resource allocations will be
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reached, given heterogeneous seller abilities. These abilities are reﬂected in the model through
the sellers’ own private valuations for the resource . Furthermore, this chapter attempts to
understand how the approach may be extended in order to achieve a particular chosen stable
outcome resource allocation. As with the homogeneous case, while this is indeed a trivial
problem when cooperation between agents may be assumed, the objective here is to achieve
this using self-interest, in a fully decentralised system. Additionally, the possibility of complex
buyer decision functions means that there may not be a straightforward mapping between
valuations and the outcome allocation.
The market mechanism and notation used are the same as described in chapter 3. In
particular, recall that a particular conﬁguration for the provision of the resource in the model,
such as the outcome resource allocation may be expressed by the vector ~LS = hls1 ; ls2 ; :::; lsni,
where n = jSj. As described in section 3.1, for ease of ease of comparison between scenarios,
the values in the vector are often presented normalised by the total quantity of resource being
provided.
In this way, any desired outcome allocation may be described. As we have seen, an evenly
balanced load for example may be written as h 1
n
; 1
n
; :::; 1
n
i. Similarly, an allocation between
six providing nodes, where the even numbered nodes provide exactly twice the resource as
the odd numbered nodes would be h1
9
; 2
9
; 1
9
; 2
9
; 1
9
; 2
9
i.
In the original version of the model all resource providing nodes were implicitly assumed
to have an equal ability to provide the service. The objective was to balance the usage or load
equally across them. In certain realistic embodiments however, it is unlikely that this will be
the case. Leaving aside any consideration of diﬀerences in the overall capacity of resource
providing nodes, that is to say the total quantity of  which a single node may provide, here a
heterogeneity of the ability of nodes in the population to provide the resource is considered.
One resource providing node, for example, may be able to perform the same task in a shorter
amount of time than another, due to an increased capability. The original payoﬀ function
takes no account of this.
Such heterogeneities of resource providing nodes’ abilities may be represented by their
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selling agents using a notional cost of provision, along with diﬀerent relative valuations of
 when compared with this cost. Since, functionally speaking, equivalent quantities of work
are substitutable irrespective of which node performed them, it might be expected that a
node able to provide more work than another for the same cost would place a lower private
valuation on performing that quantity of work, when compared with the cost.
This valuation may be built in to the existing model in the form of a sellers’ payoﬀ function
which takes account of the cost of the provision of , csi , and a preference weight, wsi , on
the price.
In the original model described in section 3.1, seller si’s utility gain, or payoﬀ, Psi , was
given by
Psi =
jBjX
j=1
psiqij ; (5.1)
or indeed
Psi = p

si
 lsi : (5.2)
Introducing a node’s cost of providing , csi , and taking account of a utility preference
weight, wsi , si’s payoﬀ can instead be proposed to be as follows:
Psi =
jBjX
j=1
qij(wsip

si
  csi) ; (5.3)
or
Psi = (wsip

si
  csi) lsi : (5.4)
This extended version of the model was ﬁrst presented and analysed in [2].
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5.3 Predicted Outcomes
As was done in the homogeneous case in chapter 3, by considering agents’ best responses in
attempting to maximise their instantaneous payoﬀ, it is possible to identify potential equilibria
and hence predicted outcome resource allocations.
5.3.1 A Baseline Example
Let us begin by exploring the eﬀect of heterogeneous seller abilities by means of a two node
example in the presence of a population of spread buyers. Recall that for such buyers, the
quantity of  purchased by buyer bj from seller si,
qij =
(vbj   ps1)
(vbj   ps1) + (vbj   ps2)
; (5.5)
where vbj is the valuation, and hence maximum price payable by each buyer.
When faced with a population of spread buyers, the payoﬀ functions (from equation 5.3)
for s1 and s2 are therefore
Ps1 =
jBjX
j=1
vbj   ps1
(vbj   ps1) + (vbj   ps2)
(ws1p

s1
  cs1) ; (5.6)
and
Ps2 =
jBjX
j=1
vbj   ps2
(vbj   ps2) + (vbj   ps1)
(ws2p

s2
  cs2) ; (5.7)
Sellers s1 and s2 will then attempt to maximise their respective payoﬀ function as before.
The outcome resource allocation is taken to be that which occurs when the system is at
equilibrium.
In this example, if s1 represents a node with a greater ability to provide the resource than
s2, then we might say that ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:5; s2 values its work twice as much when
compared to money. For the purposes of the example it is initially assumed that both sellers
bear a ﬁxed cost; cs1 = cs2 = 100, and that vbj = 300, to give a reasonable range of prices.
Using the iterative procedure described in section 3.2.3, it can be calculated that the
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system in this example is at equilibrium when ps1 = 243:1 and ps2 = 262:4. At this point,
neither s1 nor s2 may increase its respective payoﬀ by unilaterally choosing a diﬀerent price.
The allocation at these prices therefore, is the expected outcome allocation. This may be
calculated for each resource provider by substituting equation 5.5 into equation 3.1:
lsi =
jBjX
j=1
(vbj   ps1)
(vbj   ps1) + (vbj   ps2)
: (5.8)
Solving this using the sellers’ weights, the determined equilibrium price values and as-
sumed costs in the example,
ls1 = 0:6 jBj ; (5.9)
and
ls2 = 0:4 jBj : (5.10)
In other words, we can expect s1 to take 60% of the load, and s2 to take 40%, given the
above valuations and costs.
This method for determining the outcome resource allocation may easily be generalised
to other buyer behaviours, by replacing equation 5.5 with one which captures the appropriate
buyer behaviour.
5.3.2 Some More Complex Examples
Now let us consider a more complex case for each of the three buyer behaviours investigated
in chapter 3.
Bargain Hunters
Recalling results from chapter 3, game theoretic and myoptimal sellers in the presence of
bargain hunters are expected to compete downwards on price, until they reach their reserve
valuation for the resource. Since in the homogeneous case the sellers’ costs were the same,
85
this meant that their prices at equilibrium were also the same.
In the heterogeneous case, though competition on price will still occur, critically the
lower limit price for each seller will depend upon its cost and preference weight. As might
be expected, that seller (or those sellers) which are able to oﬀer the lowest price will take the
entire market, leaving those unable to compete with nothing.
This may be illustrated this by means of a three node example, such that S = fs1; s2; s3g,
where cs1 = cs2 = 100, cs3 = 150 and ws1 = ws2 = ws3 = 1. We therefore have the following
payoﬀ functions:
Ps1 = (p

s1
  100) ls1 ; (5.11)
Ps2 = (p

s2
  100) ls2 ; (5.12)
and
Ps3 = (p

s3
  150) ls3 : (5.13)
Considering ﬁrst s1, clearly if its oﬀer is to be accepted by any buyer, indicated by a
positive load, ls1 > 0, a non-negative payoﬀ is obtained if and only if ps1  100. The same is
true respectively of s2. However, for s3 this is the case if and only if ps3  150. s3 is therefore
unable to compete with s1 and s2 and will discontinue participation in the price war once the
best price drops below 150. s1 and s2 however, will continue undercutting each other until
their prices reach 100, at which point any further price cut would leave them with a negative
payoﬀ themselves. However, since they both share the same limit price, they will remain at
equilibrium with ps1 = ps2 = 100, and therefore ~LS = h12 ; 12 ; 0i.
Now let us add a fourth node to S, s4, such that cs4 = 150 and ws4 = 2:5. s4 has the
following payoﬀ function:
Ps4 = (2:5 ps4   150) ls4 : (5.14)
Now, s4’s cost is also 150, as with s3, however since its preference weight is 2:5, its payoﬀ
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will not drop below zero for positive loads so long as ps4  60. This is clearly a more
competitive position than s1 and s2 are able to take. The expected allocation at equilibrium
for this four node system is therefore ~LS = h0; 0; 0; 1i.
More generally, for purchases made by hyperrational bargain hunters, the seller or sellers
able to oﬀer the lowest price will share the load evenly between them. Any unable to oﬀer
this price will have a load of zero. The limit price for a seller si is
csi
wsi
.
This example enables us to observe the all or nothing nature of a population of buyers
made up entirely of bargain hunters, and it is here that the limit of Bertrand competition in its
classic sense is reached. In order to elicit more complex resource allocations, we must turn
to other buyer behaviours.
Time Savers
A buyer population consisting wholly of time savers will lead to a diﬀerent outcome. Recall
that in the homogeneous case sellers’ best response prices were dependent not on each other,
but on the buyers’ reserve price. So long as a seller ensures that it is in the buyers’ set of
acceptable sellers, SB , it can maximise its payoﬀ simply by maximising its price within that
constraint. The sellers’ cost and valuation parameters do not come into play in this case,
other than to ensure that there exists an oﬀer which places it in SB which does not return a
negative payoﬀ for the seller itself.
Therefore, the result for the homogeneous case for time savers also holds where sellers
have heterogeneous costs and preference weights. Since in this case each seller’s market share
is independent of its price, given a seller’s membership of SB , any operation on the price will
not aﬀect the load at equilibrium.
Spread Buyers
As was demonstrated in section 5.3.1, the iterative method used in chapter 3 for spread buyers
may be also employed in more complex cases to determine equilibria, and hence outcome
resource allocations. For the three node example discussed in section 5.3.2, the sellers’ payoﬀ
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functions are now
Ps1 =
jBjX
j=1
v   ps1
3v   (ps1 + ps2 + ps3)
(ws1p

s1
  cs1) ; (5.15)
Ps2 =
jBjX
j=1
v   ps2
3v   (ps1 + ps2 + ps3)
(ws2p

s2
  cs2) ; (5.16)
and
Ps3 =
jBjX
j=1
v   ps3
3v   (ps1 + ps2 + ps3)
(ws3p

s3
  cs3) : (5.17)
Following the iterative method, it can be calculated that this system is at equilibrium when
ps1 = p

s2
= 221:75 and ps3 = 237:49. At this point, none of the sellers may increase their
respective payoﬀ by unilaterally choosing a diﬀerent price. The allocation at these prices is
our predicted outcome allocation. This may be calculated for each resource provider using
equation 5.4:
lsi =
jBjX
j=1
v   psi
3v   (ps1 + ps2 + ps3)
: (5.18)
In the example discussed here, we therefore have an outcome resource allocation of ~LS =
h0:3575; 0:3575; 0:2850i. In other words, given the above valuation and cost parameters, we
expect s1 and s2 to take 35:75% of the load each, and s3 to take 28:5%.
Adding in the fourth seller at this point, the calculations must be repeated. In the four
node example discussed in section 5.3.2, but with spread buyers, the prices at equilibrium are
ps1 = p

s2
= 214:53, ps3 = 233:25 and ps4 = 200:73. The outcome resource allocation is
therefore ~LS = h0:2536; 0:2536; 0:1981; 0:2946i.
Critically, this result demonstrates that while bargain hunters and time savers do not pro-
vide the necessary tools with which to achieve stable uneven resource allocations, spread
buyers by contrast do just that. Given self-interested sellers with the appropriate cost and
value parameters, a population of spread buyers will make self-interested decisions such that
predictable outcome allocations are obtained. This is without any modiﬁcation to the buyers’
88
behaviour, and indeed without any desire or additional knowledge required on their part.
These results were presented in [2] and [3].
5.4 Determining Cost and Valuation Parameters
The ability to predict an outcome allocation, the allocation at equilibrium, given an initial
conﬁguration of nodes is in itself useful. However, this thesis is concerned with resource allo-
cation tasks which are approached with a particular objective in mind. How then, should the
the sellers be conﬁgured in order for the system to stabilise at a particular desired outcome?
More speciﬁcally, what seller valuation and cost values should be chosen in order for a system
containing spread buyers to evolve to such a desired outcome allocation?
The method for achieving this is essentially the reverse of the above process. Firstly, using
the desired load vector as a starting point, the prices at equilibrium which give rise to the
desired loads can be calculated. Secondly, suitable values for the sellers’ preference weight
and cost parameters are chosen to give rise to equilibrium at the required prices. In this
section, this process is explored also by means of some examples; ﬁrstly in a baseline case,
and then for a more complex objective.
5.4.1 A Baseline Example
Suppose initially that the objective is indeed to achieve an evenly balanced load between two
providers in the presence of a population of homogeneous spread buyers. This is equivalent
to the assumed objective in chapters 3 and 4. In this instance, the desired outcome may be
expressed as follows:
~LS = h1
2
;
1
2
i : (5.19)
Recall that these values are normalised by jBj. However, since the population of buyers
is homogeneous, for each seller, si 2 S it must be that
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PB
j=1 qij
jBj = qik ; 8bk 2 B ; (5.20)
where qik is the quantity of  bought by buyer bk from seller si. Therefore, for any seller
si, the non-normalised load lsi = 0:5  jBj if and only if qij = 0:5, for all bj 2 B. In the
case of homogeneous buyers, the required equilibrium prices may therefore be calculated as
if there were a single buyer, which for the sake of consistency is denoted by bj .
Now, given the buyer decision function for spread buyers (from equation 5.5 above), we
know that we require
(vbj   ps1)
(vbj   ps1) + (vbj   ps2)
= 0:5 ; (5.21)
which simpliﬁes to
ps1 = p

s2
: (5.22)
In other words, an evenly balanced load will be the outcome allocation when both sellers
quote the same price for  at equilibrium, as we already know. We also know from chapter
3, though it can be easily determined, that this equilibrium may be achieved with zero cost
values, cs1 , cs2 and when ws1 = ws2 = 1.
5.4.2 A More Complex Example
Now let us consider a more complex desired outcome allocation, ~LS = h23 ; 13i. We wish for
s1 to provide twice the load of s2.
Following the method described in section 5.4.1 above, for a given homogeneous buyer
valuation, vbj , the required relationship between ps1 and ps2 at equilibrium may be calculated,
in order to achieve the desired outcome:
(vbj   ps1)
(vbj   ps1) + (vbj   ps2)
=
2
3
; (5.23)
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which simpliﬁes to
ps2 =
vbj + p

s1
2
: (5.24)
In order to achieve the desired outcome allocation, the prices ps1 and ps2 must conform
to this relationship at equilibrium.
The question with which we are faced now becomes what valuation and cost values, cs1 ,
cs2 , ws1 and ws2 , can be chosen in order to satisfy this constraint. In order to begin to answer
this, we ﬁrstly take a look at how the equilibrium prices vary with respect to the diﬀerences
in seller valuations.
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Figure 5.1: Predicted equilibrium prices with respect to seller valuations. ws1 = 1:0, ws2 varies
along the x axis. First presented in [2].
Figure 5.1 shows two distinct regions within the space of heterogeneous seller valuations.
Firstly, note the region when ws2 < 13 , where s2 has no equilibrium price. This may be
explained as follows. Since Psi =
PjBj
j=1 qij(wsip

si
  csi), and lsi =
PjBj
j=1 qij , in order to
achieve any positive load lsi , with a non-negative payoﬀ Psi , it follows that we must have
wsi 
csi
psi
: (5.25)
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Now, the maximum possible price psi which would lead to any transaction occurring will
be the buyers’ reserve price, or valuation, vbj . Since, given a ﬁxed cost csi this is the price
which places a lower bound on the constraint on wsi , it follows that there exists no price
for which the seller si has a non-negative payoﬀ when wsi <
csi
vbj
. In the example illustrated
above, this is indeed 1
3
. Below this weight value no transactions will take place, since they
would require either buyer or seller to accept a negative payoﬀ.
However, given that s2 is unable to trade when wsi < 13 in the above example, in this
region s1 exists in a monopoly. As should be expected, it is therefore able to charge the
maximum acceptable price for the buyers, (i.e. ps1 = vbj ) and be conﬁdent of securing a
normalised load of 1.
In the competitive region of the weight space however, the equilibrium prices follow a
more complex pattern. Recall that in order to achieve the desired resource allocation, we
require a ratio between the sellers’ prices as described in equation 5.24. In the example,
when vbj = 300 ;8bj 2 B, we must require that
ps2 = 150 +
ps1
2
: (5.26)
In the example, this occurs when ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:42. Therefore, by ﬁxing values
for cs1 and cs2 , weight values may be identiﬁed which achieve the desired outcome allocation
of ls1 = 23  jBj, ls2 = 13  jBj. Normalised by jBj, we therefore have of course ~LS = h23 ; 13i.
5.5 Achieving Desired Resource Allocations
So far this chapter has followed the approach described in chapter 3, focusing largely on
predicted outcomes when sellers are able to calculate a best response to the current state of the
market. As chapter 4 demonstrated, this may not always provide an accurate representation
of the behaviour of a system under the assumption that only private information is available to
agents. Therefore, similarly to chapter 4 this section focuses on demonstrating the behaviour
of the model in simulation but for the heterogeneous scenario introduced in this chapter.
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As with chapter 4, competition between sellers is driven by the co-evolution of their re-
spective evolutionary market agents; their evolutionary ﬁtness being analogous to their payoﬀ
from interactions in the market, Psi for seller si 2 S. An evolutionary market agent, oper-
ating on behalf of a particular resource providing node, has the self-interested objective of
maximising its ﬁtness and hence payoﬀ. Section 4.3 described the evolutionary market agent
algorithm in detail.
5.5.1 Baseline Examples
Firstly, the predicted result in section 5.3.1 is also observed in simulation. Figure 5.2 shows
the normalised outcome loads for this two node example scenario. The predicted allocation
is quickly achieved, and remains stable.
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Figure 5.2: Evolution of the loads on s1 and s2, where ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:5. The resource
providers converge to loads of 0:6 and 0:4 respectively. Mean and standard deviation over
30 independent runs. First presented in [2].
Secondly, the case from section 5.4.2 is investigated in simulation, where the desired
outcome allocation is ~LS = h23 ; 13i. Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of the load on each
resource providing node over time, where ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:42 for 30 independent runs;
mean and standard deviation are shown. The system achieves the desired allocation, where s1
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of the loads on s1 and s2, where ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:42. The
resource providers converge to loads of 2
3
and 1
3
respectively. Mean and standard deviation
over 30 independent runs. First presented in [2].
is providing twice the level of load as s2, and clearly, as with the performance of the system in
the homogeneous case, a rough approximation to the predicted outcome is achieved quickly,
while the ﬁnal allocation remains stable.
5.5.2 A More Complex Example
The more complex four node case described in section 5.3.2 is now examined, in the presence
of 100 spread buyers. Table 5.1 compares the predicted and experimental outcomes for this
example. The experimental results show the state of the system at iteration 1000, for 30
independent runs.
Clearly, the co-evolutionary approach is able to achieve results very close to the predicted
outcome, with a high degree of reliability. It is however, worth noting that the unusually high
standard deviation of s4 is due to an outlier in the data obtained. Since the data represents
a snapshot of the system at iteration 1000, and given the continued Gaussian mutation of
prices about the equilibrium, occasional temporary outliers are to be expected.
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Seller Predicted Price Experimental Price Standard Deviation
s1 214:53 214:79 6:41
s2 214:53 217:68 6:10
s3 233:25 233:26 5:98
s4 200:73 201:62 10:34
Seller Predicted Load Experimental Load Standard Deviation
s1 0:2536 0:2503 0:0161
s2 0:2536 0:2535 0:0156
s3 0:1981 0:1999 0:0133
s4 0:2946 0:2967 0:0220
Table 5.1: Comparison of predicted and experimental outcome allocations. Experimental
results calculated over 30 independent runs. First presented in [3].
5.6 Exploring Equilibria
Finally, section 5.4.2 and particularly ﬁgure 5.1 above showed how equilibrium prices vary
with respect to diﬀerences in seller valuations. But how does this translate into outcome
resource allocations? Figure 5.4 illustrates for the two node example studied in that section,
the corresponding predicted outcome loads between s1 and s2, normalised by the size of the
buyer population.
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Figure 5.4: Predicted outcome loads with respect to seller valuations. ws1 = 1:0, ws2 varies
along the x axis. First presented in [2].
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Here, the monopolistic region described in section 5.4.2 is clearly visible, when ws2 < 13 ,
as ls1 = 1 and ls2 = 0. The relationship between the valuation diﬀerences and the outcome
allocation in the competitive region is however more complex. This is due to the non-linearity
of the spread buyer decision function being employed here, and the shape of the curves in
this region are dependent upon this behaviour.
This relationship is also observed in simulation, when sellers have access to only private
information. Figure 5.5 shows experimental simulation results compared with the predictions
in ﬁgure 5.4. Mean and standard deviation results are shown, in each case at the allocation
reached after 1000 iterations.
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of predicted and experimental outcome loads with respect to seller
valuations. ws1 = 1:0, ws2 varies along the x axis. Experimental results are mean and
standard deviation over 30 independent runs. First presented in [2].
Firstly, note that in the competitive region of the valuation space the experimental results
follow the predicted outcome loads to a high degree of accuracy. The stochastic nature
of the evolutionary market agents’ algorithms ensures that there remains some variation at
equilibrium, due to ongoing mutation.
During the monopolistic phase however, when ws2 < 13 , not only do the experimental
results for ls1 only loosely follow their predicted path, but also there is a high standard
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deviation between the simulation runs. However, further observation reveals that for the
experimental results in this region, ls1 + ls2 is often less than 1, meaning that the users’
desired provision is not being met in all cases. This is in fact also due to ongoing mutation
in s1’s population at equilibrium.
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Figure 5.6: Evolution of price in a monopoly. Mutation of the seller’s price about the buyers’
valuation leads to instability. Results from a typical run when ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:1. First
presented in [2].
The results in ﬁgure 5.6, from a typical run when ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:1, illustrate
this eﬀect. As the price mutates, there is a probability that it will increase above the buyers’
maximum acceptable price. When it does so, no transactions occur, as the seller, s1 in this
case, has priced itself out of the market. The result is temporarily both a load and payoﬀ
of zero. Of course, this individual will quickly be selected out, and the price will return
to a lower value, however the presence of this step function in the ﬁtness landscape of the
evolutionary market agent means that this behaviour will continue. Nevertheless, this is not
of great concern, since the price’s proximity to a step in the ﬁtness landscape only occurs in
monopoly, and will not aﬀect regular operation of the algorithm.
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5.7 Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter has considered decentralised computational resource allocation when resource
providing nodes have heterogeneous capabilities. In this scenario, sellers are considered to
value their resources diﬀerently, when compared with a common notion of money.
The market-based approach in introduced in chapter 3 was extended and generalised in
order to take account of these concepts. It was demonstrated that by accounting for this
heterogeneity of seller valuations, stable, desirable uneven outcome resource allocations can
be obtained. As with the homogeneous case, this is achieved despite a lack of central control
or cooperation between nodes; only self-interested payoﬀ maximising behaviour is relied
upon. The possibility of complex buyer decision functions means that this is not a trivial
task, since as a result there may not be a straightforward mapping between valuations and
the outcome allocation.
Further to this, a method was described for determining suitable parameters for the re-
source providing nodes, given a desired outcome resource allocation and buyer behaviour.
The ability of the approach to achieve a desired uneven allocation is achieved transparently
to resource users, as no modiﬁcation to the buyers’ behaviour is required.
It is therefore possible to predict the outcome resource allocation for given sets of buyers
and sellers, or conversely to parametrise them in order to achieve a desired outcome. Sellers
taking account of the cost of provision, and their valuation of money when compared with
this cost, leads to a resource allocation which reﬂects the varied ability of resource providers.
Furthermore, simulations making use of evolutionary market agents demonstrated that the pre-
dicted outcomes for spread buyers are also obtained when sellers have only private information
available, as in the homogeneous case.
This chapter’s contributions are therefore the following:
• An extension of the posted oﬀer market-based approach described in chapter 3 to
consider heterogeneous resource providing node capabilities, by means of additional
cost and valuation parameters.
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• A game theoretic analysis of how the extended model can obtain additional stable,
predictable, uneven outcome resource allocations at equilibrium.
• Experimental evidence which demonstrates that these outcomes can be achieved under
the assumption of only private information, when sellers use evolutionary market agents.
• A method of determining suitable seller cost and valuation parameters in order to elicit
the additional desired outcome resource allocations.
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CHAPTER 6
USING MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES TO
ATTAIN DESIRED QUALITIES OF
SERVICE
A question of need is a question of taste.
Neil Tennant and Chris Lowe
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This chapter builds upon the previously investigated retail-inspired approach, in which
resource providing nodes compete on price to sell their resources in a posted oﬀer market
mechanism. The extension presented in this chapter allows for resources to be described
over additional quality attributes, in addition to simply their price. In this extended multiple
attribute model, resource users may have diﬀerent preferences and constraints over the at-
tributes, and as such form niches in the market. Sellers therefore may target particular market
segments.
A game theoretic analysis of sellers’ behaviour in the multiple attribute version of the
model is presented, and results compared for when buyers act as bargain hunters and spread
buyers. It is demonstrated that in the presence of bargain hunters, niches in the market emerge,
but myoptimal selling agents become trapped in an unending cyclical competitive dynamic,
similar to the price wars described by Kephart et al. [9]. When buyers adopt spread buyer
behaviour, the cyclical behaviour is no longer present, and sellers instead converge to an
equilibrium state, providing their resources with price and quality attributes appropriate to
the buyer population. Qualitative diﬀerences are highlighted between two attribute and three
attribute scenarios; in the latter case market segmentation is no longer observed with spread
buyers.
Section 6.1 begins the chapter by motivating the extension to the original model presented
in chapter 3. In section 6.2 the multiple attribute extension is described, including a discussion
of agent behaviour and potential utility models. In section 6.3 the multiple attribute payoﬀ
landscape is introduced and section 6.4 investigates competitive seller dynamics in the model
with a homogeneous buyer population. The segmentation of selling agents into niches is
illustrated in sections 6.5 and 6.6 through a series of examples. Throughout, the eﬀects of
both bargain hunters and spread buyers are considered. Finally, section 6.7 presents a discussion
on what can be learnt from this analysis.
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6.1 Motivation
So far, we have seen how posted oﬀer markets may be used to allocate instances of a resource
amongst a set of agents, using evolutionary algorithms as an adaptive pricing mechanism.
Hitherto however, the resource has been assumed to be homogeneous in type, a unit of
resource from one seller is perfectly substitutable for that from another. The competitive
element of the systems investigated has been the price charged by each seller per unit of the
resource in question.
In many scenarios this will be suﬃcient, since many computational resources are equiva-
lent regardless of their source. For example, in a homogeneous compute cluster environment,
it is unlikely that a user will have a preference over which available node is used to perform
the computation, since the end result is the same. Similarly, a web service providing accu-
rate time may be oﬀered by any number of functionally correct servers, and from the user’s
perspective, which one is chosen will not matter.
However in other scenarios, users of computational resources will vary in their non-
functional requirements. For example, Zeng et al. [118] highlight that users of web services will
have diﬀerent preferences and constraints regarding quality of service (QoS) attributes, such
as execution time and reliability. They argue that mechanisms for the allocation of resources
in such systems should be designed to take account of such a heterogeneity of constraints on
and preferences between non-functional requirements.
6.2 Extending the Market Model with Multiple Attributes
The model used here is an extension of that described in chapter 3, the retail-inspired posted
oﬀer market. Chapters 4 and 5 showed that this can be a useful mechanism for achieving
a balanced load as well as other stable resource allocations in decentralised computational
systems. In the original model, resources are described purely in terms of their price, and are
assumed otherwise to be perfectly substitutable.
Using the original notation, a resource  is oﬀered by a seller si for the price psi . If 
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may instead be described over a number of attributes 1, 2, ... n, then the oﬀered price psi
may be replaced by a vector of oﬀered attribute values, ~xsi . For example:
~xsi = hx1si ; x2si i (6.1)
6.2.1 Agent Behaviour
As in the original model, buying agents are faced with a decision problem: given the oﬀers
available, which one(s) should be chosen? Sellers are faced with a similar decision: what oﬀer
will provide the maximum payoﬀ given the buyers and competitors? In order to decide this,
the agent is endowed with a utility model which reﬂects the decision making priorities of its
owner: the user or supplier of the resource.
To a certain extent, it does not matter what this model is; the agent may treat its utility
function as a black box, into which it places an oﬀer, and from which it receives a utility
value for that oﬀer. In this way, oﬀers may be compared against each other both in terms of
preference and the magnitude of the preference.
However, in order to aid analysis at this stage, a common utility model frommulti-attribute
utility theory (MAUT) [49], a branch of decision theory concerned with multiple criteria,
is used. Its aim is to analyse and compare the attractiveness of a set of alternatives, by
algebraically calculating a single conjoint utility value for each alternative. This approach
has long been useful in real world decision making [119, 120, 121], where an expert’s time is
valuable or limited, and an analytical model may be used as an aid to the decision process.
Similar reasoning applies here, where for example, the user of a resource may not be willing or
able to assess each and every oﬀer for its attractiveness themself, and an agent in possession
of a model may save considerable time and eﬀort.
The translation of human or business needs and preferences into utility functions and
weights for their respective agents is a large and complex task, and this thesis does not
pretend to contribute to that ﬁeld. Nevertheless, the commonly used additive utility function
of MAUT [49], which is relevant to many real world decision processes is that which is used
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in this chapter.
It is important however to note the assumptions relied upon by MAUT, particularly that
of utility independence of attributes. Brieﬂy, if the utility function of attribute x does not shift
strategically as attribute y varies, then x is utility independent of y. In other words, for x to
be utility independent of y, all the utility functions for x, deﬁned as y varies, must be positive
linear transformations of each other [49].
6.2.2 Additive Utility Model
As discussed, agents’ utility functions may be constructed in a variety of ways in order to
represent the underlying desirability of diﬀerent combinations of attributes. One of the sim-
plest utility models in MAUT is the additive utility function [49]. The additive utility model
assumes a reﬁnement of utility independence: additive independence of the attributes. For
attribute x to be additively independent of attribute y, the utility contribution of x must not
be dependent on the value of y. If this assumption is true for all attributes, then the additive
model may be used. For a more formal deﬁnition of additive independence, see Keeney and
Raiﬀa [49].
In the additive model the decision maker calculates a weighted sum of the utility associated
with each attribute. An attribute’s weight represents the importance of that attribute to the
decision maker, and gives its contribution to the overall utility of the alternative. The outcome
of the function is a conjoint value for each alternative, which may be used to determine the
overall relative preference. Describing an agent a’s consideration of an oﬀer by seller si, the
agent’s utility would be as follows:
ua(~x

si
) =
nX
j=1
kja u
j
a(x
j
si
) (6.2)
The attribute’s utility function uja determines the unweighted contribution of the jth at-
tribute to agent a’s utility. The attribute’s weight or scaling constant, kja represents the
105
importance of the attribute to the decision maker, agent a.
The additive utility model is designed such that attribute utility contributions normalised
to between 0 and 1 yield an outcome conjoint utility also between 0 and 1. Therefore the
scaling constants are also normalised, such that 8kja ; 0  kja  1 andPnj=1 kja = 1.
6.2.3 A Simple Example
The decision process may be illustrated by means of a simple example. Consider a buyer b
faced with the following oﬀers from sellers s1 and s2:
~xs1 = h600; 300i
~xs2 = h800; 500i
where a high value for the ﬁrst attribute is undesirable to the buyer, but a high value for
the second attribute is desirable. The buyer agent’s attribute utility functions will of course
determine the ﬁnal utility value, but in this example assume that they are linear functions
which normalise from between some minimum value 0 and maximum value 1000, and in the
case of the ﬁrst attribute, obtains the inverse. This may result in a conjoint utility of, for
example,
ub (~x

s1
) =  0:6k1b + 0:3k2b
ub (~x

s2
) =  0:8k1b + 0:5k2b
Since ub (~xs1) > 0 if and only if k
2
b > 2k
1
b , the oﬀer from s1 is only acceptable to b if
the second attribute is twice as important as the ﬁrst. For s2’s oﬀer, ub (~xs2) > 0 if and only
if k2b > 1:6k1b , which is somewhat less demanding.
Note that though this example is described in terms of a buyer agent, the same approach
may be applied to sellers, when comparing the utilities of two or more oﬀers.
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6.2.4 Budget Constraints
The utility functions discussed above describe how an agent may order and compare oﬀers
described over multiple attributes. However, they do not consider that an oﬀer, though
attractive, may be unattainable. A simple example of this is an oﬀer which, from a buyer’s
perspective, provides a highly attractive resource at a reasonable but unaﬀordable cost. In this
scenario, an undesirable attribute such as price, may be beyond the buyer’s budget constraint.
Similar constraints may exist on desirable attributes; a buying agent may be instructed
not to accept an oﬀer where for example, a security attribute is below a certain threshold.
Similarly, a seller agent may be physically unable to provide a resource with a latency below a
certain limit value. Regardless of its utility, an oﬀer where any attribute is beyond the budget
constraint of the decision maker is therefore considered unacceptable and it is rejected.
In this thesis, lower and upper constraint values are denoted by a line under or over the
attribute value respectively. For example, x1s = 100:00 and x1b = 300 indicates that seller
s will not accept an oﬀer for which x1 is below 100:00, and buyer b will not accept an oﬀer
for which x1 is above 300.
6.3 Baseline Scenario: Seller Unit Payoﬀ
In the extended multiple attribute model, two attributes may be used to represent notions of
price and quality. Let us examine how buyers and sellers will interact in this new scenario.
Figure 6.1 shows the payoﬀ landscape for a seller selling one unit of the resource . The
seller uses the additive utility model, as described in section 6.2.2, with linear attribute utility
functions, such that positive values of 1 lead to positive utility values and positive values of
2 lead to negative utility values. Its preference weights are 0:7; 0:3 for attributes 1 and 2
respectively. Higher payoﬀ is indicated by the lightness of the blue area, while the region in
which oﬀers result in negative payoﬀ is indicated in red, with the darker the red meaning the
greater the loss of payoﬀ per transaction.
Unsurprisingly, if the sale is guaranteed, the seller can obtain its maximum payoﬀ by
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Figure 6.1: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for seller s1, for the sale of a single unit
of resource .
maximising x1s1 (notionally price) and minimising x2s1 (notionally quality). Note that the
structure of this landscape remains the same as the quantity of  sold increases; the payoﬀ
merely scales uniformly with the quantity.
6.4 Homogeneous Buyers
Suppose now that there is a homogeneous set of buyers, B, to whom the resource is oﬀered.
To avoid abusing notation too much, this analysis does not refer to the whole set of buyers,
but instead to a single buyer b 2 B. However, since all the buyers in B are the same, the
analysis of b may be seen as representative of B as a whole. Each buyer has an upper budget
constraint, as described in section 6.2.4, in terms of attribute 1.
6.4.1 Monopolistic Scenario
Firstly, let us consider the payoﬀ available to the seller in the monopolistic case, that when
there is no competition from any other sellers. Figure 6.2 shows the payoﬀ landscape in the
presence of a homogeneous population of buyers, where the buyers’ budget constraint x1b is
set at 200:00.
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Figure 6.2: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for seller s1, for the sale of a single unit
of resource , where the buyer has a upper constraint of 200:00 on attribute 1.
Here the optimal oﬀer from seller s1’s perspective is still simply to minimise x2s1 and to
maximise x1s1 as much as possible within the buyers’ budget constraint. Any oﬀer for which
x1s1 is greater than the budget constraint of 200:00 will be rejected, leading to a payoﬀ of zero
for the seller.
Now consider also that the buyer makes use of an additive utility model with linear at-
tribute utility functions, as described in section 6.2.3. Figure 6.3 shows the seller’s payoﬀ
landscape with such a buyer whose preference weights k1b and k2b are 0:3 and 0:7 respec-
tively.
Note also that due to the seller’s own preference weights, if x1s1 is suﬃciently low in relation
to x2s1 , such that k1s1 u1s1 (x1s1 ) < k2s1 u2s1 (x2s1 ), then the seller’s payoﬀ drops below zero. This
is indicated by the line separating the blue and red regions of the ﬁgure.
Therefore, there exists a feasible region within the attribute space, bounded by the triangle
(0; 0); (x1b ;
k
1
b x
1
b
k
2
b
); (x1b ;
ks1x
1
b
k
2
b
). Given our assumption of only voluntary interaction between
buyers and sellers, oﬀers outside this region will be rejected either by the seller or the buyer,
since the resulting payoﬀ will be below zero for at least one of them.
Indeed, in this monopolistic example, the optimal place for our seller to position itself
is at the buyer’s budget constraint in terms of attribute 1, such that x1s1 = 200:00 in the
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Figure 6.3: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for seller s1, for the sale of a single unit of
resource , where the buyer has a upper constraint of 200:00 on attribute 1 and preference
weights 0:3; 0:7.
example, and at the corresponding limit value for attribute 2, x2s1 =
0:3200:00
0:7
= 85:71; the
optimal oﬀer for the seller is at the lower right corner of the triangle.
6.4.2 Competitive Scenario: Bargain Hunters
Now, if the seller s1 is in competition with another seller, say s2, the payoﬀ landscape for
each will also depend on the position of their competitor’s oﬀer. Once the optimal position
in the attribute space, as identiﬁed in section 6.4.1 is occupied by a competitor, the seller’s
payoﬀ landscape has shifted.
Suppose, as in the previous section, s1 has positioned itself at 200:00; 85:71. If the com-
peting seller s2 were to occupy exactly the same position, then the quantity sold to the two
sellers would be expected to be equal, and the payoﬀ available would be shared between them;
each seller would see their payoﬀ decrease by half.
At this stage it is necessary to consider the behaviour of the buyers to whom the sellers
are selling. For consistency, the buyer types introduced in section 3.1.3 are considered here.
If the buyers are bargain hunters, and therefore purchase everything from the single most
attractive seller, then rather than position itself at the optimal monopolistic position in the
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Figure 6.4: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for seller s1, given one competitor oﬀering
200:00; 100:00 and a homogeneous population of bargain hunters.
attribute space, s2 can obtain a higher payoﬀ by improving on this oﬀer by a small amount,
when viewed from the buyers’ perspective. This may involve either reducing x1s2 (price) or
increasing x2s2 (quality), or both, by some small amount.
The distance from s1’s oﬀer within which a positive diﬀerence will be realised to s2’s payoﬀ
will depend on the gradient of the payoﬀ landscape around the s1’s position, though in our
example, suppose s2 increases x2s1 from 85:71 to 100:00, while keeping x2s1 the same. By
doing so, it can expect to earn a greater payoﬀ than half of that available at the monopolistic
position.
As a result of this move, the payoﬀ landscape for the original seller, s1 is also modiﬁed.
Figure 6.4 shows the resulting payoﬀ landscape for s1, given that s2 is oﬀering 200:00; 100:00.
The structure of the landscape is identical to in ﬁgure 6.3 except that as a result of s2’s
action, the bottom right corner of the triangle bounding the feasible region for s1 is now at
the position of s2’s oﬀer. Any oﬀer which would be less attractive to the buyers than that of
s2 would be rejected.
Therefore, s1 improves its oﬀer also, and subsequently s2 is required to do likewise. As a
result, the feasible region of the payoﬀ landscape decreases in size, and the peak also drops
in height. Figure 6.5 shows the resulting landscape when competition has driven the oﬀers to
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Figure 6.5: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for seller s2, as a result of competition on
attribute 2, with a homogeneous population of bargain hunters.
200:00; 300:00. The colour scaling has been kept consistent throughout this series of ﬁgures,
to indicate that the height of the peak decreases as competition drives x2s1 and x2s2 upwards.
This sequence of competitive adaptation and co-adaptation culminates in x2s1 and x2s2
reaching the sellers own limit values, determined by their utility functions, at which point
both sellers receive no payoﬀ, and have no option to do otherwise.
It is also possible, of course, that rather than increase x2s1 , the seller could respond to
competition by decreasing x1s1 . Recall the payoﬀ landscape before competition ensued, de-
picted in ﬁgure 6.3. However, this would in fact be a fruitless move. Figure 6.6 shows the
payoﬀ associated with the attribute space from the buyer’s perspective. Here, light blue is
used to indicate high payoﬀ for the buyer, and dark red to indicate greater losses on the part
of the buyer.
It is clear that when faced with a choice between two sellers, one which has responded to
competition by increasing x2 and another by reducing x1 , that the buyers would prefer the
seller with the higher value for x2 , maintaining x1 at the budget constraint. For this reason,
sellers dropping below the budget constraint for x1 would be expected to therefore quickly
respond by returning to the budget constraint line.
We therefore observe that self-interested competition between the two sellers described
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Figure 6.6: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape from the buyers’ perspective. Compare
with ﬁgure 6.3.
in the example will result in x1s1 and x1s2 remaining at the budget constraint, while x2s1 x2s2
increase due to competitive pressure, until the resulting payoﬀ for both competing sellers is
zero.
The analysis presented here is indeed a two-dimensional version of that applied to the
single attribute case, described as a price war in section 3.2, and is reminiscent of Bertrand
competition, where sellers compete on price alone. The Nash equilibrium here is for both
sellers to make oﬀers at the top corner of the triangle bounding the feasible region, which
is unaﬀected by competition and positioned at (x1b ;
ks1x
1
b
k
2
b
). Both sellers will both receive a
payoﬀ of zero.
6.4.3 Competitive Scenario: Spread Buyers
As was shown in section 3.2, in the single attribute case spread buyers give rise to a somewhat
diﬀerent outcome; the same is true in the multiple attribute case. Since the diﬀerences be-
tween bargain hunters and spread buyers are concerned only with how multiple sellers making
acceptable oﬀers are treated by the buyers, in the absence of any competition a seller is faced
with exactly the same payoﬀ landscape as in ﬁgure 6.3 above. When there is only one seller
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Figure 6.7: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, given one competitor
oﬀering 200:00; 85:71 and a homogeneous population of spread buyers.
present, it is of course able to behave as a monopolist, as described in section 6.4.1.
When faced with a choice between two or more competing sellers however, the spread
buyers will give rise to a diﬀerent payoﬀ landscape. For ease of comparison, in the following
analysis all else remains equal between this and the bargain hunter case in section 6.4.2.
Suppose that initially seller s1 oﬀers the monopolistically optimal oﬀer of 200:00; 87:51, as
it was shown to be in section 6.4.1. A competing seller, s2 is then faced with the landscape
shown in ﬁgure 6.7, which may be compared with that in ﬁgure 6.4.
Here the familiar shape of the payoﬀ function arising from spread buyers, introduced in
section 3.2.3 can be seen. However, this time the curve projects horizontally from the budget
constraint line. As with bargain hunters, there is a clear peak in the landscape for the seller
to occupy; in this example the optimal, or best response oﬀer is 200:00; 110:14. Assuming
that s2 does indeed respond with this, the payoﬀ landscape for its competitor s1 becomes that
depicted in ﬁgure 6.8.
As can be seen, both the location and curve of the peak shifts with this response. For s1
the best response is now 200:00; 159:72. The equilibrium oﬀer may be found by calculating
best responses in an iterative manner, as was demonstrated in the single attribute case in
section 3.2.3 and used again in section 5.4. In the example given here, equilibrium is reached
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Figure 6.8: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1, given one competitor
oﬀering 200:00; 110:14 and a homogeneous population of spread buyers.
when both sellers oﬀer 200:00; 212:68. At this stage, the payoﬀ landscape for both sellers
is that in ﬁgure 6.9, where the peak in the landscape, the best response is the same as that
which both sellers made previously. The system is stable.
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Figure 6.9: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, given one competitor
oﬀering the equilibrium oﬀer of 200:00; 212:68 to a homogeneous population of spread buyers.
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6.5 Heterogeneous Buyer Constraints
Of course, as discussed in section 6.1, not all buyers can be expected to have the same budget
constraints or preferences. A heterogeneous population of buyers will lead to a more complex
payoﬀ landscape for the sellers, and result in more complex dynamics between them. In this
section, the model is analysed when buyers vary in their budget constraints.
It has long been understood [122] that market segmentation is a likely outcome of markets
with heterogeneous buyers, since it becomes advantageous for sellers to adapt to the diﬀerent
needs of the buyers. This is the process by which sellers occupy niches in the market, each
niche appropriate to a particular proﬁle of buyer. As Dickson and Ginter [122] describe, the
market may be viewed as a set of segments, or sub-markets, which sellers may target.
As this section will demonstrate, the presence of heterogeneous constraints in a population
of buyers is suﬃcient to lead to the presence of market niches even when in all other respects
the buyers are homogeneous. Here this is referred to as constraint-induced niching.
6.5.1 Monopolistic Scenario
First consider the payoﬀ landscape for a seller in the presence of a population of bargain
hunters. Here the utility functions and preferences remain as in the example in the previous
sections, however half of the buyers have a budget constraint of 200:00 and half of 100:00, in
terms of attribute x1 . This landscape is shown in ﬁgure 6.10, which may be compared with
the homogeneous case in ﬁgure 6.3. Colour scaling has been reset from the previous ﬁgures,
for clarity’s sake.
As can be seen, there are now two peaks in the payoﬀ landscape, each of a similar structure
to in the homogeneous case. Indeed, these might be described as two sub-markets in the
same attribute space. In this particular case, the two peaks provide equivalent payoﬀ for
a monopolistic seller, though this will not generally be true. Figure 6.11 shows two further
potential landscapes generated only through changes to the buyers’ budget constraints.
116
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
100
200
300
400
500
xs1
Π1
x s
1
Π
2
Figure 6.10: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1, with a heterogeneous
population of buyers. Half of the buyers have a budget constraint of 100:00, half 200:00.
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Figure 6.11: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscapes for a seller s1, with a heterogeneous
population of buyers. The buyers’ budget constraints are split equally between 150:00 and
200:00 on the left plot and 100:00 and 300:00 on the right one.
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6.5.2 Competitive Scenario: Bargain Hunters
As in the homogeneous case, let us now consider the landscape as presented to a seller s2
with a single competitor. Suppose given the landscape in ﬁgure 6.10, s1 oﬀers 200:00; 87:51,
at the right peak. This has the same eﬀect on this particular segment as was seen in the
homogeneous case in section 6.4.2. s2 is able to increase its payoﬀ by improving its oﬀer
over s1, and which point s1 responds by improving its oﬀer further. Competition ensues for
the provision of the resource to the right sub-market. Figure 6.12 shows the payoﬀ landscape
presented to s2 during this price war, speciﬁcally when s1 is oﬀering 200:00; 150:00.
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Figure 6.12: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, with a heterogeneous
population of bargain hunters. Half of the buyers have budget constraints of 100:00, half
200:00. One competing seller oﬀers 200:00; 150:00.
As can be seen, competition on the right peak actually has the eﬀect not only of bringing
down the payoﬀ for those competing for it, as was seen in the homogeneous case, but also of
reducing the payoﬀ available for a seller contemplating the lower peak. Here, the seller can
of course respond by making an improved oﬀer over its competitor on the right peak, and
continuing the escalation as was the only option in the homogeneous example. This will of
course ultimately bring down the payoﬀ available at this peak until it reaches zero. However,
in the heterogeneous case, the seller can also respond by moving to the lower peak, albeit at
a lower payoﬀ, but avoiding the competitive pressure.
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Figure 6.13: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape illustrating competition between two
sellers on a single peak. The payoﬀ available from the buyers being competed for decreases
until it is lower than that available at the other market niche. If competition continues,
eventually it reaches zero.
Suppose ﬁrst that competition does continue on the right peak. Figure 6.13 shows how
competition reduces the payoﬀ available as the right peak continues to shift towards higher
values for x2 . Firstly, the peaks become roughly equal in height. Subsequently, the higher
valued peak reduces close to zero payoﬀ. Of course, unlike in the homogeneous case, once
competition has reached the zero payoﬀ state, the system is not stable, as the left peak now
clearly oﬀers a higher payoﬀ for any seller wishing to move to it.
As can be seen, once the payoﬀ received by a seller competing for the right peak is
suﬃciently low, it may increase its payoﬀ by moving its oﬀer to the left peak in order to target
the other niche. Figure 6.14 shows the payoﬀ landscape facing seller s2 once its competitor
s1 has made this jump to the lower valued peak with an oﬀer of 100:00; 40:00.
As can be clearly seen, immediately the two original peaks are recreated, as the com-
petitive pressure is removed. Of course, subsequent competition on either peak will lead to
another escalation of x2 , until again it appears beneﬁcial to switch to the other peak, and
the process begins again. Figure 6.15 illustrates this eﬀect this time on the left peak.
The cycle of competition observed in this model is the same eﬀect as observed by Kephart
et al. [9] in their study of a model of a computational market in which agents compete
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Figure 6.14: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, with a heterogeneous
population of bargain hunters. Half of the buyers have budget constraints of 100:00, half of
200:00. One competing seller oﬀers 100:00; 40:00.
to provide relevant informational services to consumers. They show that when sellers are
myopically optimal, or myoptimal the presence of multiple peaks in their payoﬀ landscape
leads to an unending series of price wars, interrupted by abrupt resets. In the example
presented in this section, competition is not on price, but instead on another attribute, but
the logic behind it remains the same. Kephart et al. argue that these limit-cycle wars are
qualitatively the same as those observed in a model by Edgeworth with a similar two-peak
payoﬀ landscape, despite the causes for the multiple peaks being diﬀerent.
As has been shown, a seller’s decision on which sub-market to target is not straightforward,
since the relative heights of the peaks vary with the competitor’s oﬀer. Figure 6.16 shows for
s2 the height of each peak, the maximum payoﬀ available by targeting each market segment,
as a competitor s1 varies its oﬀer. On the left, the competitor explores the left peak by ﬁxing
x1s1 at 100:00 and varying x2s1 (shown on the horizontal axis). The lines show the subsequent
maximum payoﬀ obtainable by s2 in each niche. Similarly, on the right s1 explores the right
peak, ﬁxing x1s1 at 200:00 and again varying x2s1 . The maximum obtainable payoﬀ for s2 is
again shown for each niche.
The most notable feature of the plots in ﬁgure 6.16 is that in the right hand plot the lines
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Figure 6.15: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, with a heterogeneous
population of bargain hunters, Half of the buyers have budget constraints of 100:00, half of
200:00. Illustration of the eﬀect of competition on the left peak.
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Figure 6.16: Maximum payoﬀ available to s2 in each market niche, as a single competitor’s
oﬀer varies. Left: The competitor ﬁxes x1s1 = 100:00 and x2s1 varies on the x-axis. Right:
The competitor ﬁxes x1s1 = 200:00 and x2s1 varies on the x-axis. The lines indicate the height
of each peak from s1’s perspective. The buyers are bargain hunters.
intersect, whereas on the left plot they do not. Assuming sellers begin optimistically, oﬀering
at the top of one of the peaks near the monopolistic price, it is clear that the right peak
provides more payoﬀ regardless of which niche the competitor targets. We have seen that
competition will drive their values for x2 upwards on the right peak, here towards the right
on the right hand graph. This will continue until they reach the intersection point. Here, one
of the sellers, say s2, may realise that it is in its interest to switch to the left peak, where lower
values for both x1s2 and x2s2 promise to provide a higher payoﬀ.
Once the competitive pressure is removed from s1, it may itself obtain a higher payoﬀ by
decreasing x2s1 and keeping x1s1 at 200:00. Of course, s2 will quickly realise that it is in fact
better oﬀ back on the right peak with x1s2 = 200:00 and competition on x2 will begin again.
This process is therefore cyclical, as myopic payoﬀ-maximising agents compete against
each other for the higher valued right niche, their payoﬀs decreasing until one of them is
tempted instead by the left niche and jumps there. This relaxing of competitive pressure
allows their values for the second attribute to quickly decrease, before the competition begins
again.
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As Kephart [9] describes, agents with diﬀerent levels of strategic rationality and foresight
will treat this scenario in diﬀerent ways. However, most importantly it should be noted
that though this kind of game theoretic reasoning may be performed here, individual sellers
without suﬃcient knowledge of the buyers or competing sellers will not be able to do likewise,
since they do not possess the details of the payoﬀ landscape in order to ﬁnd its maximum.
Therefore, what are evolutionary market agents to make of the landscape dynamics brought
about by the bargain hunter behaviour? Certainly they would be expected to be able to ﬁnd
one or more of the peaks, though as with the single attribute case described in section 4.4,
the position of the peak when they ﬁnd it will be arbitrary. Similarly again to the single
attribute case, there exists a large step in the payoﬀ landscape, around two edges of both
peaks. This step will cause the same issues as in the single attribute case, and leads to the
same problem as described in section 4.4. The behaviour of evolutionary market agents in the
multiple attribute model is dealt with in chapter 7.
6.5.3 Competitive Scenario: Spread Buyers
Now the above scenario, competition between two sellers for a population of buyers with
heterogeneous budget constraints, is considered again, only with spread buyers rather than
bargain hunters. As with the homogeneous case, for a monopolistic seller, there is no diﬀerence
to the payoﬀ landscape between spread buyers and bargain hunters. Figure 6.17 shows the
example landscape presented to a monopolist.
In this particular example, both peaks are of equal height, but as shown in ﬁgure 6.11,
this will not necessarily be the case. As with the previous scenarios, this analysis begins by
supposing that s1 makes an oﬀer on the right peak of 200:00; 87:51. This presents s2 with
the payoﬀ landscape shown in ﬁgure 6.18.
The familiar spread buyer payoﬀ curves appear in this landscape as in the homogeneous
case, but here there is one for each market segment. It is important to note that as with
the bargain hunters case the presence of an oﬀer on the right peak brings down the payoﬀ
available at the left peak too. This is since a seller occupying that peak would no longer
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Figure 6.17: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1, with a heterogeneous
population of spread buyers. Half of the buyers have budget constraints of 100:00, half of
200:00. There is no competitor.
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Figure 6.18: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, with a heterogeneous
population of spread buyers. Half of the buyers have budget constraints of 100:00, half of
200:00. One competing seller oﬀers 200:00; 87:51.
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Figure 6.19: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s2, with a heterogeneous
population of spread buyers. Half of the buyers have budget constraints of 100:00, half of
200:00. One competing seller oﬀers 200:00; 100:00.
be chosen by buyers with the higher budget constraint, since there is now an oﬀer available
which is more attractive to them.
There is now a global optimum from s2’s perspective, since the right peak, at 200:00; 110:14
promises a payoﬀ of 49:82, compared with 47:07 at the left peak. Assuming s2 oﬀers this,
ﬁgure 6.19 shows the resulting payoﬀ landscape for s1.
As may be expected from the bargain hunter case, competition brings down the payoﬀ
available at each peak. However, unlike with bargain hunters, a stable equilibrium may be
reached, as it is not in the sellers’ interest to compete down as far as their break-even line.
Following the iterative method, in this example the two sellers are at equilibrium when one
oﬀers 100:00; 67:57 and the other oﬀers 200:00; 161:18. Most importantly, with two peaks and
two sellers, throughout the competitive process the sellers maximise their respective payoﬀs by
segmenting in order to occupy diﬀerent peaks. At equilibrium, the stable pair of landscapes
in ﬁgure 6.20 is presented to both sellers.
In order to understand this niching eﬀect further, ﬁgure 6.21 shows plots equivalent to
those in ﬁgure 6.16 but for spread buyers. The plots show the height of each peak, the maximum
payoﬀ available in each niche for s2, as its competitor s1 increases the value of x2s1 in its oﬀer.
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Figure 6.20: Two attribute example payoﬀ landscapes for two sellers at equilibrium, with
a heterogeneous population of spread buyers. Half of the buyers have budget constraints of
100:00, half of 200:00. s1 occupies the left peak and s2 occupies the right peak; the system is
at equilibrium.
On the left, x1s1 is ﬁxed at 100:00, on the right at 200:00. When competition begins, as was
shown in ﬁgure 6.17, the payoﬀ at each peak was equal, however once a competing oﬀer
is made, the payoﬀ available on the alternate peak to the competitor remains above that
available on the same peak. This is the case regardless of which niche is initially targeted.
This is borne out in competition over time, as two myoptimal sellers update their oﬀers
to remain at their global optimum. Figure 6.22 shows the eﬀect of competition over time on
each seller’s payoﬀ.
This analysis illustrates niching behaviour between two competing sellers in a population
of spread buyers. However, for larger number of sellers calculating the optimal decision for
each seller becomes increasingly more computationally expensive, since it relies on consid-
ering the combinations of sellers providing acceptable oﬀers to either, both or no market
segments. Equally, as the number of market segments increases, a similar problem will arise.
As with the single attribute model, analysing the eﬀect of many sellers or buyer proﬁles on the
payoﬀ landscape quickly becomes infeasible. Therefore as the market grows, computational
simulation is used instead.
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Figure 6.21: Maximum payoﬀ available to s2 in each market niche, as a single competitor’s
oﬀer varies. Left: The competitor ﬁxes x1s1 = 100:00 and x2s1 varies on the x-axis. Right:
The competitor ﬁxes x1s1 = 200:00 and x2s1 varies on the x-axis. The lines indicate the height
of each peak from s2’s perspective. The buyers are spread buyers.
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Figure 6.22: Payoﬀ available on each peak as a result of competition between two sellers. s2
occupies the left peak, s1 occupies the right peak. The buyers are spread buyers.
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6.6 Heterogeneous Buyer Preferences
Section 6.5 illustrated how market segmentation and niching may be induced by heteroge-
neous constraints on the acceptability of attribute values. However, market niching may
also be induced by agents’ heterogeneous preferences. In this thesis, the latter is termed
preference-induced niching, which is brought about by the existence of a tradeoﬀ between mul-
tiple desirable or undesirable attributes, between which an agent may have a preference.
At this stage it is important to highlight a diﬀerence in the treatment of price between some
literature largely arising from economics and that in the ﬁeld of marketing [122]. Typically in
marketing price is treated as one of many attributes to be optimised as part of the marketing
mix, in order to increase market share or maximise the proﬁt from a sales activity. Economists
however sometimes treat price as being separate from the attribute values, which describe
the product being exchanged at the given price. The diﬀerence is largely unimportant here,
therefore in line with more recent literature particularly on multiple attribute negotiation [123,
124], price is considered an attribute. In this case, two conﬂicting attributes as investigated
so far, are not suﬃcient to allow preference-induced niching to occur. In order to bring about
preference-induced niching, at least three attributes are required, once of which may of course
be price.
6.6.1 Monopolistic Scenario
Considering a seller qualitatively the same as in the previous examples, its additive utility
function might be extended to incorporate the third attribute, with linear attribute utility
functions, such that positive values of 1 lead to positive utility values and positive values of
2 and 3 lead to negative utility values. In this example its preference weights are 0:6; 0:2; 0:2
for attributes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Again it is important to stress that this is merely an
example seller used to explore the interactions between agents in the model being investigated.
Similarly, in this example the buyers’ behaviour is extended without a change in their
qualitative properties. A buyer’s additive utility function here contains linear attribute utility
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functions, such that positive values of 1 lead to negative utility values and positive values
of 2 and 3 lead to positive utility values. Note that this is the reverse direction from the
corresponding sellers, indicative of the direction of travel of the value of each attribute. In
this example the buyers are divided into two equally sized groups, with preference weights
0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 for attributes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
In both the two attribute and three attribute cases, in the absence of constraints both
buyers and sellers’ payoﬀs can be maximised by the attribute values being inﬁnite. We saw
with two attributes that given a budget constraint however, the buyers instead prefer those
sellers who maximise their price within the constraint, and then provide the most attractive
oﬀer in terms of the other attribute. The same eﬀect may be seen with three attributes.
Recall that if the buyer is given a budget constraint, such that x1b = 200:00, then the
oﬀer from any seller si in which x1si > 200:00 will be rejected as unacceptable. In this case,
the most attractive oﬀer from the buyer’s perspective will be that which maximises x2si and
x3si , while minimising x1si . However, since the buyer prefers higher values of x3si more than
lower values of x1si , due to its preference weights, a seller that chooses to increase both, in
order to meet this need will ﬁnd its oﬀer preferred to one which does not. Therefore the
sellers will increase in their oﬀer the attribute value which the buyers least prefer, but which
they themselves do. In this example, x1si is expected to reach an equilibrium value where
x1si = x
1
b = 200:00 and for competition to ensue on the other attributes, much as was
observed in section 6.4.2.
The visualisation of multiple attribute payoﬀ landscapes when the number of attributes
is greater than two is obviously more diﬃcult than in the two attribute case in the previous
sections. However, given an assumption that oﬀers by all sellers at equilibrium will be made
on the buyers’ budget constraint line, where a seller si’s oﬀer includes x1si = 200:00, the
visualisation of the sellers’ payoﬀ landscape may be made easier. The dimensionality of the
landscape is reduced by ﬁxing and excluding x1si .
Figure 6.23 therefore shows the payoﬀ gained by a seller s1 for selling one unit of resource
as x2s1 and x3s1 vary, where x1s1 = 200:00. As was the case previously, lighter blue represents
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Figure 6.23: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1 for selling one unit of
resource as x2s1 and x3s1 vary, where x1s1 = 200:00.
areas of high payoﬀ and red represents negative payoﬀ, darker red being the most negative.
Of course, as with ﬁgure 6.2 this landscape assumes a unit sale. However, as described
for the two attribute case in section 6.4.1, the buyers’ preferences and constraints will impact
upon this landscape. Figure 6.24 shows the modiﬁed payoﬀ landscape taking account of the
buyers’ characteristics.
Considering a heterogeneous buyer population, where the buyer population is split into
two halves with the preference weights 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 and 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 respectively, then these two
landscapes are reduced in height by half and then added together. The landscape therefore
has the appearance of those in ﬁgure 6.24 superimposed, as shown in ﬁgure 6.25.
Here there are three peaks in the payoﬀ landscape, one speciﬁc to each buyer proﬁle,
and one which represents a best compromise between them, at the intersection of the buyers’
reserve lines.
In ﬁnding this position, each buyer proﬁle’s reserve line is that which lies between the
points given by the buyer’s break-even value of each attribute, given a zero value of the other.
More precisely, in the three dimensional attribute space, a buyer b’s reserve plane will be that
which is deﬁned by the following equation:
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Figure 6.24: Three attribute example monopolistic payoﬀ landscapes for a seller s1 as x2s1 and
x3s1 vary, where x1s1 = 200:00. Left: the buyers have weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8. Right: the buyers
have weights 0:1; 0:8; 0:1.
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Figure 6.25: Three attribute example monopolistic payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1 as x2s1
and x3s1 vary, where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population is divided into two halves with
preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively.
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k1b u
1
b(x
1) + k2b u
2
b(x
2) + k3b u
3
b(x
3) = 0 (6.3)
For example, if a buyer’s attribute utility functions are linear as described in section 6.2.3,
weights 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 for attributes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, and x1 = 200:00, then the
buyer’s reserve line is therefore deﬁned by
  0:02 + 0:8x
2
1000
+
0:1x3
1000
= 0 (6.4)
To illustrate this in terms of ﬁgure 6.25, the line in equation 6.4 intersects the horizontal
axis at x2 = 25:00 and the vertical axis at x3 = 200:00.
The same method may be applied to the other buyer proﬁle, in order to obtain the inter-
secting reserve line and therefore the seller’s optimal oﬀer.
6.6.2 Competitive Scenario: Bargain Hunters
In a two-seller competitive scenario, the payoﬀ landscape will be structured similarly, but
here the intersection of the two lines will be at the competitor’s oﬀer. For example, if a single
competitor, s2 were to make an oﬀer of 200:00; 50:00; 100:00, then the payoﬀ landscape for
s1 would be as shown in the left plot of ﬁgure 6.26.
Dependent on the competitor’s oﬀer, though there remain three peaks in the payoﬀ land-
scape, their relative heights will vary, as also shown in ﬁgure 6.26. For example, if the
competitor’s oﬀer is suﬃciently low, as in the left plot, then only one is a global optimum,
that which is just above the intersection of the two lines. However, as shown in the right plot,
as the competitor’s oﬀer moves closer to s1’s own break-even line, then the central peak loses
attractiveness and the peaks are of more equal height. As the example landscapes in ﬁgure
6.27 illustrate, were s2’s oﬀer to move closer still to s1’s break even line, one or both of the
two outlying peaks may become more attractive than the central one.
Since s2’s oﬀer is positioned exactly at the intersection of the two lines, in order to take
advantage of the payoﬀ available just above it and target the central niche, s1 must increase
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Figure 6.26: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscapes for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1
vary, where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of bargain hunters, divided into
two halves with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. The lines in-
tersect at the competitor’s oﬀer. Left: s2 oﬀers 200:00; 50:00; 100:00. Right: s2 oﬀers
200:00; 200:00; 200:00.
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Figure 6.27: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscapes for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1
vary, where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of bargain hunters, divided into
two halves with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. The lines in-
tersect at the competitor’s oﬀer. Left: s2 oﬀers 200:00; 275:00; 275:00. Right: s2 oﬀers
200:00; 150:00; 350:00.
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Figure 6.28: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1 vary,
where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of bargain hunters, divided into two
halves with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. A competitor, s2
oﬀers 200:00; 310:00; 0:00.
either x2s1 or x3s1 or both by a small amount. Of course, from s2’s perspective, the intersection
of the lines is then shifted to the position of s1’s oﬀer, forcing it to do the same in order to
remain in this niche. The intersection moves further away from the origin, and as it does
so its attractiveness decreases with respect to the two outlying niches. This competition will
continue until either the payoﬀ available in the central niche is zero, or else low enough to
trigger a seller to move to one of the outlying peaks.
Once a seller chooses instead to target one of the outlying niches, its competitor is im-
mediately encouraged to do likewise. Consider that s2 makes an oﬀer at 200:00; 310:00; 0:00,
targeting the lower niche. The payoﬀ landscape for s1 is as shown in ﬁgure 6.28.
This move shifts the intersection of the lines back away from the sellers’ break-even line.
However, as before, as competition between the sellers ensues on this peak, the intersection
point shifts away from the origin and payoﬀ decreases. Figure 6.29 illustrates this.
As is now clear, the reduction of payoﬀ available on the peak being competed for leads to
an increasing diﬀerence in payoﬀ between the two niches. Eventually a seller will once again
switch to the other peak, and the process will begin again. Hence, regardless of which peak
is initially chosen by the sellers, the cyclical competition wars will continue.
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Figure 6.29: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscapes for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1 vary,
where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of bargain hunters, divided into two halves
with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. Competition ensues on the
lower peak as s2 oﬀers 200:00; 370:00; 0:00 (left) and later 200:00; 450:00; 0:00 (right).
As with section 6.5, when buyers act as bargain hunters, the presence of more than one peak
in the sellers’ payoﬀ landscape ensures that their myopic behaviour leads to an unending cycle
of competitive undercutting of oﬀers. This again is an example of the limit-cycle phenomenon
observed by Kephart et al. [9].
6.6.3 Competitive Scenario: Spread Buyers
Similarly to sections 6.4 and 6.5, the multiple attribute model is now considered where buyers
with heterogeneous preferences act as spread buyers rather than bargain hunters.
Clearly as before, the diﬀerence in the buyers’ decision function will not aﬀect the out-
come in the monopolistic case. However, once a competitor is present, the spread buyer
behaviour will manifest itself through the sellers’ payoﬀ landscapes. Accordingly, ﬁgure 6.30
shows the payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1, when responding to a competitor s2’s oﬀer of
200:00; 200:00; 200:00. The buyers are spread buyers, and the landscape is shown for the
cases when the buyers’ weights are 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:8. As with bargain hunters it is
assumed that sellers will oﬀer the equilibrium value for x1 of 200:00.
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Figure 6.30: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscapes for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1 vary,
where x1s1 = 200:00. One competitor s2 oﬀers 200:00; 200:00; 200:00. In each case the buyers
are a homogeneous population of spread buyers. Left: their preference weights are 0:1; 0:1; 0:8.
Right: their preference weights are 0:1; 0:8; 0:1.
As with the bargain hunter case, splitting the buyers into two equally sized proﬁles, with
preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively, the payoﬀ landscapes may be
thought of as being superimposed. Figure 6.31 shows the resulting payoﬀ landscape for s1.
Perhaps the most notable result of the buyers switching to spread buyer behaviour is that
there are no longer multiple peaks or niches in the sellers’ payoﬀ landscape. Instead, a large
central peak appears, at which the seller can maximise its payoﬀ.
Indeed in this example, a myoptimal seller maximising its payoﬀ would be expected to
oﬀer at the optimal market position of 200:00; 129:03; 129:03. Assuming s2 did so, s1 is then
faced with the landscape in ﬁgure 6.32.
As is now well rehearsed for spread buyers, an iterative process may be followed in order
to determine the equilibrium point in the attribute space. In this example, equilibrium is
reached when both sellers oﬀer 200:0; 114:81; 114:81. At this point, neither seller can increase
its payoﬀ by moving its oﬀer from this point, as illustrated by ﬁgure 6.33.
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Figure 6.31: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1 vary,
where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of spread buyers, divided into two halves
with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. One competitor s2 oﬀers
200:00; 200:00; 200:00.
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Figure 6.32: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1 vary,
where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of spread buyers, divided into two halves
with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. One competitor s2 oﬀers
200:00; 129:03; 129:03.
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Figure 6.33: Three attribute example payoﬀ landscape for a seller s1 as x2s1 and x3s1 vary,
where x1s1 = 200:00. The buyer population consists of spread buyers, divided into two halves
with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. One competitor s2 oﬀers
200:00; 114:81; 114:81. The system is at equilibrium.
6.7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, the single attribute posted oﬀer market model as introduced in chapter 3
was extended, in order that resources may be described over additional quality attributes.
Resource users may have diﬀerent preferences and constraints over the attributes, and as
such form niches in the market, into which providers may segment.
In scenarios where seller payoﬀ landscapes have multiple peaks, brought about by either
heterogeneous buyer constraints or by heterogeneous buyer preferences, myoptimal seller be-
haviour leads to limit-cycle wars, as observed in the qualitatively similar model studied by
Kephart et al. [9]. They argue that the combination of three factors cause these unstable
dynamics, ﬁrstly multiple peaks in the payoﬀ landscape as discussed, secondly the ability of
agents to possess suﬃcient knowledge of the landscape in order to identify where the global
optimum lies as well as move immediately to it, and thirdly the inability of myopic agents
to anticipate the response of their competitors. Given the example scenarios investigated in
this chapter, a fourth factor appears to be the presence of hyperrational bargain hunter style
behaviour on the part of buyers. Buyer behaviours which give rise to smoother seller payoﬀ
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functions, such as the spread buyers investigated here, can mitigate against the limit-cycle war
eﬀect and instead provide for a stable equilibrium.
Therefore, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• An extension of the posted oﬀer market-based approach to resource allocation, to con-
sider resources which may be described over multiple quality attributes in addition to
or in place of price.
• A potential extension to the buying and selling agents’ decision models, grounded in
multi-attribute utility theory, which enables them to consider the additional attributes
present in the extended model.
• A description of two potential causes of market segmentation, namely constraint-induced
niching, due to buyers’ heterogeneous constraints and preference-induced niching, due to
their heterogeneous preferences over attributes.
• Analysis of the dynamics of the system in a range of representative example scenarios,
where buyers are either bargain hunters or spread buyers. Limit-cycle or price wars are
observed where buyers act as bargain hunters, however their behaviour as spread buyers
mitigates this and instead leads to a stable, predictable equilibrium.
As with the diﬀerences between chapters 3 and 4, the idealised behaviour described by
Kephart et al. [9] and assumed in the analysis in this chapter, cannot be expected to be wholly
borne out in practical scenarios. The following chapter, chapter 7 will therefore investigate
the extended multiple attribute model where sellers have access to only private information,
by means of evolutionary simulation.
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CHAPTER 7
A DIVERSITY DILEMMA IN
EVOLUTIONARY MARKETS
The man who follows the crowd will usually get no further than the crowd. The man who walks alone is
likely to ﬁnd himself in places no-one has ever been.
Alan Ashley-Pitt
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This chapter investigates the extended multiple attribute market model introduced in
chapter 6, in simulation, through the use of evolutionary market agents introduced in chapter
4. Through evolutionary simulations, it is shown that resource providing nodes using evo-
lutionary market agents are able to position themselves in the niches predicted in chapter 6,
thereby providing levels of quality attributes appropriate to the users. However, it is further
shown how algorithmic artifacts may distort this to varying degrees, due to a dilemma faced
by evolutionary sellers between a maintaining high population diversity to perpetuate search
and a low diversity to exploit a market position and hence gain a higher payoﬀ. This dilemma
is illustrated using a parameterised hypermutation operator.
Of course, the dilemma between maintaining high diversity for exploration and low diver-
sity for exploitation is not new. Indeed, in a discrete choice form it is often characterised in
terms of a family of bandit problems, which quickly become very diﬃcult to solve analytically,
even for relatively small cases [125]. The problem is also well known in the evolutionary com-
putation community [126] and according to Holland a classic problem aﬀecting all adaptive
and learning systems [127].
However, what is investigated here is diﬀerent from those evolutionary cases previously
studied, due to the online nature of the ﬁtness evaluation. Particularly, in classical evolu-
tionary search and optimisation, the goal is that one individual within the population ﬁnds
the optimum. In the case studied here, performing a ﬁtness evaluation on a given individual
in the population counts towards the total ﬁtness which is obtained by the algorithm over
time. The goal in optimising the tradeoﬀ presented by the diversity dilemma exposed in this
chapter is to maximise total payoﬀ over time, calculated across all ﬁtness evaluations.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 demonstrates through
the use of simulation results, that evolutionary market agents, as introduced in chapter 4 and
without modiﬁcation are able to position sellers in market niches, by considering a conjoint
utility value for each oﬀer as that oﬀer’s ﬁtness value in the evolutionary algorithm. In section
7.2 the number of sellers ﬁnding each niche is examined, and it is demonstrated that the
standard evolutionary market agent algorithm can lead to uneven segment sizes. Section 7.3
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describes the population diversity dilemma which explains why the uneven segments occur
and sellers are unable to obtain the optimal payoﬀ. The dilemma is explored in section 7.4 by
means of a parameterised hypermutation operator, which frames the dilemma as a tradeoﬀ in
the algorithm’s design parameters. Section 7.5 examines what behaviour might be expected
of self-interested sellers in the context of the diversity dilemma. Finally, section 7.6 concludes
the chapter with a discussion.
7.1 Demonstrating Market Segmentation
We have seen so far how the model introduced and investigated in earlier chapters may be
extended to take account of multiple attributes, and we have further seen the eﬀect of multiple
attributes on market dynamics with myoptimal sellers. However, as discussed in chapter 4,
the use of myoptimal sellers in this analysis makes the assumption that sellers have access to
global information about their payoﬀ landscape, which in turn requires up to date knowledge
of all other agents in the system, including the buyers’ utility functions. This is considered
private information, which is not generally available. The evolutionary market agent algorithm
however is a heuristic approach, which makes use only of local, private information.
7.1.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, as with chapter 5, the focus is on spread buyer behaviour. Firstly, this is since
it was shown in chapter 4 that the combination of evolutionary market agents and bargain
hunters leads to instability, and secondly that in the multiple peak landscapes arising from
the multiple attribute model, bargain hunters lead to a cyclical competitive dynamic, known
as limit-cycle wars between sellers. By contrast, spread buyers were shown to lead to stable
and predictable outcomes, due to the smooth nature of their payoﬀ functions.
In the context of the evolutionary market agent algorithm, the conjoint utility measure
provided by the multi-attribute utility function is therefore seen as the payoﬀ associated with
a certain oﬀer, and hence used as a ﬁtness measure for each agent’s evolutionary algorithm.
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The initial experimental setup consisted of 20 seller agents and 1000 buyer agents trading
a resource  with two attributes, 1 and 2, notionally price and quality respectively. Both
buyer and seller populations had homogeneous linear attribute utility functions, such that
attribute 1 was desirable to the sellers but undesirable to the buyers, while attribute 2 was
undesirable to the sellers but desirable to the buyers. In terms of the additive utility model’s
scaling constants, sellers were given the weights 0:7, 0:3, while buyers were given the weights
0:3, 0:7. The exact values of these weights, and their symmetry, proved not to be important,
however they were found to provide a good range within the attribute space for feasible oﬀers.
7.1.2 Constraint-induced Niching
Constraints, as introduced in section 6.5, were used to generate market segmentation or
niching. Each buyer had a hard budget constraint, in terms of attribute 1, notionally price,
such that any oﬀer for which x1 was greater than this constraint is rejected as unacceptable by
that buyer. The value of each buyer’s budget constraint was drawn with equal probability from
one of two Gaussian distributions, with a relatively low standard deviation when compared
with the oﬀer space as a whole. The means of these distributions were 100:00 and 200:00. This
is similar to the scenario investigated in section 6.5, when heterogeneous buyer constraints
are ﬁrst studied.
Figure 7.1 shows the position of each of the 20 sellers’ oﬀers in the attribute space, at a
given point in time. Recall that each point, each oﬀer in the attribute space is the result of an
independent evolutionary algorithm, and that no information is shared between algorithms.
The vertical lines in each plot represent the buyers’ budget constraints in terms of attribute
x1 , which varies horizontally. The upper and lower diagonal lines represent the break even
lines for the sellers and buyers respectively. These features are derived from their utility
functions and preference weights as described in chapter 6, and may be compared with the
features on, for example, the payoﬀ landscape in ﬁgure 6.17.
As can be clearly seen, from an initial random distribution, sellers’ oﬀers quickly found the
feasible region between the two diagonal lines. The oﬀers then segmented, converged to two
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niches, one for each subset of the buyer population. The system subsequently remains stable,
other than for ongoing small mutations about the centre of each niche. In summary, the seller
agents self-organise to the predicted equilibrium values for their oﬀers’ attributes. The ﬁnal
plot in ﬁgure 7.1 may be compared with the peaks in the equilibrium payoﬀ landscapes shown
in ﬁgure 6.20.
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Figure 7.1: Evolution of the oﬀers in the attribute space through time for a typical simulation
run. Each circle represents an individual seller’s oﬀer. The space between the diagonal lines
is the feasible region in which oﬀers are acceptable to both the buyers and sellers. The two
vertical lines indicate the means of the Gaussian distributions from which the buyers’ budget
constraints are drawn. Evolutionary market agents lead the sellers to ﬁnd the niches created
by the buyers’ heterogeneous budget constraints.
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7.1.3 Preference-induced Niching
Chapter 6 also described how market segmentation may be brought about by heterogeneous
preferences on the part of buyers, rather than directly through budget constraints. In this
next series of simulations, the scenario described in section 6.6 is reproduced, where a third
attribute 3 is added. Here, sellers make use of the additive utility model, with linear attribute
utility functions, such that positive values of 1 lead to positive utility values and positive
values of 2 and 3 lead to negative utility values. In this example the sellers’ preference
weights are 0:6; 0:2; 0:2 for attributes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Buyers also make use of the
additive utility model with linear attribute utility functions, such that positive values of 1
lead to negative utility values and positive values of 2 and 3 lead to positive utility values.
In the ﬁrst baseline simulation, buyers are homogeneous with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8
for attributes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Figure 7.2 shows the evolution of the sellers’ oﬀer
for a typical simulation run with this homogeneous population of buyers.
The plots in this ﬁgure can be compared with with the payoﬀ landscape shown in ﬁgure
6.30, where the optimal oﬀer is for the sellers to minimise the buyers’ least preferred attribute,
x2 and instead compete to provide x3 . This is indeed what is observed in simulation, as
shown in ﬁgure 7.2, and a stable equilibrium is reached.
Interestingly, as section 6.6 illustrated, when the buyer population has heterogeneous
preferences, spread buyer behaviour rather than bringing about market segmentation as with
bargain hunters, instead led to an equilibrium payoﬀ landscape where the optimal oﬀer was a
compromise which targeted neither of the two buyer proﬁles fully. As with the analysis in sec-
tion 6.6, in the next simulation the buyer population is divided into two equally sized groups,
with preference weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 for attributes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Figure 7.3 shows the evolution over time of the sellers’ oﬀers for a typical run of this
simulation. As with the homogeneous case in ﬁgure 7.2, the evolutionary market agents lead
the sellers to reach equilibrium as predicted in the landscape analysis presented in section
6.6. Of note also in this particular example is that the sellers’ oﬀers do not converge tightly
to the peak in the payoﬀ landscape. Due to the lack of a sharp peak, as seen in the other
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Figure 7.2: Evolution of the oﬀers in the attribute space through time for a typical simulation
run with three attributes. Attribute x2 is on the horizontal axis, x3 on the vertical. Each
circle represents an individual seller’s oﬀer. The blue line represents the sellers’ break-even
line when x1 = 200:0. The buyers are homogeneous with weights 0:1; 0:1; 0:8. Evolutionary
market agents lead the sellers to ﬁnd the equilibrium oﬀer, where provision is focused on
attribute x3 at the expense of x2 , according to the buyers’ weights.
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Figure 7.3: Evolution of the oﬀers in the attribute space through time for a typical simula-
tion run with three attributes. Attribute x2 is on the horizontal axis, x3 on the vertical.
Each circle represents an individual seller’s oﬀer. The blue line represents the sellers’ break-
even line when x1 = 200:0. The buyers are divided into two equal proﬁles, with weights
0:1; 0:1; 0:8 and 0:1; 0:8; 0:1 respectively. Evolutionary market agents lead the sellers to reach
equilibrium, where oﬀers represent a compromise between both buyer proﬁles.
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landscapes, they instead remain relatively spread out across the plateau which exists in this
particular example.
Finally, the assumption that sellers would always oﬀer a value of x1 at the buyers’ budget
constraint, which underlies the validity of these ﬁgures, should be checked. In all the simu-
lations in this section, this was found indeed to be the case. Figure 7.4 shows the evolution
of sellers’ oﬀers for x1 across the 30 independent runs of the ﬁnal simulation. The budget
constraint, which serves as the equilibrium value for x1 was 200:00.
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Figure 7.4: Evolution of mean attribute x1 values through time in the simulation depicted in
ﬁgure 7.3. Mean and standard deviation shown over 30 independent runs. The sellers’ oﬀers
ﬁnd the buyers’ budget constraint and remain there.
7.2 Quantifying Market Segmentation
Section 7.1 showed that sellers’ use of evolutionary market agents allows them to ﬁnd and
position their oﬀers market niches that are otherwise unknown to them. However, it is also
clear from the results in ﬁgure 7.1 that the sellers are not evenly split between the niches. In this
and the following sections, the behaviour of sellers in the scenario described in section 7.1.2
is investigated further. Figure 7.5 shows for that experiment the number of sellers positioned
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Figure 7.5: Number of sellers in each market segment. Segment A, that at the left niche,
repeatedly contains fewer sellers than segment B, at the right niche.
within a radius of 30 from the centre of each niche for this experiment, as the simulation
progresses. Mean and standard deviation are shown for 30 independent runs.
That this is not optimal seller behaviour can be veriﬁed by looking at the payoﬀs the sellers
obtain in each niche. Figure 7.6 shows the mean payoﬀs, along with their standard deviation,
for the sellers in each segment, over time. The sellers in the left segment, call it segment A
are generally obtaining a higher payoﬀ than those in the right segment, segment B. However,
their payoﬀ is highly unpredictable, indicated by the very high standard deviation across the
independent runs. Conversely, the sellers in segment B are obtaining a lower payoﬀ, though
are highly stable over time.
The question then arises of why the sellers in segment B do not move their oﬀers to the
niche occupied by segment A, given the increased likelihood of obtaining a higher payoﬀ for
doing so. Indeed, beyond iteration 1000, there is relatively little change in either segment
size or payoﬀ. This is due to the lack of diversity in the sellers’ populations of oﬀers after
this stage in the simulation. Since the populations are highly converged, making a jump to
the more attractive niche is very unlikely.
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Figure 7.6: Mean and standard deviation seller payoﬀs for each segment. The payoﬀ for
sellers in segment A, the lower valued niche, is greater though highly unpredictable. The
payoﬀ for segment B is lower though more stable.
7.3 The Diversity Dilemma
Of vital importance when considering the behaviour of evolutionary sellers in this simulation
is that since the seller has no model of the market, in order to obtain a ﬁtness value for an oﬀer
in its population, it must test this oﬀer in the live market. This is due to information being
private and therefore a seller has no knowledge of the buyers or behaviour of its competitors,
other than that which may be inferred through the payoﬀ returned from its actions. Performing
a ﬁtness evaluation on a given oﬀer in the population therefore counts towards the total payoﬀ
which is obtained by the seller over time.
Since every ﬁtness evaluation counts, once a seller can be sure it has found the best
position for its oﬀer, it can maximise its payoﬀ over time by always taking that position. In
terms of the evolutionary algorithm, this means the seller’s population of oﬀers converging
to that point, losing all diversity.
However, a seller can never be sure it has found this position, since even if it is at a local
optimum, a better position may exist in the attribute space. This is what we observe occurring
in the simulation results described in section 7.2. In order for a seller to ﬁnd a position in
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the attribute space which would lead to a higher payoﬀ, or indeed to gain conﬁdence that
there does not exist such a position, the seller must perform a search. In the context of the
evolutionary algorithm, this search requires population diversity.
Since the evolutionary market agent algorithm has been hitherto tested primarily in single
attribute environments with single equilibria, it is no surprise that the algorithm favours an
initial search period with high population diversity, in which the equilibrium is found, followed
by a loss of diversity in the population, as the discovered position may be exploited to obtain
maximum payoﬀ. In scenarios such as that investigated in this chapter however, where from
the perspective of the algorithm more than one peak exists, a diﬀerent approach to the
diversity dilemma may be needed.
7.4 Exploring the Diversity Dilemma
The focus in this section is to explore the diversity dilemma described in section 7.3, and
attempt to mitigate its eﬀect on the overall payoﬀ which a seller achieves. As discussed at the
beginning of this chapter, the problem of population diversity management in evolutionary
computation is not new, and indeed increased population diversity is a characteristic which
is often found to be desirable in evolutionary algorithms applied to dynamic optimisation
problems [78]. Methods of diversity preservation include immigrant schemes, random restarts
and hypermutation [128]. This thesis does not claim that any particular approach is any better
suited to the diversity dilemma investigated here than any other, however in this section an
example of a diversity preservation technique is used in order to characterise the diversity
dilemma. Speciﬁcally, hypermutation is adopted as it has been shown to preserve diversity
without discarding as much information as alternative schemes such as random restarts [128].
However, the approach employed departs from hypermutation as originally presented in
that rather than rely upon a trigger, such as a drop in evolutionary ﬁtness, to initiate the
increase in mutation factor, instead the hypermutation is triggered randomly. In the scenario
investigated, it is indeed not clear what might constitute an eﬀective trigger, since it is not a
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Figure 7.7: Number of sellers in each market segment. The addition of hypermutation allows
sellers to continue to move between niches throughout the simulation, without requiring a
higher base mutation factor.
drop in ﬁtness or a lack of diversity per se which indicates the need for an increased search.
Instead, as described in section 7.3, any seller could at any time be in a suboptimal market
position without knowledge of this. Therefore, a hypermutation is performed instead of a
regular mutation with a very small probability, each time a mutation is made.
In the ﬁrst hypermutation experiment described, the occurrence of a hypermutation event
caused the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution from which the mutation factor
was drawn to increase from 3:0 to 50:0 for that mutation only. Each time a mutation was due
to be performed, a hypermutation was instead made with probability 0:01. All else remained
the same as the simulation described in section 7.1.
Figure 7.7 shows that despite the initially converged populations being similar to in the
version without hypermutation, the addition of random hypermutation allows sellers in seg-
ment A to move occasionally to segment B in order to take advantage of the higher payoﬀ
available.
As the number of sellers in segment A increases, so the market share served by each seller
decreases, and conversely so for segment B. This is reﬂected in the payoﬀ obtained by the
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Figure 7.8: Mean and standard deviation seller payoﬀs for each segment. The addition of
hypermutation leads to both more equitable and stable payoﬀs between the two segments.
sellers, illustrated in ﬁgure 7.8. It is clear that ability of even a small number of sellers to
move to the more proﬁtable segment A leads to a somewhat more equitable payoﬀ between
the segments. However, more importantly, the addition of the hypermutation operator allows
the sellers to continue to move between niches throughout the simulation, without requiring
a higher base mutation rate and despite their converged populations.
This result in itself is useful, however even given hypermutation, we still do not observe
the segments’ respective payoﬀs equalising within any reasonable time, rather drifting to-
gether at a slow pace. The rate of equalisation may be increased by increasing the level of
hypermutation. In the following set of experiments, the hypermutation operator was modiﬁed
such that, when triggered, the subsequent n mutations were hypermutations. The probability
of a hypermutation occurring remained the same.
Here the mean payoﬀ of the sellers in each segment, calculated between iterations 4000
to 4999 is recorded. This proved to be late enough such that the sellers’ populations had
completed their initial convergence period, such that any observed population diversity and
subsequent movement is due to mutation or hypermutation. Figure 7.9 shows the mean and
standard deviation of these values, calculated over for 30 independent simulation runs, plotted
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Figure 7.9: Mean sellers’ payoﬀ after convergence, by segment, calculated over 30 independent
runs, as the number of hypermutations, n, increases. As n grows, the segments’ payoﬀs
become more equitable.
as the number of hypermutations per hypermutation occurrence, n varies. Similarly, ﬁgure
7.10 shows the mean of the standard deviations between the sellers’ payoﬀs in each run, again
calculated over the same 30 independent runs.
As ﬁgure 7.9 shows, increasing the number of hypermutations performed, n, leads to
increasingly equitable payoﬀs between the sellers, as an increasing amount of movement is
facilitated between the niches, and they become less uneven in size. However, there is a
price to pay for this equity; this increase in diversity brought about by more hypermutation
leads also to an increasing standard deviation between the sellers’ payoﬀs, as shown in ﬁgure
7.10. Since the sellers’ populations are more diverse, and the evaluation of each individual
contributes towards the total payoﬀ, this result can be expected.
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Figure 7.10: Standard deviation between the sellers’ payoﬀs after convergence, by segment,
calculated over 30 independent runs, as the number of hypermutations, n, increases. As n
grows, the standard deviation between the sellers’ payoﬀs within the segments also increases.
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7.5 Expected Seller Behaviour
The discussion in section 7.4 is largely conducted from the perspective of the system as a
whole, from a bird’s eye view, where information about all sellers is available. However, this
information is of course not available to the individual sellers, who rely only upon private
information. What behaviour then should we expect of self-interested sellers’ evolutionary
market agents, with regard to the diversity of their populations?
Figure 7.11 shows the mean payoﬀ and standard deviation over all sellers in the system,
during the converged phase between iterations 4000 and 4999, regardless of their position
or payoﬀ. This may be interpreted as an expectation of a seller’s payoﬀ during this phase.
Again, the number of hypermutations n is varied on the horizontal axis.
Firstly, these results show that the highest expected payoﬀ may be achieved by using no
hypermutation at all, when n is zero. However, this comes at a high price in terms of the
certainty of the expectation, indicated by the high accompanying standard deviation amongst
the sellers. This is because, as was shown, there is a chance of the seller ﬁnding a niche which
it shares with relatively few competitors. However, this is not guaranteed, and the payoﬀ it
receives will be much lower if it ﬁnds only the more populated niche. Figures 7.5 and 7.6
illustrated this.
By adopting a small amount of hypermutation (i.e. n = 1), a seller can dramatically
increase its chance over time of ﬁnding the more proﬁtable niche and hence the certainty of
the expectation. This comes at a small but signiﬁcant cost to its expected payoﬀ.
The highest degree of certainty was achieved by sellers in this simulation by performing
a small number of hypermutations. Values for n between 2 and 4 give rise to the lowest
standard deviations, again with a small penalty in the expected payoﬀ.
Larger number of hypermutations however led to a decrease in the level of certainty with
which a seller would obtain the expected payoﬀ, and a decrease in the expected payoﬀ itself.
Despite that from the perspective of the system as a whole, this leads to more equitable payoﬀs
and evenly sized segments, this behaviour is hard to motivate from a seller’s perspective.
Rather, it would be expected that sellers might choose between maximising their expected
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Figure 7.11: Mean of and standard deviation between the sellers’ payoﬀs after convergence, for
all sellers, calculated over 30 independent runs, as the number of hypermutations n increases.
Rational sellers face a choice between a high expected payoﬀ with a low certainty, and a
lower expected payoﬀ with a greater certainty. High levels of hypermutation do not appear
beneﬁcial.
payoﬀ, at a cost of certainty, or else sacriﬁce a small amount of expected payoﬀ in order to
buy a greater amount of certainty over their payoﬀ. This is how the diversity dilemma may
be characterised from a seller’s perspective, and either option leads to the greatest likelihood
being an uneven balance of sellers between the segments.
7.6 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter the extended multiple attribute market-based approach to resource allocation,
as introduced in chapter 6 was further investigated by means of evolutionary simulation. As
with the simulations in chapters 4 and 5, resource providers use evolutionary market agents to
decide the oﬀers for their resources, in a posted oﬀer market mechanism.
It was shown that evolutionary market agents are able to position sellers’ oﬀers in the market
niches identiﬁed in chapter 6, providing stable and predictable levels of a quality attribute
appropriate to the users. However, a dilemma faced by evolutionary sellers was highlighted,
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between maintaining a high population diversity to facilitate search and a low diversity to
exploit a market position and hence gain a higher payoﬀ. This dilemma was illustrated and
characterised using a parameterised hypermutation operator.
We have learnt that the standard evolutionary market agent algorithm can lead to sellers
self-organising to uneven segment sizes, since populations of oﬀers with low diversity are
unlikely to move between niches. As a result, sellers are unable to obtain the optimal payoﬀ.
We further learnt that by introducing a randomly triggered hypermutation operator, sellers
become more likely to move between niches in order to obtain a higher payoﬀ, making the
segment sizes more even. This leads to an increased certainty of achieving the expected
payoﬀ. Certainty comes at a cost however, as increased diversity also means that sellers must
accept a slightly lower overall expected payoﬀ.
It seems likely that sellers’ dilemma is therefore between a higher expected payoﬀ but
with low certainty of achieving it, or a slightly lower expected payoﬀ with a higher degree
of certainty. The levels of diversity required to achieve truly even segment sizes and ﬂuid
movement between segments are unlikely to be realised by self-interested sellers, since in this
case both the expected payoﬀ and the certainty are reduced.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• Experimental evidence that sellers with access to only private information, using evolu-
tionary market agents are able to position themselves in the market niches identiﬁed in
chapter 6. The approach is suﬃcient to generate market segmentation.
• The description of a dilemma facing evolutionary sellers, between maintaining a high
population diversity in order to continue to search the attribute space, and a low pop-
ulation diversity with which to exploit their current best known oﬀer.
• The characterisation of the diversity dilemma, through the use of a randomly triggered
hypermutation operator, in terms of high expected payoﬀ but with low certainty, and a
lower expected payoﬀ with a higher certainty.
• Analysis which suggests that self-interested sellers are unlikely to choose a balance in
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the diversity tradeoﬀ which would lead to an expectation that the number of sellers in
each segment would be representative of its demand.
Since nothing in the implementation of the agents or evolutionary algorithm is speciﬁc
to the particular way in which the niches in the market were generated, though they were
carried out when the multiple peak landscape was generated through constraint-induced nich-
ing, we expect that the results obtained here will apply equally to other forms of market
niching. Nevertheless, it will be important to conﬁrm this experimentally in more complex
systems, particularly as Kephart et al. [9] note that multiple peaks may well be the norm in
computational markets, as such landscapes may be generated by a wide range of causes.
It is important to note that this chapter does not argue that hypermutation should be a
preferred way of framing the described sellers’ diversity dilemma or method of tackling it;
the operator is used merely as an exploratory tool. Therefore, though the tradeoﬀs faced
by sellers appear to be inherent to the system itself, other diversity mechanisms could lead
to potentially more attractive positions within a tradeoﬀ. This will of course depend on
the objectives of a particular resource provider, and there is therefore signiﬁcant scope for
numerous other diversity mechanisms to be explored in this context.
Indeed, the hypermutation approach employed here is likely to be suboptimal in a land-
scape about which sellers have some information. The approach of making large jumps leads
more often to a loss of payoﬀ rather than the ﬁnding of a more attractive peak. Alterna-
tive approaches might therefore include modifying the evolutionary algorithm to make some
sort of directed hypermutation, using knowledge obtained about the structure of the payoﬀ
landscape in previous iterations. Of course, as with payoﬀ information in the currently used
algorithm, it would be important to acknowledge and mitigate against the eﬀects of out of
date landscape information, as is done with the stochastic operators discussed in section 4.6.
Of course, these ideas and niching itself are not new in the study and development of
evolutionary algorithms [129]. However, since the niching described here is concerned with
the proximity of oﬀers, each of which is the result of an independent evolutionary algorithm
rather than an individual within a single population, it is unclear what crossover from pre-
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vious understanding and techniques might be possible. Since each evolutionary algorithm
acts independently of the others as it converges to a particular point in the attribute space,
no landscape information is shared between algorithms. Any such sharing between algo-
rithms would require private market information to be shared between independent sellers,
something which is ruled out by the model and often illegal in real markets.
An important direction for future work will be to investigate the presence of competitive
limit-cycle dynamics, as shown to be the case with bargain hunters or more stable niching, as
seen with spread buyers when the buyer population contains a mix of strategies. Section 4.5.3
showed that in the single attribute case, when the proportion of bargain hunters increases in a
population consisting otherwise of spread buyers the stable load balanced outcome obtained
with spread buyers degrades gracefully. It will be useful to know if similar eﬀects are observed
in the multiple attribute case.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We know next to nothing about virtually everything. It is not necessary to know the origin of the universe;
it is necessary to want to know. Civilization depends not on any particular knowledge, but on the
disposition to crave knowledge.
George Will
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This thesis has presented a resource allocation problem motivated by an emerging compu-
tational paradigm: dynamic, decentralised and massively scalable component-based systems.
Making use of the retail-inspired posted oﬀer mechanism, a fully decentralised, evolution-
ary market-based solution was proposed, which uses competitive co-evolution between self-
interested sellers to achieve desired outcome resource allocations. No central or regional
coordination is required, nor is any cooperation between agents. The success of this ap-
proach was illustrated against a range of resource allocation objectives, including in chapters
3 and 4 an evenly balanced load, in chapter 5 additional stable uneven outcome allocations
and in chapters 6 and 7 allocations of resources with multiple quality attributes, appropriate
to a heterogeneous population of users.
Crucially, the approach assumes not only a lack of cooperation between agents but also
self-interest. Since it accounts for such self-interested utility maximising behaviour, it is more
suited to the motivating scenarios than other decentralised approaches. Unlike many market-
based systems, the approach requires no central or regional point of control or coordination,
such as an auctioneer or specialist. Only private information is available to the agents, as
sellers have no knowledge of the size of the market, the last accepted price, the number of
competitors or any history. The approach is highly scalable with respect to the number of
participating nodes in the system. The time taken for the system to converge to close proximity
of the predicted outcome allocation appears to to grow asymptotically to the number of service
providing nodes. Additionally, the system has no point which is weaker than any other, and
is hence robust to node failure.
Throughout, three buyer behaviour models were considered, hyperrational bargain hunters,
lightweight time savers and risk averse spread buyers, each representative of diﬀerent realistic
characteristics. Buyer behaviour models with a step in their decision function were found to
lead to unstable, erratic outcome allocations. Those with smooth decision functions however,
such as spread buyers, led to highly accurate and stable allocations, as well as being robust to
small changes in price. It was further shown that this performance degrades gracefully as the
proportion of buyers with step functions in the population increases.
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Many of the eﬀects described by this thesis were done so through the use of a range of
example scenarios and objectives. In each example, the predicted equilibria in the system
were analysed and these results compared with those from evolutionary simulations. A major
contribution of this, in addition to supporting the claim that particular outcome allocations
can be obtained, is to describe and demonstrate a methodology for determining the outcome
resource allocation, in the presence of a given conﬁguration of agents. A description was
given of how the methodology may easily be extended to cover additional buyer behaviour
models not covered here. This generic methodology will be useful in future scenarios and
speciﬁc embodiments, when further node behaviours need to be considered.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
More speciﬁcally, this thesis provides the following contributions:
• A novel approach to the allocation of computational resources in fully decentralised
systems using self-interested agents, based on the retail-inspired posted oﬀer market
model.
• A methodology for the game theoretic analysis of instances of the approach, enabling
the prediction of resulting outcome resource allocations, for a given population of
agents.
• A description of how the approach may be applied in order to obtain an evenly balanced
load across a decentralised network of resource providing nodes, in the absence of
central coordination or cooperation.
• A method for determining suitable parameters for agents in the system in order to bring
about additional stable outcome resource allocations. This is achieved transparently to
the resource users.
• An extension to the approach, in which resources may be described in terms of multiple
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quality attributes. Analysis demonstrates that market segmentation in this extended ap-
proach can enable resources to be provided with quality of service attributes determined
appropriately and proportionally to a heterogeneous population of users.
• A novel agent strategy using evolutionary computation to determine good price and
quality attributes for resources, capable of obtaining the predicted outcome allocations
using only private information.
• Analysis of the performance of the mechanism when user agents are endowed with
a range of diﬀerent decision making behaviours, and the impact of diﬀerent buyer
decision functions.
While other related approaches to that presented do exist, speciﬁcally those which use
bilateral bargaining or participation in multiple auctions, the method in this thesis requires
less complex reasoning on the part of participating agents. Furthermore, the method proposed
is evaluated against its ability to produce desired global outcome resource allocations, such
as evenly and unevenly balanced loads. This is not the case of other proposed market-
inspired resource allocation techniques. Despite this, the approach taken does not preclude
the use of more complex cognitive or otherwise strategic agents. Importantly however, this
thesis demonstrates that the simple agents described are suﬃcient to bring about the desired
resource allocations under the assumptions of decentralisation and self-interest.
This is signiﬁcant, since it will permit designers of systems operating on networks with
these characteristics to elicit desired global resource allocations without a high computational
cost on individual nodes and without their cooperation. This ensures that the usage of nodes’
resources for functional tasks rather than management of the network can be maximised.
Furthermore, the scalability and robustness properties of the approach, in particular that of
graceful degradation in the presence of disruptive nodes or node failure, ensure that operators
of such systems do not need to be as concerned with the impact of such disruptions. This is
not the case with systems which require central or regional coordination.
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It is important at this stage to also identify weaknesses with the approach and analysis
presented. Two assumptions present in the model may be particularly relevant. Firstly there
is an assumption throughout this work that network connectivity is uniform, and a viable
broadcast capability exists. These assumptions are in fact commonplace in related work,
though in embodiments of the model this may not be as straightforward as assumed. Indeed,
if message passing is expensive or there exists no way to eﬀectively broadcast oﬀers without
relying on other nodes, then additional costs involved in this would need to be added to the
model. In particular, if competing nodes are being relied on to forward messages at a cost,
then this may aﬀect the dynamics of the market itself, since decisions made in both message
passing and resource provision will aﬀect each other.
A further consideration in certain embodiments may be the technical infeasibility or else
potential performance hit as a result of breaking a task up into several, indeed many sub-
tasks as is done here. If there are additional costs associated with this, then these should be
quantiﬁed and also built into the model.
8.2 Future Work
The future directions identiﬁed for this work fall into a number of distinct areas. An important
next step in making the approach available to system designers will be the embodiment of the
studied model in relevant architectures. The model presented in this thesis is purposefully
generic and abstract, with the objective of being generally applicable to those classes of
system which possess its characteristics: decentralisation, self-interested nodes and generic
componentised resources. For this reason, speciﬁc technical restrictions and capabilities are
not considered here. Therefore, for the approach to be useful in, for example grid systems,
compute clusters, cloud and service oriented computing, an important next step is the design
or extension of architectures in order to embody the model.
When truly independent self-interest is present, it will be important to consider more
complex high level strategies for both buyers and sellers. These will include those able to
167
make use of historical information, as well as those which make use of diﬀerent approaches
to strategy learning, such as the Gjerstad-Dickhaut [116] and Roth-Erev [117] algorithms. The
outcomes from this should be compared with existing results and mixed populations also.
Crucially, the strategies presented in this thesis act as price takers, despite the eﬀect they
have on the market. Higher level strategies may be able to exploit this by moving the market
in the short term in order to gain a longer term payoﬀ. As discussed in chapter 3, other buyer
behaviours should also be considered. Sticky buyers for example, who might prefer to continue
using service providers which they have previously used unless there is signiﬁcant reason to
switch, provide a model of potentially highly realistic behaviour. There are of course virtually
limitless potential buyer behaviours which could be studied, and this will be made easier by
the contribution of a generic methodology for this analysis as presented in this thesis.
It is likely that realistic scenarios will be highly dynamic, where resource providing nodes
may be added to or removed from the system during its operation. In addition, the population
of resource users may change over time, and there may also be external disturbances. It will
be desirable for the system to automatically adjust to such changes, and also to be able to
predict how quickly this is achieved. As techniques further develop for the application of
evolutionary computation to dynamic optimisation problems, it is likely that this approach
will continue to be useful. Nevertheless this is clearly an area where further work would be
valuable.
Not least due to future development in the direction of more dynamic scenarios, further
design and tuning of the evolutionary algorithm used in the sellers’ evolutionary market agents
can be expected to improve system performance. Despite a small amount of experimental
analysis in chapter 3 of the performance of diﬀerent variants of the algorithm used, this
thesis does not claim that this particular evolutionary algorithm is optimal for this purpose;
it is merely used to represent the application of an evolutionary process to the problem
studied. Further analysis of the algorithm, especially in dynamic environments, will be useful
in identifying improvements.
Particularly, market based approaches are widely considered to be highly robust, and
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the approach presented here, since it it requires no central or regional coordination points,
appears to be so. In understanding fully the weaknesses of the evolutionary approach, it will
be important to perform more detailed analysis and experimentation in order to quantify this.
For example, once equilibrium is reached and a resource allocation stabilised, how robust is
this to minor disturbances? This will be particularly relevant in the multiple attribute case,
when disturbances in one market segment may impact upon those in another.
Finally, market-based control techniques have been applied to a variety of other real world
scenarios other than purely computational ones. Examples of this include air-conditioning
control [13] and transport logistics [130] amongst others. The generic nature of the approach
presented in this thesis will likely be equally applicable in these scenarios, where the charac-
teristics of self-interest and decentralisation are present.
169
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] P. R. Lewis, P. Marrow, and X. Yao, “Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation
in decentralised systems,” in Parallel Problem Solving From Nature - PPSN X, vol. 5199
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1071–1080, Springer, 2008.
[2] P. R. Lewis, P. Marrow, and X. Yao, “Evolutionary market agents and heterogeneous
service providers: Achieving desired resource allocations,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
Congress on Evolutionary Computation, pp. 904–910, 2009.
[3] P. R. Lewis, P. Marrow, and X. Yao, “Resource allocation in decentralised computational
systems: An evolutionary market based approach,” Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 143–171, 2010.
[4] P. R. Lewis, P. Marrow, and X. Yao (named inventors), “Load balancing in a data net-
work.” European Patent Application No. 08252953.8, ﬁled September 2008. UK Patent
Application No. 0905439.6, ﬁled March 2009. US / Canadian Patent Application No.
PCT/GB2009/002135, ﬁled September 2009. Korean Patent Application No. A31728
KRw, ﬁled September 2009. Holder: BT PLC.
[5] I. Foster and C. Kesselman, eds., The Grid: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure.
Morgan-Kaufman, 1999.
[6] R. Buyya, C. S. Yeo, and S. Venugopal, “Market-Oriented Cloud Computing: Vision,
Hype, and Reality for Delivering IT Services as Computing Utilities,” in 2008 10th IEEE
International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications, pp. 5–13,
IEEE, 2008.
[7] M. P. Singh and M. N. Huhns, Service-Oriented Computing: Semantics, Processes, Agents.
Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2005.
170
[8] J. Yang, “Web service componentization,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 46, no. 10,
pp. 35–40, 2003.
[9] J. O. Kephart, J. E. Hanson, and J. Sairamesh, “Price-war dynamics in a free-market
economy of software agents,” in Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Ar-
tiﬁcial Life, (Cambridge, MA, USA), pp. 53–62, MIT Press, 1998.
[10] M. He, N. R. Jennings, and H.-F. Leung, “On agent-mediated electronic commerce,”
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 985–1003,
2003.
[11] M. P. Papazoglou, P. Traverso, S. Dustdar, and F. Leymann, “Service-oriented comput-
ing: Research roadmap.” 2006.
[12] K. Lai, “Markets are dead, long live markets,” ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 5, no. 4,
pp. 1–10, 2005.
[13] S. H. Clearwater, ed., Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Alloca-
tion. Singapore: World Scientiﬁc, 1996.
[14] R. Wolski, J. Plank, J. Brevik, and T. Bryan, “Analyzing market-based resource allo-
cation strategies for the computational grid,” International Journal of High Performance
Computing Applications, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 258, 2001.
[15] D. Cliﬀ and J. Bruten, “Simple bargaining agents for decentralized market-based con-
trol,” Tech. Rep. HPL-98-17, HP Laboratories, Bristol, UK, 1998.
[16] F. Hsu, Behind Deep Blue: Building the Computer that Defeated the World Chess Champion.
Princeton University Press, 2002.
[17] A. L. Beberg, D. L. Ensign, G. Jayachandran, S. Khaliq, and V. S. Pande, “Folding@home:
lessons from eight years of distributed computing,” in IEEE International Symposium on
Parallel and Distributed Processing (IPDPS), pp. 1–8, 2009.
[18] E. A. Brewer, “Lessons from giant-scale services,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 5, no. 4,
pp. 46–55, 2001.
[19] V. Cardellini, M. Colajanni, and P. S. Yu, “Dynamic load balancing on web server sys-
tems,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 28–39, 1999.
171
[20] T. Eymann, M. Reinicke, O. Ardaiz, P. Artigas, L. D. de Cerio F., Freitag, R. Messeguer,
L. Navarro, D. Royo, and K. Sanjeevan, “Decentralized vs. centralized economic co-
ordination of resource allocation in grids,” Lecture notes in computer science, pp. 9–16,
2004.
[21] R. Alfano and G. D. Caprio, “TURBO: An autonomous execution environment with scal-
ability and load balancing features,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Distributed
Intelligent Systems: Collective Intelligence and its Applications (DIS’06), pp. 377–382, 2006.
[22] O. Ardaiz, P. Artigas, T. Eymann, F. Freitag, L. Navarro, and M. Reinicke, “The catal-
laxy approach for decentralized economic-based allocation in grid resource and service
markets,” Applied Intelligence, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 131–145, 2006.
[23] V. Ramasubramanian and E. G. Sirer, “Perils of transitive trust in the domain name
system,” Tech. Rep. TR2005-1994, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA, 2005.
[24] J. Cao, D. P. Spooner, S. A. Jarvis, and G. R. Nudd, “Grid load balancing using intelligent
agents,” Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 135–149, 2005.
[25] J. S. A. Bridgewater, P. O. Boykin, and V. P. Roychowdhury, “Balanced overlay networks
(BON): An overlay technology for decentralized load balancing,” IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, pp. 1122–1133, 2007.
[26] S. Surana, B. Godfrey, K. Lakshminarayanan, R. Karp, and I. Stoica, “Load balancing
in dynamic structured peer-to-peer systems,” Performance Evaluation, vol. 63, no. 3,
pp. 217–240, 2006.
[27] R. Buyya, D. Abramson, J. Giddy, and H. Stockinger, “Economic models for resource
management and scheduling in grid computing,” Concurrency and computation: practice
and experience, vol. 14, no. 13-15, pp. 1507–1542, 2002.
[28] P. Rodriguez and E. W. Biersack, “Dynamic parallel access to replicated content in the
internet,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 455–465, 2002.
[29] R. Chang, M. Guo, and H. Lin, “A multiple parallel download scheme with server
throughput and client bandwidth considerations for data grids,” Future Generation Com-
puter Systems, vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 798–805, 2008.
[30] S. U. Khan and I. Ahmad, “Non-cooperative, semi-cooperative, and cooperative games-
based grid resource allocation,” in 20th International Parallel and Distributed Processing
Symposium, 2006, p. 10, 2006.
172
[31] D. K. Begg, S. Fischer, and R. Dornbusch, Economics. London, UK: McGraw-Hill, 7th ed.,
2002.
[32] M. N. Rothbard, “Free market,” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.
http://www.econlib.org/.
[33] R. M. Starr, “Commodity money equilibrium in a Walrasian trading post model: An
example.” eScholarship Repository, University of California, 2006.
[34] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Micro-Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
[35] E. D. Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth. London, UK: Random House Business Books,
2007.
[36] A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations. Everyman’s Library, reprint ed., 1991.
[37] Ebay. http://www.ebay.com/.
[38] D. Cliﬀ, “Minimal-intelligence agents for bargaining behaviors in market-based envi-
ronments,” Tech. Rep. HPL-97-91, HP Labs, Bristol, UK, 1997.
[39] D. P. Friedman and J. Rust, The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evi-
dence. Boulder, Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1993.
[40] S. Phelps, S. D. Parsons, and P. McBurney, “An evolutionary game-theoretic compari-
sion of two double-auction market designs,” in Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Agent
Mediated Electronic Commerce, (New York, NY, USA), 2004.
[41] A. Byde, “A comparison between mechanisms for sequential compute resource auc-
tions,” in Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-agent Systems, (Hakodate, Japan), 2006.
[42] E. David, A. Rogers, N. R. Jennings, J. Schiﬀ, S. Kraus, and M. H. Rothkopf, “Opti-
mal design of english auctions with discrete bid levels,” ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 12, 2007.
173
[43] N. R. Jennings, P. Faratin, A. R. Lomuscio, S. D. Parsons, C. Sierra, and M. Wooldridge,
“Automated negotiation: Prospects, methods and challenges,” International Journal of
Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 199–215, 2001.
[44] A. Byde, “Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design,” in IEEE
International Conference on E-Commerce, pp. 347–354, 2003.
[45] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm, “Self-interested automated mechanism design and impli-
cations for optimal combinatorial auctions,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 132–141, ACM Press, 2004.
[46] D. Cliﬀ, “Explorations in evolutionary design of online auction market mechanisms,”
Journal of Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 162–175, 2003.
[47] H. A. Simon, Reason in Human Aﬀairs. Stanford University Press, new ed., 1983.
[48] M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, ch. The Methodology of Positive Economics,
pp. 3–43. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
[49] R. L. Keeney and H. Raiﬀa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value
Tradeoﬀs. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976.
[50] K. Binmore, Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2007.
[51] J. V. Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton,
NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 3rd ed., 1953.
[52] J. Nash, “Equilibrium points in n-person games,” in Proceedings of the National Academy
of the USA, vol. 36, pp. 48–49, 1950.
[53] J. M. de Bornier, “The ’cournot-bertrand debate’: A historical perspective,” History of
Political Economy, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 623–654, 1992.
[54] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
[55] G. Kendall, X. Yao, and S. Y. Chong, The Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma: 20 Years on. ”World
Scientiﬁc”, 2007.
174
[56] Y. Cheung, S. Bedingﬁeld, and S. Huxford, “Monitoring and interpreting evolved be-
haviours in an oligopoly,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Evolu-
tionary Computation, pp. 697–701, 1997.
[57] L. Tesfatsion and K. Judd, Handbook of computational economics. Elsevier, 2006.
[58] J. M. Epstein and R. L. Axtell, Growing Artiﬁcial Societies. Washington, DC, USA: Brook-
ings Institutional Press, 1996.
[59] D. F. Midgley, R. E. Marks, and L. G. Cooper, “Breeding competitive strategies,” Man-
agement Science, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 257–275, 1997.
[60] M. Wooldridge and N. R. Jennings, “Intelligent agents: Theory and practice,” Knowledge
Engineering Review, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 115–152, 1995.
[61] A. Sengupta, D. V. Greetham, and M. Spence, “An Evolutionary Model of Brand Com-
petition,” in IEEE Symposium on Artiﬁcial Life 2007, pp. 100–107, IEEE, 2007.
[62] R. E. Marks, “Niche Strategies: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Computer Tournaments Revis-
ited.” 1989.
[63] R. Axelrod, “The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,” in Genetic
algorithms and simulated annealing (L. Davis, ed.), pp. 32–41, London: Pittman, 1987.
[64] J. H. Holland, Adaptation in natural and artiﬁcial systems: An introductory analysis with
applications to biology, control, and artiﬁcial intelligence. MIT Press, 1975.
[65] L. J. Fogel, Artiﬁcial Intelligence Through Simulated Evolution. New York, NY, USA: John
Wiley and Sons Inc, 1966.
[66] I. Rechenberg, Evolutionsstrategien: Optimierung technischer Systeme nach Prinzipien der
biologischen Evolution. Stuttgart, Germany: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973.
[67] X. Yao, “An overview of evolutionary computation,” Chinese Journal of Advanced Software
Research, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 12–29, 1996.
[68] A. E. Eiben and J. E. Smith, Introduction to Evolutionary Computing. Heidelberg: Springer
Verlag, 2003.
175
[69] X. Yao and Y. Xu, “Recent advances in evolutionary computation,” Journal of Computer
Science and Technology, vol. 21, pp. 1–18, January 2006.
[70] X. Yao and P. J. Darwen, “An experimental study of n-person iterated prisoner’s
dilemma games,” in Selected papers from the AI’93 and AI’94 Workshops on Evolutionary
Computation, Process in Evolutionary Computation, (London, UK), pp. 90–108, Springer-
Verlag, 1995.
[71] S. Y. Chong, P. Tino, and X. Yao, “Measuring Generalization Performance in Co-
evolutionary Learning,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 12, no. 4,
pp. 479–505, 2008.
[72] S. Y. Chong, P. Tino, and X. Yao, “Relationship Between Generalization and Diversity
in Coevolutionary Learning,” IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in
Games, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 214–232, 2009.
[73] Y. S. Son and R. Baldick, “Hybrid coevolutionary programming for nash equilibrium
search in games with local optima,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation,
vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 305–315, 2004.
[74] K. De Jong, “Learning with Genetic Algorithms: An Overview,”Machine Learning, vol. 3,
pp. 121–138, October 1988.
[75] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[76] S. Phelps, M. Marcinkiewicz, S. D. Parsons, and P. McBurney, “Using population-
based search and evolutionary game theory to acquire better response strategies for
the double-auction market,” in Proceedings of Trading Agent Design and Analysis Work-
shop, International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, (Rochester Hills, MI, USA),
pp. 21–27, IJCAI, 2005.
[77] P. Vytelingum, D. Cliﬀ, and N. R. Jennings, “Analysing buyers’ and sellers’ strategic
interactions in marketplaces: An evolutionary game theoretic approach,” in Proceedings
of the 9th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, (Hawaii, USA),
pp. 141–154, 2007.
[78] J. Branke, Evolutionary Optimization in Dynamic Environments. Kluwer, 2001.
[79] J. Greﬀenstette, “Genetic algorithms for changing environments,” in Proceedings of the
Second International Conference on Parallel Problem solving from nature, (Amsterdam, The
Netherlands), pp. 137–144, Elsevier, 1992.
176
[80] H. G. Cobb, “An investigation into he use of hypermutation as an adaptive operator
in genetic algorithms having continious, time-dependent nonstationary environments,”
Tech. Rep. Memorandum Report 6760, Navy Research Lab, 1990.
[81] P. Rohlfshagen and J. A. Bullinaria, “Alternative splicing in evolutionary computation:
Adaptation in dynamic environments,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Congress on Evolution-
ary Computation, pp. 2277–2284, 2006.
[82] J. Branke, “Memory enhanced evolutionary algorithms for changing optimization
problems,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 3,
pp. 1875–1882, 1999.
[83] A. Gupta, D. O. Stahl, and A. B. Whinston, “The economics of network management,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 42, pp. 57–63, September 1999.
[84] T. L. Casavant and J. G. Kuhl, “A taxonomy of scheduling in general-purpose dis-
tributed computing systems,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 14, no. 2,
pp. 141–154, 1988.
[85] V. Walia, A. Byde, and D. Cliﬀ, “Evolving market design in zero-intelligence trader
markets,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, pp. 157–163,
IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[86] S. Phelps, P. McBurney, and S. Parsons, “Evolutionary mechanism design: a review,”
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 237–264, 2009.
[87] M. Esteva and J. Padget, “Auctions without auctioneers: Distributed auction protocols,”
in Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, vol. 1788, ch. II, pp. 20–28, Berlin, Germany:
Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[88] D. Hausheer and B. Stiller, “Peermart: The technology for a distributed auction-based
market for peer-to-peer services,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Communications, vol. 3, pp. 1583–1587, 2005.
[89] H. Kikuchi, S. Hotta, K. Abe, and S. Nakanishi, “Distributed auction servers resolving
winner and winning bid without revealing privacy of bids,” in Proceedings of the Seventh
International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops, (Washington,
DC, USA), p. 307, IEEE Computer Society, 2000.
177
[90] J. Niu, K. Cai, S. Parsons, E. Gerding, P. McBurney, T. Moyaux, S. Phelps, and D. Shield,
“JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition,” in Proceedings of the 7th in-
ternational joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: Demo papers,
pp. 1649–1650, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems, 2008.
[91] C. A. Waldspurger, T. Hogg, B. A. Huberman, J. O. Kephart, and S. Stornetta, “Spawn: A
distributed computational economy,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 18,
no. 2, pp. 103–117, 1992.
[92] E. H. Gerding, R. K. Dash, D. C. K. Yuen, and N. R. Jennings, “Optimal bidding strate-
gies for simultaneous vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes,” in Proceedings of the 8th
Workshop on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, (Hakodate, Japan), 2006.
[93] E. H. Gerding, R. K. Dash, D. C. K. Yuen, and N. R. Jennings, “Bidding optimally in con-
current second-price auctions of perfectly substitutable goods,” in Sixth International
Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-07), (Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA), pp. 267–274, 2007.
[94] T. Eymann, “Co-evolution of bargaining strategies in a decentralized multi-agent sys-
tem,” in AAAI Fall 2001 Symposium on Negotiation Methods for Autonomous Cooperative
Systems, 2001.
[95] T. Eymann, B. Padovan, and D. Schoder, “The catallaxy as a new paradigm for the
design of information systems,” in Proceedings of the 16th World Computer Congress of the
International Federation for Information Processing, 2000.
[96] T. Eymann, M. Reinickke, O. Ardaiz, P. Artigas, F. Freitag, and L. Navarro, “Self-
organizing resource allocation for autonomic networks,” in Database and Expert Systems
Applications, 2003. Proceedings. 14th International Workshop on, pp. 656–660, 2003.
[97] E. H. Gerding and J. A. La Poutré, “Bilateral bargaining with multiple opportunities:
Knowing your opponent’s bargaining position,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 45–55, 2006.
[98] F. Lopes, M. Wooldridge, and A. Q. Novais, “Negotiation among autonomous com-
putational agents: principles , analysis and challenges,” Artiﬁcial Intelligence Review,
vol. 2008, no. 29, pp. 1–44, 2008.
[99] A. Chandra, P. S. Oliveto, and X. Yao, “Co-evolution of optimal agents for the alternat-
ing oﬀers bargaining game,” in EvoApplications, vol. 1, pp. 61–70, 2010.
178
[100] C. R. Plott and V. V. L. Smith, “An experimental examination of two exchange institu-
tions,” The Review of economic studies, pp. 133–153, 1978.
[101] J. Ketcham, V. L. Smith, and A. W. Williams, “A comparison of posted-oﬀer and double-
auction pricing institutions,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 595–614,
1984.
[102] S. Jagannathan and K. C. Almeroth, “Price issues in delivering e-content on-demand,”
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 18–27, 2002.
[103] R. Wang, “Auctions versus posted-price selling,” The American Economic Review, vol. 83,
no. 4, pp. 838–851, 1993.
[104] R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, “Eﬃcient mechanisms for bilateral trading,”
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 265–281, 1983.
[105] A. Chavez, A. Moukas, and P. Maes, “Challenger: A multi-agent system for distributed
resource allocation,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Autonomous
Agents, 1997.
[106] L. Xiao, Y. Zhu, L. M. Ni, and Z. Xu, “GridIS: An incentive-based Grid Scheduling,” in
Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium,
p. 65b, 2005.
[107] K. Kuwabara, T. Ishida, Y. Nishibe, and T. Suda, “An equilibratory market-based ap-
proach for distributed resource allocation and its applications to communication net-
work control,” in Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation
(S. H. Clearwater, ed.), pp. 53–73, Singapore: World Scientiﬁc, 1996.
[108] S. Jagannathan, J. Nayak, K. Almeroth, and M. Hofmann, “On pricing algorithms for
batched content delivery systems,” Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, vol. 1,
pp. 264–280, 2002.
[109] S. Phelps, P. McBurney, S. Parsons, and E. Sklar, “Co-evolutionary auction mechanism
design: A preliminary report,” Lecture Notes in Ccomputer Science, pp. 123–142, 2002.
[110] E. J. Anderson and T. D. H. Cau, “Modeling implicit collusion using coevolution,” Op-
erations Research, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 439–455, 2009.
179
[111] T. C. Price, “Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in
markets,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 219–254, 1997.
[112] A. R. Greenwald and J. O. Kephart, “Shopbots and pricebots,” Proceedings of the Sixteenth
International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 506–511, 1999.
[113] M. Ripeanu and I. Foster, “Peer-to-peer architecture case study: Gnutella network,” in
Proceedings of International Conference on Peer-to-peer Computing, vol. 101, 2001.
[114] S. Ratnasamy, P. Francis, M. Handley, R. Karp, and S. Schenker, “A scalable content-
addressable network,” in Proceedings of the 2001 SIGCOMM conference, vol. 31, pp. 161–172,
2001.
[115] P. Eugster, R. Guerraoui, A. Kermarrec, and L. Massoulie, “Epidemic information dis-
semination in distributed systems,” Computer, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 60–67, 2004.
[116] S. Gjerstad and J. Dickhaut, “Price formation in double auctions,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1–29, 1998.
[117] A. E. Roth and I. Erev, “Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and
simple dynamic models in the intermediate term,” Games and economic behavior, vol. 8,
no. 1, pp. 164–212, 1995.
[118] L. Zeng, B. Benatallah, A. H. H. Ngu, M. Dumas, J. Kalagnanam, and H. Change,
“QoS-Aware Middleware for Web Services Composition,” IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, vol. 30, pp. 311–327, 2004.
[119] M. Barbuceanu and W.-K. Lo, “Multi-attribute utility theoretic negotiation for electronic
commerce,” in Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce III, Current Issues in Agent-Based Elec-
tronic Commerce Systems, (London, UK), pp. 15–30, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[120] G. P. Huber, “Multi-attribute utility models: A review of ﬁeld and ﬁeld-like studies,”
Management Science, vol. 20, no. 10, pp. 1393–1402, 1974.
[121] G. W. Torrance, M. H. Boyle, and S. P. Horwood, “Application of multi-attribute utility
theory to measure social preferences for health states,” Operations Research, vol. 30,
no. 6, pp. 1043–1069, 1982.
[122] P. R. Dickson and J. L. Ginter, “Market Segmentation, Product Diﬀerentiation, and
Marketing Strategy,” The Journal of Marketing, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 1–10, 1987.
180
[123] S. S. Fatima, M. Wooldridge, and N. R. Jennings, “An agenda-based framework for
multi-issue negotiation,” Artiﬁcial Intelligence, vol. 152, pp. 1–45, 2003.
[124] S. S. Fatima, M. Wooldridge, and N. R. Jennings, “Optimal negotiation of multiple
issues in incomplete information settings,” in Third International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems - Volume 3 (AAMAS’04), (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 1078–1085, 2004.
[125] W. G. Macready and D. H. Wolpert, “Bandit problems and the exploration/exploitation
tradeoﬀ,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 2–22, 1998.
[126] A. E. Eiben and C. A. Schippers, “On evolutionary exploration and exploitation,” Fun-
damenta Informaticae, vol. 35, pp. 1–16, 1998.
[127] J. H. Holland, “Genetic algorithms,” Scientiﬁc American, vol. 267, no. 1, pp. 66–72, 1992.
[128] H. G. Cobb and J. J. Grefenstette, “Genetic algorithms for tracking changing en-
vironments,” in Proceedings of the 5th international conference on genetic algorithms,
pp. 523–530, 1993.
[129] P. Darwen and X. Yao, “Every niching method has its niche: Fitness sharing and im-
plicit sharing compared,” in Parallel Problem Solving from Nature—PPSN IV, p. 398–407,
Springer, 1996.
[130] P. Davidsson, L. Henesey, L. Ramstedt, J. Törnquist, and F. Wernstedt, “An analysis of
agent-based approaches to transport logistics,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging
Technologies, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 255–271, 2005.
181
